Abstract. Since the antiquity consciousness, the mind, reason, and the living being have been founded on an individual basis. Only the language condition provided the opportunity to speak of a community in first instance. Nevertheless, from nature consciousness and mind are no isolated entities. That each consciousness is bound to any other and that only the membrane is forming the condition to make them separated entities is shown in connection with another faculty, projection. It must reveal that collective consciousness is the real ground and that only instances of orientation and perspectivity may constitute the position of the common consciousness which is taken up from phenomenology (Sartre, Husserl). In the second part collective consciousness is related to morals in order to provide arguments that, on the double background of genetics and the patrimony, a common stance of responsibility is the appropriate one.

“Le concept de transcendantal et son corrélatif, le concept de transcendant, nous devrons les puiser exclusivement dans notre méditation philosophique. Remarquons à cette égards que, si le moi réduit n’est pas une partie du monde, de même, inversement, le monde et les objets du monde ne sont pas des parties réelles de mon moi. On ne peut les trouver dans ma vie psychique à titre de parties réelles de cette vie, comme un complexus de données sensorielles ou d’actes psychiques.”^[[1]] As the title indicates, two main avenues will have to be pursued in the following, one that belongs to the core of classical and theoretical history, the other to ethics. Even if they are handled in a parallel manner, the second relies on the first. Its main destination consists in showing that the human substance has a collective basis or that human consciousness as the representative of it must be conceived of as having a root, an actual stance, and a common perspectivity (as well as projectivity) that is collective. This needs explanation, however, to speak of an avenue was mainly due to the entrenched counter-frame in which Western thinking has constituted the substance (as a correlative of the material atome),^[[2]] the individual, person, subject, ens, and finally the I to fan out the segments of a common nod, substantialization as singularization (or individualization). As will be seen, contemporary argumentation in the field of genetics and ethics is adherent to this, so, according to the destination, the claim will be that the entity which has to be made responsible for maintaining (especially on technical terms), safeguarding, and protecting the human patrimony is a collective (and not only a common or general) one. Obviously, the introductory passage stemming from Husserl’s First Cartesian Meditation, takes the counter-direction in that it tries to circumscribe a peculiar attitude of consciousness resulting from the έποχή, that will make the I the centre (or pole) of reflection^[[3]]. Against which the world and le Moi (taken up form the French translation in a Sartrean context) are totally falling apart, i.e. no one has to be considered as a part of the other. Regarding the wording, it is fairly reminiscent of, in particular, Leibniz who taught that “chaque substance est comme un monde à part, independent de toute autre chose hors de Dieu.”^[[4]] Due to his mirror theorem, which purports every substance has to be conceived of as the unique counterpart of the actual universe he, however, did not abstain from designating the substance, together with its ‘proper’ pronome (against the plural and the indefinite other ones), to be the bearer of a world in itself^[[5]]. A world, taken seriously, should not only comprise a complexity but also plurality (or ‘Mannigfaltigkeit’), even more an indefiniteness as regards infinity, that, when is it taken on grounds of reality, will enable the explanation of the counterpart, the unity or substance. If both imply one another on the same level, the metaphysical, and in a sense of necessary precondition that hereafter may lead to logical ordination, then it will not be the case that the substance is rendered only until it has reached the realm of self- or individual reflection. Without solely resorting to this argument, it is this way of inclusion the following argumentation will hold even if, as indicated, it will have to leave the tradition.

“Un point du moins est clair dès le début : une fois exécutée cette réduction [phénoménologique], si nous parcourons le flux des multiples vécus qui seule subsiste à titre de résidu transcendantal, nous ne nous heurtons nulle part au moi pur comme à un vécu parmi d’autres vécus, qui naîtrait avec le vécu dont serait un fragment et s’évanouirait à nouveau avec lui. Le moi paraît être là constamment, même nécessairement, et cette permanence n’est manifestement pas celle d’un vécu qui s’entête stupidement, d’une « idée fixe ». Il appartient plutôt à tout vécu qui survient et s’écoule ; son « regard » se porte sur l’objet « à travers » (durch) tout cogito actuel.”^[[6]].

Part of Leitideen für eine Phänomenologie, Husserl demonstrates that to live one’s self (me) entails the common possibility of a field of consciousness (champs de conscience) where it means “an original fragment of something that is lived,” or “un vécu parmi d’autres vécus.” Alledgedly, it is not pure, and Sartre will recall this as the transcendental I, reliant on le Pour-soi, that, within conscience, trancendents le champs irréfléchie or Pour-soi pré-reflexif^[[7]], intermediate stage as it already implies the cogito. He explains that in this field, as representing the non-aware (subliminal or unconscious) and projecting the temporal dimensions, there is also a common root or cell, if not nod^[[8]], where past, future, and present are indistinguishable (“dans les limbes de l’inconscient [...] il nous est impossible de discerner en eux le passé du futur.).”^[[9]] It is the regard, that helps Husserl to maintain the possibility of “converting” un flux du vécu into cogitations actuelles (the reside of the self, me).^[[10]] On account of Sartre, he surpasses and even straightforwardly goes back on geometrical language (apart form horizon and perspective) in order to claim for “l’ombre projetée du Pour-soi réfléchi [qui] possède naturellement un futur dégradé en en-soi et qui fait corps avec elle en déterminant son sens.”^[[11]] If really projected, and even if the reflective, as the source of consciousness, is projecting “un psychique pourvu des trois dimensions temporelles,”^[[12]] the axis that delivers and is rendering this primordial, constitutive, and irresolvable transformation of conscience, i.e. there will be no one that does not appertain to, must guarantee the reverse too. As projection everywhere (or necessarily) has at least a two-fold generation, it is not only “la forme psychique [qui] n’est pas « à être », elle est déjà faite;. elle est déjà tout entière, passé, présent, avenir, sur le mode « a été ».^[[13]] So when the I is coming up, solely representing a fragment of the lived among the other fragments which form the flux of consciousness, it will be projected to itself (leaving the question if it should not equally be seen as a necessary one even if different from the Cartesian, and Husserlian transcendental one).^[[14]] More, and beginning to focus the scope of the title above, the ‘items’ and the “evidence avec laquelle le psychqiue se donne à l’intuition de la réflexion pure,”^[[15]] and if really it is projection that explains the centre root of the performance (not leaving the question about the human faculties and the inclusion of projection which is strongly affirmed by natural visuality),^[[16]] will not only be things, bodies, and objects (as materially shaped) of the world, on the one hand, and fragments of the psychical vividness on the other where the I, condensed by έποχή or “polarisation”,^[[17]] is sensing itself (or where it would have to be felt according to the earlier inner sense [Kant]). Above all, and by predominant contiguity, i.e. a necessary possibility, there will have to be also the other living beings, though not as external bodies rather than minds sharing their common (uninterrupted) internality: Actual, impressing consciousness(es) which keep their proper shape (intersection and possible superimposition), impact, affection and appertaining entire establishment that, by means of geometrical language, would have to be called their perspectivities (as the natural condition) and projectivities (as the inherent realm of possibility).^{[ [18]]}
“Si, par impossible, vous entriez «dans» une conscience, vous seriez saisis par un tourbillon et rejetés au-dehors, près de l’arbre, en pleine poussière, car la conscience n’a pas de « dedans »; elle n’est rien que le dehors d’elle-même et c’est cette fuite absolue, ce refus d’être substance, qui la constituent comme une conscience.”^[[19]] Taking his departure from an image and denouncing the traditional mind as devouring and digesting the outer world, Sartre leaves the following (and well-known) conclusion. Instead of any resiliation into ideas, it is intentionality which constitutes consciousness. As Kant, however, it leaves the consciousness with analogous areas or spheres: A relation to the subject, another to the object, and a final relation to objects as objects of thinking at all (“Gegenstände des Denkens überhaupt” which, in a proper understanding, should conform to the task of έποχή).^[[20]] Sartre, being unhappy with this division that unwillingly reflects the transcendental ideas, finally concludes that the intentionalities (p.e. hate, love, fear, or sympathy) are not only manners of decovering the world: “Ce sont les choses qui se dévoilent soudain à nous [comme haïssables, sympathiques, horribles, aimables].”^[[21]] And revealing an objective “propriety” (like a mask that really does threaten), they are also at once prompting the internal life (“la vie intérieure”) which, according to Sartre, evokes the apparent solution that “finalement tout est dehors, tout, jusqu’à nous-mêmes: dehors, dans le monde, parmi les autres [ou] homme parmi les hommes.”^[[22]]
Once again, consciousness has proven for orientation and the axis that has to be made liable for all the renderings of its bundled representation(s), i.e. the essential forming of perception. Like Husserl – up to recent interpretation in the field of Kant, Leibniz or even Gadamer^[[23]] – Sartre did not reflect on using geometrical (or mechanical) terms belonging to projection (or gravitation as regards the material world). Yet his observation that an attitude that, centering on the vanishing point (“la fuite”), must absorb the substance the mind otherwise is bestowing itself with, should not be passed over. Above all, if the axis provides, as shown, convertibility (the tradition holds to become manifest in cases of identity between intentio recta and intentio obliqua),^[[24]] why should not the once centre of reflection (or έποχή) totally convert into the second centre, thus merging with the horizon of the outer ‘things’ – without, of course, loosing or leaving the fundamental projective relation. Husserl himself, as mentionned, had termed it “the second kind of polarization” where the cogito or “Moi identique, actif ou passif, vit dans tous les états vécus de la conscience et, à travers ceux-ci, se rapporte à tous les pôles-objets.”^[[25]]
Without leap, healing (or otherwise confirming) the argument, these poles should be able to settle objectivity so that external objects as bodies and shapes determining the mind must coincede with forms of representation the mind has formed by itself.^[[26]] More and further, without any communicative means (language or signs, diagrams)^[[27]] consciousness as being perceived should become convergent on the one emanating from the perceiving. And instead of making inroad into projective terms like the horizon (or fusion of horizons), fuite and point of view, they should be taken systematically together on proper grounds including the concept of axis in order to come into grips with (a) the full amount of human-like consciousness behaviour, (b) the settlement of the substance, and (c) the distinction of interiority (we prefer instead of internality) and exteriority (and the same).
According to (a) and taking the side of Kant, cardinal tenets have to be crossed. The coincidence of inner and outer sense is well founded, however the outcome by reason of projection as the root cause or real centre of consciousness is very different. First, body and mind are not simply (or necessarily) falling apart, reminiscent of a long Cartesian, Spinozean, Leibnizian tradition:

“Ich, als denkend, bin ein Gegenstand des inneren Sinnes, und heiße Seele. Dasjenige, was ein Gegenstand äußerer Sinne ist, heißt Körper.”^[[28]] = das Verhältnis zu den Gegenständen im Raume gibt das Kommerzium mit Körpern.”.

As soon as the inner sense is addressed, it will not necessarily fall into absolute privacy, a realm of obligatory discreteness or even enclosure. It is abstraction and coincident reflection that will make the spheres different, and in particular will resolve any interiority into a mental one, instead of releasing the relationship into a reciprocal two- or manifold ingression and egression of perceptions on the same level. This should not be restricted to be logically one-fold, however on fundamental grounds it leaves the real possibility. And because it is projection which yields both the possibility and the balance, and hence (on natural grounds) must include polarity, a real and at the same time natural process of focussing and being focussed, the I will no longer rely on reflection but on polaric diversion (besides a thing or fact, Fichte in his Wissenschaftslehre does not observe).

[A.]. “Nun kann ich von einem denkenden Wesen durch keine äußere Erfahrung, sondern nur durch das Selbstbewußtsein die mindeste Vorstellung haben. Also sind dergleichen Gegenstände nichts weiter, als die Übertragung dieses meines Bewußtseins auf andere Dinge, welche nur dadurch als denkende Wesen vorgestellt werden”^[[29]].

One wonders why this open contradiction, regarding the speaking mind, has had such little reception More, how the underlying conception, as it supersedes the claim of universal apperception by means of a projecting act of (self-)consciousness did not make its way into the commonday as well as distinctive interpretation of idealism.^[[30]] On purpose(s) aforementioned, Kant’s claim (in a sense of representative or paradigmatic dogma), though, should meet rejection and refutation at the same time – the human mind is capable of immediately perceiving perceptions and representations, even wordly communications of another one (if also willing so, and being receptive in this proper sense) so that a “thinking being” becomes real through experience and any condition of the outer world. Or, when the possibility is real to project one’s self-consciousness onto, and even into, another one, if this one is willing to perceive, then it must be convertible on grounds of projection which, by essence, is a convertible relation,^[[31]] and deliver the reciprocal experience so that the actual consciousness is eventually projected onto, and even into the perceiving one, i.e. in Kant’s spelling, the mine. The negation does no go with projection or not (which would be against the natural equipment)^[[32]] but with perspectivity or projectivity, and in the last case the projective relation holds between items that, even if bundled and transferred, are not bound to perspectivity.^[[33]]

Fig.1: Focal series

(In order to instantiate according to the figure, the projectivity may represent a series of historic conditions of a person (the relative nods P, P’, P’’) under the influence of two axes which together are not bound by a historian and his personal view. For that purpose, a Pascalean condition must enter in order to include the whole situation by perspectivty.^[[34]] According to a recently reviewed critique of positivist historiography, that of Péguy,^[[35]] one axis may represent social credits as family and group development, school learning and qualifications, the other social claims and liabilities appertaining to colleagues, friends / partners, supervisors, societal ‘rulers’, latent or not: P’ to P’’ would mark the manifest proportion in the life of P, a sensible shift. As the method is reliant on projection, the question how the image of P’’ in P would have to be rendered, is left open, it would depend on the “sommet de la courbe du mouvement,” which, notably, does not encompass a whole “anthropogéographie.”)^[[36]]
Regrasping (b), the settlement of the substance, one is getting into grips with a new solution (which is not the Spinozean or Spinozistic). First, as revealing the substance is dependent on projection and the necessarily involved axis, thus on having polarized the energy in order to perform a center of perception, the Sartrean attitude where the I seems void (“tout est dehors, au monde, parmi les hommes”) is only a portion or segment of a fan of possible attitudes (and the above figure is already helpful but for full representation both the outer and the inner spheres would have to be rendered in each case of alternating perceptive situation). As consciousness cannot abandon its own being, i.e. ‘ground’ and ability to project, it at the same time cannot actually absolve itself from any other consciousness (if not per abstraction and conclusive appearance [Schein], which is quite coincedent with speaking or the ordinary usage of language). Hence it also cannot really sever, even if separate itself from the world, its actual being, that

- causes and prompts perceptions to come into the human mind because, by its essence, this is a projective one (as any spatial and temporal perceptions prove); or otherwise
- causes projections to fall into the human mind, states of other actual consciousness included, as the insular or even isolated situation is, from the beginning, unreal and equally untrue.

So consciousness does possess a large, wide « dedans » as soon as the axis (within consciousness) has altered its orientation. However, by reason of truth and reason itself, there has to be a continuous, obligatory settlement of the two main directions (or vectorizations where the origin is different by emergence of the main source outside or inside). So far, it should be clear that human consciousness is doing a lot of this work by itself due to its simple nature (what may explain a portion of its being overlooked, especially with tradition). Yet on this background, the following tenet of Kant does exhibit the straight, classical counterpoint of the Sartrean counter-pole cited above:

[B]. “Ich bin einfach, bedeutet aber nichts mehr, als daß diese Vorstellung: Ich, nicht die mindeste Mannigfaltigkeit in sich fasse, und daß sie absolute (obzwar bloß logische) Einheit sei.”^[[37]]

Once more, the I, in itself, seems void (a well-known characteristic as regards polarization and projection),^[[38]] and Kant immediately concedes the mere logical meaning – seen from apperception, the same unity must comprise the entire working of categorization the human consciousness has passed. Now the substance, as it has lost its absolute cause of spontaneity and has become dependent on orientation, should assume a much larger and different signification than the agent and/or the representative of the I (two senses in which the activum and the passivum or the focussing and the being focussed are coincident). Regarding Kant, the persisting (das Beharrliche) which affects the mind in order to prompt the substantial recognition should reveil an essential affinity to another one as the perceptive or conscient being, because it might conform to the outcome of a projective act (“transfer onto another thinking being”). Further, as consciousness, by its real nature, cannot be separated from itself, therefore requiring necessarily a common, or collective ground, the essence of one person cannot really be totally distinct from the essence of another person. Then, on one part, the problem of the paralogisms rests with the collective root of the soul or Selbst,^[[39]] and on the other part, which will be of main interest for the following, the human patrimony is entering into the field in order to claim for what should be conceived of as the human substance. As the human consciousness only is fanning out segments of possible states of essence, its identity is belonging to a common nod where all these segments or perspectivities do coincide (and regarding perspectivity, the fully receptive stance should not be excluded). Further, seeing that the nod itself is never separated from consciousness instead of being an integral part the collective must be the necessary real ground (i.e. the common ground of real, and not ideal, ‘Aufhebung’). Now on the other side this same nod belongs to being and essence (and the psychological nature or character) which, in the same moment as consciousness is altering its stance, will be projected from all sides, the inner and the outer ones, into consciousness. The persisting coincidence of the nod (and identity) therefore passes on to the substantial one which, at it utmost limit of understanding, will become the collective essence of the mankind, in particular as the genetic code or human patrimony. From this standpoint, a real, last distinction between an endogenous and an exogenous root of the individual psychism cannot exist.^[[40]] However, any accidentia or attributes (in traditional speaking) must refer to orientation and the projective essence which, on one side, provides evidence, even proves the particular stance of consciousness (its ‘point of view’ or standpoint being not the same),^[[41]] and on the other side, a portion of the substantial essence steadily projected. So the problem of analysis is not so much a logical one or problem of finding the subject-predicate-concatenation^[[42]] rather than finding the real line of separation between the individual and the collective essence which always must exist in coincidence (as is also a profound problem in defining the genetic code). So far, a new theoretical situation, belonging to metaphysics, has emerged that should be able to overcome the critique of postmetaphysical reservation:^[[43]] The autonomy of the subject is still there, but it has lost its autocratic resoluteness.
Before passing on with illustration to the second part which will be focussing this assertion, systematic clearance follows from consideration of the third point (c) regarding the relationship between interiority and exteriority. As to necessity, this relation never will cause doubt, though not by reflection or even deductive claims relying on apperception and the possibility to use one’s pronominal scalar. Instead of and in first instance, it will be subject to the projective root which, by its proper, natural significance, is coincident with polarisation (as the elliptic and hyperbolic geometry give evidence also,^[[44]] with orthogonal axionometry as the artifical counter-example). As the nod of orientation cannot vanish (be nothing), a more or less strident, neat focus belonging to the exterior realm will always (in natural circumstances) be coincident with an interior or inner focus (evidencing the polaric foundation). However, if consciousness should be able to ‘differentiate’, i.e. let natural polarization decrease up to a limit of nearly zero-resiliation, then it also should lose its capability of separating or distinguishing itself by means of asserting, and actually being, a concrete (‘absolute’) entity. In realms of morals, the worship (or religion), and affection, this stance seems quite natural and it even does not require an artful or artistic precondition, but it seems undervalued in phenomenological investigation as it does not simply fall together with the second Husserlean polarization (the “horizon of object-poles”: in a peculiar sense, it is not intentional).
However what is important to see is that the axis as the representative of any interstitial distance the consciousness has in itself against any coincident ‘point’ or location of the world,^[[45]] any other actual consciousness being focussed, will never be void, abolished, or in itself vanishing. To name it otherwise, it may be termed the membrane in a threefold organic, metaphysical, and recognitional sense relating at once to the brain, the relationship being/consciousness versus consciousness, and finally its capacity to manage it. What makes a consciousness be is, now, its limit or realm of limitation, not its classical, highly promoted (if not overestimated and/or overcharged) centre (still on reserve and, of course, active).
In consequence of, because the relationship of exteriority and interiority has always to be valid in a fully equipped philosophy (against any modern or sensualist reduction, and in parallel to the critical foundation),^[[46]] the substance will never simply represent the outside or inside, i.e. the substance on Aristotelean or on accrued Leibnizian or monadic terms (who tried to hold both perspectives in balance in order to recognize nature as the abundant container of real substances [the continuum]). So if the patrimony of mankind represents the essence, i.e. substance, it never will fall in its entirety into the human mind recalling the recognitional problem of its plain, straightforward awareness and/or availability.^[[47]] On the other side, if the spontaneous act is merging with the substantial meaning it will be coincident with the projective root – the first instance of actus purus in Leibnitian terms – so that it is not its sustained centre, not its mere Setzungskraft (the positting or setting force), but its constant realm and sphere of limitation which will represent the substantial claim. To say it otherwise, as soon as projection enters into the foundations it is section that makes the effort in order to separate due personal from common or really collective proprieties, an endeavour, that (already well-known from traditional claims) will never come to an end, or separate the sphere of inner consciousness or interiority from its coincident, simultaneous extension marking the counterpart or exteriority.
It should be clear that substantial meaning cannot go on a par with either exteriority or interiority. In each case of substantial acknowledgement, it has to be related to both branches, the appertaining section, as representing the membrane, performing the actual limitation (and as a symptom, one has to distinguish with Leibniz the meaning of the inner soul and mind, the I is able to represent, and the outward souls as everywhere adherent to living beings). Recent, and historical literature is not totally unaware of this fact even if the projective claim, at first sight, seems to complicate the theoretical situation and must reintroduce the metaphysical relation (which should be welcome in order to overcome the struggles of reduction and rational overcharge). In any case, as consciousness never will succeed in demonstrating its real own, insular centre that should leave a gap or sensible leap against collective consciousness,^[[48]] it is the patrimony or the genetic code (from biology) that, by widening the limit from the simple personal to the all-personal or human content, will show what has to be seen as the substance, in addition, when it cannot be reduced or restricted to claims of apperception. It was Auguste Comte, who in the middle of the nineteenth century recognized this fact, emerging from a theoretical situation by reason of which real entities belonging to the discipline of metaphysics do no longer exist:^[[49]]

„Une réflexion décisive, indiquée déjà par le sage Franklin, démontre même que, sous l’aspect purement physique, aucune famille ne saurait être appréciée isolément; et l’on peut étendre une semblable remarque aux diverses sociétés politiques. Car, chacun de nous ayant nécessairement deux ancêtres immédiats, pareillement assujettis à cette fatalité, quand on remonte beaucoup le cours des âges sociaux la population devrait être infiniment plus nombreuse qu’aujourd’hui, si les ancêtres éloignés eussent toujours differé. Or, comme la relation inverse est pleinement constatée, en fait et en principe, il s’ensuit que le point de vue domestique, et même civil, se trouve beaucoup trop étroit pour expliquer la simple origine physique de chaque existence individuelle. Rien ne peut mieux vérifier combien l’esprit d’ensemble est plus réel, que l’esprit de détail.“

Remarkably, the standpoint on physical causation is opening the furcation of succession, instead of focussing it, as was the intellectual habit in the writings of Leibniz who in realms of temporal assignation to the actual substance went back to the first couple, Adam and Eve.^[[50]] And as a philosopher-sociologist, Comte already comes to the conclusion of the collective essence of consciousness he is naming an entire spirit (or mind) to be more real than the detailed – or individual – one.
In order to illustrate the collective claim and to make a next step, an author like Michel Dufrenne might help (although he did not invent a new thought):

“Cette garantie, c’est dans le jugement des siècles, et des experts reprenant ou anticipant le jugement de l’histoire, que nous pouvons la trouver: si l’histoire, qu’il faut bien invoquer quand il s’agit de l’humain, incline au scepticisme lorsqu’elle propose une diversité déconcertante d’œuvres et de jugements, elle porte en elle son propre antidote: elle consacre les valeurs, elle fonde un universel à travers le particulier ; mémoire de l’humanité, elle essentialise et fonde en vérité comme la mémoire bergsonnienne ; elle est, à notre savoir qu’elle inspire, ce que la vie qui nous porte est à notre comportement.”^[[51]]

The overlayment and sedimentation of history, its universalization in a sense of common, merging memory was more or less (and once more) a theorem and requirement belonging to the realm of perception with Leibniz (even if he did not exercise it as a historian himself).^[[52]] In a twofold and contrary sense, it also belongs to the original positivist concept of social development, hence consciousness – the stages of humanity Comte taught in the history of philosophy section in système de politique positive – ^[[53]] and otherwise to its critique, who, Charles Péguy, mocked contemporary historians performing the positivist method in a superficial manner. To paraphrase the interpretation of Kremer Marietti, it must fail against the “profound history” where the real sources of actual experience are stored (and she shows how much Péguy, nevertheless, held a view that reconciles with Comte himself).^[[54]] What is important, and particularly for the following, is that memory overlaps, i.e., as evidence of collective consciousness it cannot be assigned solely to exterior observation instead of merging and founding each and every inner experience alike.
In a synonym, the merging of a common sphere with a particular view returns with Gadamer’s Horizontverschmelzung. Here is no place to make a profound examination as to the question of ‘mauvaise fusion’, the applicable background of the terms, and especially the preciseness of the term horizon insofar as it has to express a determinate limit.^[[55]] As has been explained in the foregoing, the distinction of individual against collective consciousness will demand the utmost preciseness the human mind is capable of. And as soon as the compatibility with geometries is required (which should be sustained), the same condition holds. So if “projection” as the projective faculty belongs to the natural equipment of the mind and is expanded all-over human perception, the fusion of horizons that is merging “une langue” or facts of past with present will always provide evidence of exactness,^[[56]] at least, in remote areas, will demand for achieving “contrôle” by means of penetrating the overlayment, possible aberration, and how consciousness in the distance may figurize the information.^[[57]] Whereby this, the projective input of the mind, should be the main theoretical endeavor to overrule any non-aware or negligent ‘mauvaise fusion’. Finally, as a fully-fledged orientation is claimed that is equivalent with projection, there can come up no restrictive sense where it would simply have the one-sided meaning of overthrowing as Kant used it in the passage cited above (and Fichte literally, as mentionned, did not).^[[58]] The better sense of projection where it must include the vector that determines the mind by any real fact(s) and content from the situation or environment – endowing a real consciousness, as has been seen – is also the understanding that underlies the term Horizontverschmelzung with Grondin. However, he tries to explain it on hermeneutic terms and really does not even reflect the projective essence,^[[59]] i.e., that conferring both, present understanding (as the limit horizon of the Grundlinie [ground or section line] and the horizon of the past onto its destination, is quite another thing than having a self-originating horizon of the past falling on the present where, by the projective claim, it will outcome with a proper figuration and constellation (or, in the sense of Humboldt, with traces of ideas): Whether really ‘fusion’, there will exist the inner limit where both counter-directed vectors come together (to make the projective content, its constructive essence). Be that as it may, Grondin, in order to illustrate with the following passage, gives an example of his understanding of Horizontverschmelzung that will arrive right at the centre of the second part:

“J’évoquerai un dernier exemple de ce ‘langage des choses’. Il est bien connu que la génétique la plus récente a tenté de porter au jour ce qe l’on appelle le ‘génome’ humain qui vient en quelque sorte résumer notre ‘code génétique’. Il va de soi qu’il s’agit là d’une explication scientifique, falsifiable, et par conséquent d’une pure vue de l’intelligence humaine sur nos gènes. On en parlera certainement d’une manière bien différente dans cent ans. Mais il ne s’agit pas pour autant d’une pure et simple ‘invention’ de notre intelligence. Car c’est le code du génotype lui-même, des choses elles-mêmes, que le scientifique cherche à porter au langage. La théorie génétique ne m’intéresse pas ici pour elle-même. Ce qui m’importe, c’est de faire voir que la science, comme toute compréhension humaine, cherche à découvrir et articuler un langage qui est, d’une importante manière, déjà celui des choses elles-mêmes. C’est aussi ce langage des choses qui permet d’évaluer nos constructions et de les invalider (ceci ou cela n’est pas conforme à ce que disent les choses ou l’expérience). Il y a ainsi un langage des choses, de l’être, que nous pointons quand nous cherchons à comprendre et que nous ouvrons nos sens.”^[[60]]

‘Ce que disent les choses’, or ‘le langage des choses’ cannot come into the mind without determination (in order to avoid any recognitional mythe). Without a clear analysis of the components and their interrelationship a well-known circular situation will be recreated. By this token, Grondin articulates the vector originating in the ‘être’ in order to separate and contrast it with “invention”. The recognitional problems resulting from this theoretical situation (not coincident with the metaphysical, sensualist, critical or dialectical, and of course not with the analytical and hermeneutical position,^[[61]] especially when the language condition is suspended) may be left aside for the moment. What counts on the substantial claim is that he is also confronting the totality of the human essence, its genetic code, with the particular view of an individual that manifests the standpoint. The semantics work, at least, in a twofold direction where on one side they are emanating from the essential entities of the genetic code, on the other side from perceptions and notional strivings of the human mind itself (condensing its experience) in order to come together on a common limit, the projective outcome (and intermediation never identical with any Hegelean synthesis, Fichte was on the way to reveil). So totality, and universality, has two sides as it may go on a par with the universal transfer of the standpoint or with the transgression of the content, the code, on the other. So long existence is forming the precondition, both never will collapse due to the membrane (equivalent to the projective plan both from the intellectual and biological side) which therefore is getting into the cardinal position to represent substantial meaning (instead of simply dividing entities as individuals). Closing the section, it should be clear that, when the collective consciousness is the real one which leaves no gap in-between from one individual to the other, so delivering the real source and reason of projectivity as it has to focus either,^[[62]] there can exist no clear-cut personal memory (the engramme)^[[63]] or genetic code because collective and personal attribution always go together,^[[64]] one steadily has to make experience in a collective attachment or entourage (not simply existing in one’s reflexion), and because no one really can be said to make his experiences on his own (as Descartes stated in the classical manner in his platonizing dialogue on the research of the truth).^[[65]]

According to the title, the main purpose of the following consists in developing the relationship between genetics, ethics, and their legal connotations on grounds of collectivity instead of common grounds abstracted from and devolving to individual responsibility. After the introduction, insight and reason of this endeavour should have become clear, and remembering it, the impact of historical European or common Western thinking that since the antiquities has always been propelling the individualistic standpoint should have gained a peculiar distance to itself. So, even if there is no ‘nachmetaphysisches Denken’,^[[66]] it is, as mentioned above, not the ens, unum, atom, the individual substance or alike, not the I but the collective consciousness that by nature (energetic source) is forming the starting point and in particular the point of relevance (where the consequences are rooted). Nevertheless, and from the other side, today’s commissions on the ethical implications of genetics, p.e. the American or the French one, ultimately relate to the individual concerned as the focus of their argumentation. Histories may not be convertible, a common conviction, though traces they left open can be regrasped. And instead of inviting to take a path that has been overpassed by the entrenched one, the situation is more due to introducing a central alternation to the fundamental orientation itself, so that the core performances of – natural – projectivity or perspectivities (the usual term that has to be complemented by the former) will become evident. In a special way, it will alter essence, mind, and consciousness of the walker being the spectator and investigator himself, because the approach is leaving the positivist mode, the ultimate separation of cognizer against the world, behind. So collectivity, and not alterity or the categorical imperative which always includes the passage from the I to another one without real attachment, should be vested with the first category of ethics, at least it should assume a well determined place. To come up to this standing, collectivity – as encompassing any individual in a common consciousness, so far the natural as unripped and non-equipped with any notional or societal ‘fences’ – needs to be grounded on interiority because it must be available from the grounds of volonté, the inner will. Hence it must rely on a form of consciousness that is at once not the singular recounted (up to ‘les laissés au compté’), but considered from a standpoint that may easily pass from the outer to the inner prospect without narrowing the segment or content. Here the faulty convention has taken place in so far classical up to – language driven – analytical philosophy will make believe that following this alternation of perspective necessarily the inner life or innerlyness enclosed will form the sole result: The small spot of punctual subjectivity which, alledgedly, leaves no immediate lights of another consciousness, the collective. However, alternating the focus (pole) does not necessarily entail to shorten the sphere of its content. If so, the projective claim would loose its validity and not be correct. On the other hand, to make clear the presupposition, consciousness is everywhere bound together, and there is no need to be ripped this way as, in a prevailing position, the transcendental condition purports. And also objectivity, in a peculiar sense, will alter its meaning, when it is transferred to the terms of projection and projectivity, in parallel to sociologists of the nineteenth and beginning twentieth century, Comte and Durkheim, who established a common mind (collective consciousness and “esprit propre de la société analogue à la nôtre”)^[[67]] that nevertheless was constrained to the causal scheme (exclusivity of exterior observation, the science’s rationale). A projective mind does not require to be held off from its (outer) content it has been taking up to understand instead of forming a doubling centre of coincidence. Considering morals, there equally will be no ‘subjective’ deliberation that actually will be (totally) detached from the presence of other – ontologically, all the other – individuals, and suffering alters is meaning alike, as consciousness may, from the beginning, adhere to the instantial one. To say it otherwise, agens and patiens (with allusion the classical substantial theorem or philosophem) obtain a peculiar circumspection as soon as projectivity and collectivity enter into the foundations.
Genetics, and in particular its main material, the genes, do not match the exterior claim. Even if they can be handled in a technological, by now highly sophisticated manner, as the genotype they do not represent the core of the exterior realm, but, quite to the contrary, the essence of one’s personality which, as anyhow conceivable, represents the core of interiority. In one of its reports the French Comité consultatif national d’éthique relates to this fact stating that the genome of an individual results more from its being than from its having it order to conclude that it shall not become the object of any commerce.^[[68]] To generalize this presupposition, any living being, projected and considered from its real interiority, should be related to its genes. In consequence, the human does not represent the simple, necessary singular nod of intersecting branches of hereditary ancestors that spread into its existence, thus the genetic protagonists of the Mendel laws^[[69]], which was, as cited above, the opinion of Comte too (“le point de vue domestique, et même civil, se trouve beaucoup trop étroit pour expliquer la simple origine physique de chaque existence individuelle”). The human patrimony does not simply rely on the crucial points of intersection to form an hereditary ‘arborescence’. Likewise, the human is not the representative of a stem cell transplanted into an alien mother cell, a parallel, which, symptomatic for the contemporaneous scientific mentality, tries and really does overexpand the exterior claim and condition^[[70]]. As has been discussed in the first part, since the positivist turn and the downfall of Hegelianism in the middle of the nineteenth century the sciences, and philosophy as well, have lost any substantial grip on interiority. Yet if inheritance as manifested by the genes is belonging to interiority in a cardinal proportion, because any being should be capable of using its energy, faculties, and natural gifts exclusively under this perspective, then the concept of science will have to give up an essential investment into its sole focus, even a bias, that is inclined to externalisation as the, allegedly, one-identical, secure method of achieving scientific knowledge.
To sum up, inheritance or the genetic code should not be restricted to either the individual or the kindlike representation. On grounds of real collectivity, it is not the problem to sever the concrete (and infinite) from the type-like token,^[[71]] otherwise the individual centre from a turmoiled mass.^[[72]] Even if correct on grounds of textbooks on genetics, which exhibit the 23 human chromosome complements,^[[73]] it is by far not evident (and really impossible) that the essence of the genotype as working in an individual actually has to be limited to that isolated sphere,^[[74]] the sphere, philosophy since about the middle of the eighteenth century has been calling the subject,^[[75]] in parallel to the I (already established). It is the point of demarcation also to which contemporary ethics subscribe when explaining how claims have to be distinguished that belong to parental donators of spare embryos against the claims and responsibility of the intervening researcher, the medicine, and finally claims the embryo as representative of human life itself should possess^[[76]]. To make the need for the opposite collective perspective more clear, everyone will have made the experience, and literature of all kinds, the drama, poems, or the novel is suffused with, that during lifetime experience is inherent to an individual that cannot and does not belong to near or more remote ancestors of the peculiar family. So this experience cannot come into the subject and its inner life by means of genetic transfer whether artificial or natural, and to state this does not mean philosophy renews its subscription to the arts, as a sociologist like Durkheim perhaps would object, because it makes a fact to be irrenouncable for one’s person. The overall attachment (non-isolatedness) of personal existence given, the fundamental unit of biological life, the membrane, has to be regrasped and reinforced because any instrumentalization of the slightest genetic information and outcome in phenotype will not be able to explain how this profound collective intersection of genetic information is produced:^[[77]] With the outcome of an interfering experience that is at once individual and a collective one, so far the simply natural (and, regarding the terms, the common may signify the logical one), or of an inner experience that, in its entirety, impossibly may result from an investigation into the manifest descendant lines. Relying on the membrane, though, which is an organ to provide the permeability and intersection of cells and their information, nature from the very beginning is capable to gather and manifest a collective unit. The animal body is a striking proof of such collective aggregation and permeation of cells, and history, in particular Leibniz,^[[78]] tried to explain the composite substance (la substance compose/unum per aggregationem) within his main stream of monadology and philosophy of the continuumthereby overruling the Aristotelean branch of his philosophy. Now, if there is real experience of such interfering realms, of interior contents, that cannot result from the manifest ancestral branches nor from portions of the engramme, which is the span of one’s personal perceptual remembrance during lifetime,^[[79]] then the same collective perspective and aggregate condition should be extended and turned around to the whole sphere of consciousness, or to the mind as Leibniz would have said (and, of course, analytical or ordinary language philosophers do not).
Hence what interferes within personal experience does not, on its whole, stem from direct procreation, a reproductive act of any kind to be necessarily assignable to the sole manifestors. At first sight, this result will be uncomfortable for genetics, as scientists have to take into account an important factor of indetermination or indefiniteness. Seen from the topic of the conference, incontingency should have a root here and mapped onto this situation in order to explain.^[[80]] The interference, an essential intrication and overlapping of consciousness together with its personal, and non-personal experience as well, is always there, permanent from the very beginning, as soon as energy spreads into life, informs the body, its cell life as well as any sort of perception, and it does not coincede with mutation (a situation similar to and well known from quantum physics but not identical with). So the aggregation of the individual mind, or of consciousness in a real sense, and not only of the body, is a fact of insurmountable evidence even if the act of self-reflection provides the easiest means of self- identity,^[[81]] that in any moment is supported by the focussing faculties of the mind itself.
By now, the theoretical situation leaves a parallel between ethics and the above-mentioned ‘fait social’ of Durkheim. Considering collectivity, it provides an occasion for delineation with another theoretician, Rousseau, as will be seen at the end. Durkheim’s notion describes, by definition, a social condition where collective behavior overrules the individual. Obliged to describe a concrete reality, the sociologist encounters a causality that entails a common, collective attitude towards the interplay of social roles, or a social fact.^[[82]] On this behalf (and also a summary to the argumentation above), the French Comité consultatif d’éthique pronounces in one of its earliest reports (avis no. 3 1984): “The total sum of information contained in the human genome appertains to the human patrimony: It is a domain of knowledge that cannot make the object of a monopole.”^[[83]] Though on different grounds, one a social or practical causality, the other a biological or genetic one, both have to embody a collective ‘unit’ or entity (unknown from scholastics, even if the patrimony which cannot become the possession of another one, p.e. is known from article 3 of Kant’s treaty Zum ewigen Frieden).^[[84]] Further, as projection is making the condition, ‘le fait social’ as the one plan and inheritance as the other from their different ontological sides can be mapped together leaving nods in an interfering plan: Where the individual is situated, acting, anywhere sensing, even thinking – and forgetting the condition, or otherwise assuming he, in a Cartesian mode, would, by real Schein, stand alone against all the world and society..
In consequence, as claims considering the authentic ‘information’ must spread over individuals, strands of a nation, nations themselves, and finally the global population forming the real sense of ‘mankind’, they should not be restricted to individuals or to the legal entity of statehood or associations with similar statutes which, by virtue of legal couching and convention, are to take the exterior standpoint.^[[85]] Nevertheless, if not a monopole, there should be an entity capable of representing the potential of inheritance on its whole. In its immediate (or spontaneous) form it will be the common consciousness, now in particular the collective interior, which, according to the comité, has the utmost responsibility – and liability – for any aberrations, damages, and degenerations resulting from genetic interference. Due to this outcome, one may suggest to alter the referential pronoun to the plural form, i.e. we.^[[86]] However, because the most fundamental link that connects and, from bio- and ontological fact, always has connected consciousness with any other is due to the membrane, its simple existence, any linguistic pronunciation will be later, post- and not antecedent. Even Fichte mingled the fact when pronouncing the ‘absolute Gesetz’ of the projective mind in his later Vortrag of the Wissenschaftslehre.^[[87]] We and its connotations, societal and/or situational, simply do not correspond to what collective consciousness from the beginning entails, where stress, the opposite and immediate intersections hold. Regrasping the classical forms of apperception, one even must conclude that the link, as a primordial condition to constitute consciousness, is overruling apperception.
So far, these presuppositions call for a definition that takes together the fundamental condition of the membrane, its relation to the entire biological genome and to the collective consciousness forming the metaphysical as well as ethical correspondent on the whole. The capacity that relates to this overall responsibility and eventual indemnification for genetic inheritance may be named the sharedom of the collective consciousness. So defined, it is a moral one even if it can easily be conceived of as a social or political too. Hence sharing the human patrimony with another person means to transfer to any other living being at once its right to fully inhabit the realm of common inheritance. Seen from the perspective of fundamental rights, no person can be genetically restricted to the parental lines of her family nor to the investigations and donations assisted procreation will have lent to her. Even cloning, as the report of the French comité consultatif d’éthique to the President (nr. 54 1997) explains, leaves a crucial segment of undetermined influence that will build up the individual psychism. Due to the membrane condition, there will always be a portion of contingency that interferes with her individual genome, and its impact may result from the common patrimony and/or the (actual) environment. Finally, because the technology of genetics has to comply with legal regulations and constitution ratified or not, the latter seen from the European perspective, a second idea enters into the field as it is related to collectivity as well. It is the common will or volonté générale of Rousseau whom also Durkheim gave a succinct interpretation.
Before addressing to it, another short investigation into the thinking of Durkheim (even if it appears to represent a somewhat common or naive argument) should help to form the passage. A main argument in the area of assisted procreation reads in the following way taken up from a recent dictionary article. It concludes that by reason of different perspectives of the participants, fertile and non-fertile couples, the physician, a donating human, further possible events that may happen during the process of conception, a situation of “normative disorientation” results where only one common remedy is found, “the interest in the child to come to world.”^[[88]] But there are also several projections that meet in the child as well, as its right to grow up without restrictions regarding its capacities and abilities, as the family that demands for coherence, finally the societal life where the child will have to be socialized and integrated. Now, in his lectures on pragmatism and the question of truth Durkheim discussed “impersonal truth and individual diversities.” He claimed for a concept of plurality that is not the customary where disparities are, by free will, acknowledged and upheld.^[[89]] He taught:

“We cannot exhaust reality either as a whole or in any of its constituent parts. Therefore every object of knowledge offers an opportunity for an infinity of possible points of view, such as the point of view of life, of purely mechanical movement, of stasis and dynamics, of contingency and determination, of physics and biology and so on. Individual minds, however, are finite, and none can work form all the points of view at once. [Therefore] each mind is free to choose the point of view from which it feels itself most competent to view things. This means that for every object of knowledge there are differing but equally justified ways of examining it. These are probably partial truths, but all these partial truths come together in the collective consciousness and find their limits and their necessary complements.”^[[90]]

What Durkheim claims seems to be an instance of simple belief, a sort of anticipated reconciliation. Regarding scientific truth, it leaves the question about prevalence, convention, and contest, and regarding tolerance, the picture seems by far too optimistic as the political and social life does not realize itself by complementing, and balancing, one view against the others. Nevertheless, he was justified to uphold the collective consciousness which is not simply a serial or stepwise sum of all the different perspectives, in addition, in a reflective way. His background was based on his sociological research. He knew that in the historical realms of marriage, of suicide, of labor division, and of religion there are given social constraints that represent ideas which are not developed by the individual.^[[91]] Quite on the contrary, as a member of the society the individual is compelled to submit to them: not as an abstract norm like a written or unwritten law, but like a real pressure that it feels (where Durkheim takes up the empirical tradition from Comte).
On grounds of projection his being justified is even greater. The perspectivities he relates to are necessary implications from the human mind, its “point of view” or real departure (and if finite should form a peculiar question of investigation). However, any instance of polarization it manifests must have a counter-pole (like any point of view must correspond to a vanishing point, as soon as the first is instantiated, and in contrast to projectivity). Quite natural, and explaining the purported finiteness of the mind (like he does), the individual consciousness cannot fall out and totally disengage from the common consciousness, which, at the same time and in the same reality, must have plan and figure, a focus where it centers as soon as a perspective becomes manifest (and not as an analogue or principal outcome of geometry). Its possible approximation will depend on the situation (which is not a consensus),^[[92]] but it is impossible that, as soon as the point of view is real and relates to the projective condition, the counter-plan is empty, void of proper structure, figuration and appropriate meaning (i.e. import): It is not ‘le néant’ which appertains to the level of common consciousness (steadily coincident). So the theoretical aspect of truth is well confirmed, however, the resulting configuration might be more complex than simply stating the necessary nod of intersection on the other side from the individual faculties..
Collective consciousness, therefore, cannot vanish with history. Social constraints like marriage may alter, nevertheless the human consciousness will always behave in the field of a collective one. That one level meets the other, even depends on the metaphysical, and not only social condition, and his conviction should be universalized according to the projective precondition. To refute him or the view of sociology, would require to refute the last which seems impossible as the perspective constitutes the first rule of perception and the natural constitution of the mind. Thereafter, what this outcome means for the ethical investigation outlined above is not only that the ‘common remedy’, found in the interest of the child, can be translated into the centre of the common consciousness, the nod of intersection against a persevering ‘disorientation’ of personal perspectives. In particular, it should prevail as it is able to represent the patrimony in a natural, immediate way no reflective, even projective standpoint from the other side is able to replace. So these, the perspectives of the participants, should form the first circle or sphere of sharedom to the rights of the child to have unrestricted access to the human patrimony. Hereby the genetic approach onto human essence should loose its instrumental character as sharing is left to the projective condition – which, against conventional understanding, is natural and non-ripping, and imparts what really means to look upon, to care for, and to think of someone – and endowing a child with rights can become the counterpart of endowing oneself, de recto and not by reflective conferral. In a peculiar sense, interiority has lost its paralysing substantial gap stemming, not at least, from the positivst – if not rationalist – tradition. And in order to make the consequence in the realm of policy, the sphere of nations may coincede without interruption, because human dignity as an outcome of evolution must exceed the national border and relate to the whole mankind, in the same sense as the French Comité consultatif d’Éthique has assigned human dignity to be the utmost harbinger and value of moral responsibility in the realms of genetics.^[[93]]. Patrimony, the signum and coin-underpart of a nation, may easily join with any sharedom manifest among a collective consciousness (leaving arguments for the world society that do not rely on the reflective outweighing of war-making)..

As indicated, by reason of differentiation a short final investigation will point out to the relation between the general will and moral sharedom as the entity to represent the responsibility for the human patrimony. Well known, Rousseau believed in a fundamental act of the members of a society due to which they will create the foundation of a state. The general will which makes up this constitution renders a level of commonness that, according to Rousseau, is both real and logically working over the individual’s level.^[[94]] It is not produced by aggregation of physical power, the negotiation of palms, but by simple generality (akin to universality). As an interpreter of Rousseau, Durkheim has made this point clear in his succinct commentary on the Contrat social (about 1915). Like several authors to date, he also called into question the real status of this entity. There is a controversy between the natural order and the social order as the former results from the empirical individual, the second from the abstract one, ‘le souvérain’. Above all, the particularistic will of the government will never simply fit to the requirements of the democratic body it at the same time represents and has to rule. The fact he may have taken up from Kant who stressed the need of a particular, individualized government against the people in a republic,^[[95]] and today the historical development of the European constitutions show a well colourful spreading between centralization and decentralization reflecting this relationship.^[[96]] In the end, Durkheim believed that the claim of homogeneity which is necessary for the general will to become constitutive relies on a polaric situation:^[[97]]

“Et cette conception même vient de ce que Rousseau n'aperçoit que deux pôles à la réalité humaine, l'individu abstrait, général, qui est l'agent et l'objectif de la vie sociale, et l'individu concret, empirique, qui est l'antagoniste de toute existence collective ; qu'en un sens ces deux pôles se repoussent et que pourtant le premier sans le second n'est qu'une entité logique.”
.
Nevertheless, even if the analysis of a democratic society will always require an essential impact of heterogeneity, of irresolvable difference, and even polarity in a constitutive sense he made clear in the realm of truth, Durkheim underlined Rousseau’s claim that a collective unit should have a proper standing on its own, and one should presume on both sides, the logical and the empirical. It is not enough that a particular ‘lien’ spreads all over the society’s members in order to manifest the être social as a moral one. It must be “der Act des allgemeinen Willens, wodurch die Menge ein Volk wird,“^[98]] as Kant purported. Instead of, Rousseau came to the conclusion that “it is certain that the human gender offers to the human mind only a purely collective idea which does not presuppose any real union between the individuals which constitute it.”^[99]] As argued above, his conclusion does not cope with the foundations of sharedom. Actually, the human mind, as an instance of real consciousness, does not rely on a purely collective idea. Quite to the contrary, its collectivity is proven as the first condition of nature because, from emanation, there is no individual gap or spot, evidencing a reflective or existential isolation, and as soon as consciousness begins to think (in order to become a classical substance) it will never lose its basic interconnection. This, however, must not become manifest as a social lien. It might simply exist in a form of diffusion and non-aware overlapping. But when consciousness begins to reflect upon, a reflection, that will always have to sustain the split of subject and object (so long it is not able to overcome it due to the projective condition) the working of association begins, on a par with the moral reflection that steadily tries to account for the enlarging unity. It is not inborness (in the classical, idealistic sense), though the patrimony as the holder of genetic essence will easily join and even strengthen the motivation of the lien. It is just there, at any instance, to stick to and provide evidence for the membrane in a twofold manner, the organic and the intellectual, which, representing the spontaneous limit, may explain the turnover of philosophy (versus, and within substantial thinking, and relying on an intermediate – or interstitial – limit does not, against the prejudice, mean to rely on a rip). It is only a sort of a very old, stipulated and all-over traded convention of social negligence and habitualized, thoroughly assimilated reflection that was able to make this fact unconscious and subliminal. On the other part, even impersonality, the feature that renders the superior level of the general will, “au-dessus de tous les particuliers,”^[100]] will not coincede with sharedom. The human patrimony, in its essence, cannot be regarded as impersonal, analogous to the status of a conceived of and constituted legal person. It must mean and appertain to the natural level, and even statehood, as one may realize, obtains a natural foundation when it becomes the distinctive, immediate projection of the collective consciousness bearing that faculty in itself, not from outside stipulative or theoretical endeavor. Nevertheless, when it will be incorporated into legal consideration, the sharedom of responsibility will loose its immediate impact as the language break will result in a proper shifting – natural language does not, in its root, refer to the common or collective consciousness, but to the individual speaker^[101]] (even if the instinct is collective, Comte, and otherwise modern logic show the interference). So we cannot believe in the following statement, at least and in particular in its characterisation of interiority, which, assured, reflects two centuries:

“Ce qui est à attendre par moi, c’est autrui, non en tant que j’en prends connaissance, mais en tant qu’il prend connaissance de soi, ce qui est impossible: cela supposerait, en effet, l’identification en intériorité de moi-même à autrui. Nous retrouvons donc ici cette distinction de principe entre autrui et moi-même, qui ne vient pas de l’extériorité de nos corps, mais du simple fit que chacun de nous existe en intériorité et qu’une connaissance valable de l’intériorité ne peut se faire qu’en intériorité, ce qui interdit par principe toute connaissance d’autrui tel qu’il se connait, c’est-à-dire tel qu’il est.”^[[102]]

If the source of existence is reliant on the membrane as genetics provides evidence, and if there can be no consciousness which should not depend upon, then interiority cannot fall within absolute status (an error that may be tracked down to the mythe, and reality, of Babylon). Even identity cannot stand apart, because it is affected in its core signification, and the information in its entirety (as the foundation of any characteristic and semantic value) is subject to. So inheritance has, in advance, a relationship with the membrane, at the same time the limit of consciousness against consciousness, and there is will exist no definite, individual border that should determine, and only determine, a peculiar subject (akin to the skin, la peau, that even in times of renewal was not capable of conquering the substantial claim). From this follows that the substantial path, looking for the real entity, will have to encompass a collective unit, the real one, and regarding the natural situation of recognition and conventional understanding sustained by language, la naivété is well challenged.

^[*] A contribution for: ESF Research Conference on Biomedicine within the Limits of Human Existence, Biomedical Technology and Practice Reconsidered, Doorn, The Netherlands, 8-13 April 2005. (The author is grateful to Angélique Kremer-Marietti, the editor, for helpful comments concerning the presentation and overview of the arguments. Part I has been rewritten.
^[1] Cited from : Jean-Paul Sartre, La Transcendance de l’Ego. Esquisse d’une description phénoménologique, introduction par Sylvie Le Bon, Paris (Librairie Philosophique J.Vrin) 1981, p.93.
^[2] A comparison Leibniz has directly undertaken ("Systeme nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que de l'union qu'il y a entre l'ame et le corps," § 11, in: GP IV, p.482-483).
^[3] Husserl, Cartesische Mediattionen § 31, cit. Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.107-108.
^[4] G.W.Leibniz, Discours de Métaphysique, § 14, in : GP IV, p.439.
^[5] See, p.e., Hans Poser, “Der Leibnizsche Harmoniebegriff als Einheit in der Vielheit”, in: Vf. (ed.), Leibniz, die Künste und die Musik. Ihre Geschichte, Theorie und Wissenschaft, forthcoming München 2006 (Katzbichler-Verlag), part 2-3.
^[6] Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.103-104.
^[7] p.e. partie II, in. Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.94-102. Sartre, L’Être et le Néant, Paris 1949, p.117-119 (Librairie Gallimard).
^[8] In the context of Arguesian terminology it would be possible to call it the stump (souche), see Girard Desargues, Brouillon Proiect d’une atteinte aux evenemens des rencontres du Cone avec un Plan, in: L’Oeuvre Mathématique de G. Desargues, hg. von René Taton, Paris 1988, p.106 (Librairie philosophique J.Vrin) ; J.J. Field, J.J. Gray, The Geometrical Works of Girard Desargues, New York/Berlin 1987, p.66, 74 (Springer-Verlag); regarding the pencil : Judith N.Cederberg, A Course in Modern Geometries, 2^nd Edition, New York 2000 (Springer-Verlag), ch.IV.
^[9] Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.101.
^[10] Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.104.
^[11] Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.99.
^[12] Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.98.
^[13] Sartre 1981, op.cit.,p. 101.
^[14] Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.99 “pas apodictique.”
^[15] Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.99.
^[16] As regards psychology and physiology, see Rudolf Arnheim, Kunst und Sehen. Eine Psychologie des schöpferischen Sehens, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1965 (Englisch: Art and Visual Perception – a psychology of the creatve eye, 1954). Richard L.Gregory, Auge und Gehirn. Psychologie des Sehens, Reinbek bei Hamburg 2001 (englische Originalversion Eye and Brain. The Psychology of seeing, Oxford –Tokyo 1998; Rudolf Metzger, Gesetze des Sehens, Frankfurt 1975. As regards the well elaborated history of perspective, p.e. Rudolf Bkouche, „La Naissance du Projectif. De la Perspective à la géométrie projective”, in: Roshdi Rashed, Mathématiques et Philosophie de l'Antiquité à L'Age classique, Paris 1991, p.239-285 ; Michel Gallet, „Réflexions sur la Perspective, à propos d’un livre de Daniel Arasse“, in: Gazette des Beaux-Arts, 6ième période Tome CXXXVI, 142 année (2000), p.69-72 ; and the faculties : Wolf Feuerhahn, „Comment la psychologie empirique est-elle née ? “, in: Archives de Philosophie 65 vol.1 (2002), p.47-64.
^[17] As cited, Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.108.
^[18] A passage from esthetic literature that might mrror the situation in theoretical philosophy : Mikel Dufrenne, Phénoménologie de l’expérience esthétique, tome premier: L’objet esthétique, Paris: Presses universitaires de France 1967, p.120-125.
^[19] Satre 1981, op.cit., p.111.
^[20] KrV 333-334/B 390-391.
^[21] Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.112-113.
^[22] Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.113.
^[23] Richard Kirkham, Theories of truth. A critical Introduction, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press 1992. See also: James van Cleve, Robert E.Frederick (eds.), The Philosophy of Right and Left. Incongruent Counterparts and the Nature of Space, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1991; John Dilworth, „Internal versus External Representation“, in: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62:1 (2004), pp.23-36. Hubertus Busche, Leibniz’ Weg ins perspektivische Universum: eine Harmonie im Zeitalter der Berechnung, Hamburg 1997. Jean Grondin, “La fusion des horizons. La version gadamérienne de l’adaequatio rei et intellectus?”, in: Archives de Philosophie 68 (2005), pp.401-418. The same holds for the salient use of the term projection with: J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre (Vortag 1804), in: Gesamtausgabe der Bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, hg. v. Reinhard Lauth & Hans Gliwitzky, Nachgelassene Schriften, II, Band 8, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt 1985 (Friedrich Frommann Verlag/Günter Holzboog). Even if still explaining the appertaining ‘Gesetz’ (loi) from the ideal standpoint (p.372), the systematics do not totally fall apart.
^[24] See Hans Radermacher, “Dialektik”, in: Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe, hg.v. Hermann Krings, Hans Michael Baumgartner und Christoph Wild, Band 2, München 1973 (Kösel-Verlag), pp.290-309, 1.1.-1.2.
^[25] As cited, Husserl, Cartesianische Meditation § 31, Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.108.
^[26] The cardinal kantian standpoint, see recently p.e. Charles Parsons, „The Transcendental Aesthetics“, in: P.Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant, CUP 1992, S.62-100; Daniel Sutherland, „Kant on Fundamental Geometrical Relations”, in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 87/2 (2005), S.117-158. Darius Koriako, „Was sind und wozu dienen reine Anschauungen?. Kritische Fragen und Anmerkungen zu Kants Raumtheorie“, in: Kant-Studien 96. Jg. (2004), S.20-40. We do not discuss his allegation that colour perception has an equivalent value as regards the a priori.
^[27] Shin, Sun-Joo, Lemon, Oliver, „Diagrams“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries /diagrams/>.
^[28] KrV A 342/B 400. I, as thinking, am an object of the inner sense, being named the soul. That which is an object of the outer sense, is named a body. [...] the relationship to objects in space delivers the commercium with bodies.“ (KrV A 345/B403) 
^[29] KrV A 347/B 405. “Now I cannot have the least representation of a thinking being by means of outer experience, but only through self-consciousness. Thus such objects are nothing else than the projection [lit transmittance] of this my own consciousness onto other things which only by this are conceived of as thinking beings.”
^[30] See the article mentionned on dialectics, and Dieter Henrich, Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Hg.), Metaphysik nach Kant?, Stuttgart 1988 (Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongreß 1987).
^[31] With the irrestriced and uncontradicted model of geometry, and against a faulty tradition that has used the term in single connection with the setting act of the mind (Setzakt).
^[32] As also Fichte thought : Wissenschaftslehre (1804), op.cit., II/8, p.370 : “Dieses Projizieren geschieht, wenigstens der Materie, dem darin ausgesagten Inhalte des Wissens nach, nach einem absoluten Gesetze, das nicht nicht Gesetz sein, nicht nicht Causalität haben kann; es ist daher absolut immanentes Projiciren und kann davon nimmer los; oder, wie wir, als verdeutlichend, hinzusetzten, das Licht in der Projektion kann nicht durchaus also sein, wie es innerlich, oder nach dem Gesetze, ohne alle Projektion wäre.”
^[33] According to Cederberg 2000, op.cit., ch.IV.
^[34] See diagram and proof in connection with Cederberg 2000, op.cit., p.244 (conics in the projective plane). In order to enhance projection and narration : Florence de Chalonge, “Poétique et phénoménologie: le point de vue et la perception”, in: Littérature Nr. 131 (2003), pp.71-84.
^[35] This journal (Angèle Kremer Marietti, « Péguy et le Positivisme », in : DOGMA, mise à jour 16/07/2006 [http://www.dogma.lu], reprint form L’Amitié Charles Péguy, 16^ème Année, No 64, Octobre-Décembre 1993, pp.234-245).
^[36] Kremer Marietti 2006/1993, op.cit, p.4 (pdf-version).
^[37] KrV A 355.
^[38] The uneigentlicher oder ideal point, as is termed the vanishing point in modern projective geometry (since Poncelet), Emanuel Sperner, Einführung in die Analytische Geometrie und Algebra, 5.Aufl. Göttingen 1963.
^[39] KrV A 341-A 405.
^[40] To refer to a well-known text (scilicet, to update) : Rolf Oerter, Moderne Entwicklungspsychologie, Donauwörth (Verlag Ludwig Auer) 16th edition 1976, pp.27-29.
^[41] Friedrich Gaede, „Leibniz’ Urteilsform und das Ende der Barockliteratur“, in: SIMPLICIANA (Schriften der Grimmelshausen-Gesellschaft III), Münster 1981, S.65-71. Gaede, „Der Substanzbegriff als Thema und Maßstab des Romans. Beobachtungen zu Leibniz, Grimmelshausen und Th.Mann“, in: Vf. (Hg.), Leibniz, die Künste und die Musik: ihre Geschichte, Theorie und Wissenschaft, München (Katzbichler, forthcoming 2006).
^[42] To refer, in the context, once more to literary instructive elucidation: Friedrich Gaede, German Baroque Literature – The European Perspective, New York 1983, ch.2, pp.25-37, as well as Gaede 1981, op.cit.
^[43] As an example : Jürgen Haberma, “Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. Zu Richard Rortys pragmatischer Wende,” in: Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung, Frankfurt 1999, pp.230-270.
^[44] Cederberg 2000.
^[45] To compare with Michel Dufrenne as an outstanding example of literature in aesthetics focussing inentionnality, the permanence of the axis is also attested, however, the polarity has vanished as also the peculiar significance of standpoint (as a transcendental or condition otherwise) is not addressed (Michel Dufrenne, Esthétique et philosophie, Paris: Éditions Klincksieck 1967, ch.2, especially 56-59).
^[46] As a representation, argumentation as to the ascriptive self, its apperceptive power can be regrasped with Kant and its interpretation through Strawson and Bird (Graham H. Bird, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. An Outline of One Central Argument in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, London (Routledge & Kegan Paul) 1962; and in particular Graham H. Bird, „The Paralogisms and Kant’s Account of Psychology“, in: Kant-Studien vol. 91 (2000), pp.129-145
^[47] p.e. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, „De ipsa natura sive de vi insita actionibusque creaturarum“, § 7, in: GP IV, pp.504-516
^[48] To repeat – on other grounds – a conclusion, Sartre has come to in L’être et le néant, Paris (Librairie Gallimard) 1940, III/ch.1.
^[49] Auguste Comte, Système de Politique Positive ou Traité de Sociologie, instituant la Religion de l’Humanité, in: Œuvres d’Auguste Comte, Tome VIII, vol 2, Paris (éditions anthropos) 1970, p.364.
^[50] See in particular the correspondence with Arnauld (GPII).
^[51] Dufrenne 1967, a.a.O., p.43.
^[52] A first glance might be taken from the recent publication Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Schriften und Briefe zur Geschichte, bearbeitet, kommentiert und herausgegeben von Malte-Ludolf Babin und Gerd van den Heuvel, Hannover 2004 (Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung).
^[53] Auguste Comte, Système de Politique Positive ou Traité de Sociologie, instituant la Religion de l’Humanité, in: Œuvres d’Auguste Comte, Tome VII-IX, Nd Paris (éditions anthropos) 1970
^[54] Kremer Marietti 2006/1993, op.cit., pp.6-10 (pdf-vrsion).
^[55] Grondin 2005, op.cit., pp.403-407.
^[56] Grondin 2005, op.cit. p.411.
^[57] Grondin 2005, op.cit., no. 4.
^[58] P.e. in an extensive elaboration in lectures from 1804 about the Wissenschaftslehre (vol. II/8 of Gesamtausgabe).
^[59] Esp. Grondin 2005, op.cit., p.406-407.
^[60] Grondin 2005, op.cit.,p.415-416.
^[61] Jan Schapp, „Metaphysisches und nachmetaphysisches Denken. Bemerkungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns von Jürgen Habermas“, in: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie vol 83 (1997), pp.193-205, 197-200.
^[62] Fichte left with the presupposition of ‘projectio per hiatum irrationalem’ because he severely tried to uphold his main claim, the sole setting force of the I, the exclusive holder of reality. (Werke II/8, p.237). In lectures XXIII-XXV, however, there are exhibited good arguments for not abolishing projection as an essential, immediate, and constantly performing faculty (or ‘arch-principle’ as he says) of the consciousness.
^[63] As the personal history is called in psychology (Philip Zimbardo, Psychologie, 6. édition Berlin 1995, p.298).
^[64] Which still is not reflected in, p.e., the positivist bound evaluation of categorization : Steven Harnad, „To cognize is to categorize: cognition is categorization“, in: Henry Cohen & Claire Lefebvre (eds.), Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science, Amsterdam (Elsevier) 2005, S.19-42.
^[65] René Descartes, La Recherche de la Vérité par la Lumière naturelle, in : Œuvres des Descartes, publiées par Charles Adam & Paul Tannery, Band X, Paris 1966 (Librairie philosophique J. Vrin), pp.501 (le lieu si solitaire d’Eudoxe), 509 („les premiéres créances en notre fantaisie“ [...] que la volonté ne suffit pas pour effacer“).
^[66] Jan Schapp, „Metaphysisches und nachmetaphysisches Denken. Bemerkungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns von Jürgen Habermas“, in: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie vol 83 (1997), pp..193-205.
^[67] Émile Durkheim (1892), „La contribution de Montesquieu à la constitution de la science sociale“ (Bordeaux 1892), in: Montesquieu et Rousseau, précurseurs de la sociologie. Paris (Librairie Marcel Rivière et Cie) 1966, pp.25-113 (Série B. Les Classiques de la sociologie. Collection Petite bibliothèque sociologique internationale dirigée par Armand Cuvillier), introduction.
^[68] “Le génome d'un individu, parce qu'il relève de son être plutôt que de son avoir, ne peut pas être l'objet de commerce, tout comme les autres composants physiques de sa personne”(Avis sur l'application des tests génétiques aux etudes individuelles, études familiales et études de population. (Problèmes des “banques de l'ADN, des “banques” de cellules et de l'informatisation des données”), No. 25 24 juin 1991, Le Comité consultatif national d’éthique. Paris/www.comite-ethique.fr).
^[69] Benjamin Lewin, Molekularbiologie der Gene, aus dem Englischen, Heidelberg: Springer 1998, S.44-47.
^[70] “Quelles que soient les finalités alléguées en faveur d'un tel projet, les unes présentables, d'autres au contraire à peine énonçables, elles offrent toutes ce trait commun que, dans leur principe même, elles reviennent à projeter de mettre au monde un ou des êtres humains non comme libres fins en soi mais comme purs moyens au service d'objectifs préalables qui leur seraient, fût-ce en dépit des apparences, foncièrement extérieurs.” Le Comité consultatif national d’éthique, Avis No. 54 22 avril 1997, “Réponse au Président de la République au sujet du clonage reproductive”, p.20.
^[71] Durkheim 1892, op.cit. III.
^[72] To recall an interpretation of Pierre Macherey concerning the painting of Albrecht Altdorfer on the battle of Alexandre against Darius („Temps modernes“ (24/5/2006, Textes en ligne http://stl.recherche.univ-lille3.fr/seminaires/philosophie/macherey/).
^[73] Norman V.Rothwell, Understanding Genetics. A Molecular approach, Ny : John Riley & Sons 1998.
^[74] “Or on peut l'écrire en toute assurance : l'idée qu'une parfaite similitude génétique entraînerait de soi une parfaite similitude psychique est dénuée de tout fondement scientifique. L'identité biologique d'un individu ne peut déjà être réduite à son identité génétique nucléaire , à cause du rôle de l'hérédité cytoplasmique (mitochondriale) et surtout de celui de l'épigénèse dans le développement.” (Le Comité consultatif national d’éthique, Avis No. 54, op.cit., p.18.
^[75] Panajotis Kondylis, Die neuzeitliche Metaphysikkritik, Stuttgart : Klett-Cotta 1990, p.279.
^[76] “Donating spare embryos for embryonic stem-cell research”, from the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, in : Fertility and Sterility vol. 78, no. 5, November 2002, pp.957-960. – “Avis sur les problèmes éthiques nés des techniques de reproduction artificielle”. No. 3 23 octobre 1984, Le Comité consultatif national d’éthique (Paris).
^[77] Evidence can be found in the arguments and facts provided by avis 54 of Le Comité consultatif national d’éthique.
^[78] Esp. G.W.Leibniz, Philosophischer Briefwechsel, Band 1, Der Briefwechsel mit Antoine Arnauld, Hamburg (Meiner) 1997 (and letters to other scholars like De Volder and de Bosses, in : GPII).
^[79] Philip Zimbardo, Psychologie, 6.Aufl. Berlin 1995.
^[80] There are other ones as might be seen from the following citation : “Un contrôle social de la demande de procréation assistée semblait s’imposer: une distinction devait pouvoir se faire entre les demandes considérées comme socialement acceptables et celles potentiellement déstabilisatrices de la vie sociale et de l’équilibre psychique des individus” (Art. “Procréation assistée” from Simone Novaes, in: Dictionnaire d’Éthique et de Philosophie morale, publié sous la direction de Monique Canto-Sperber, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1996, p.1187).
^[81] Recent investigation Graham H. Bird, “The Paralogisms and Kant’s Account of Psychology“, in: Kant-Studien vol. 91 (2000), pp.129-145.
^[82] Qu'est-ce qu'un fait social ? in : Émile Durkheim, Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, l^ère éd. : Paris 1894 (presses univrsitaires de France), 1. ch. Robert Alan Jones, Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four Major Works, Beverly Hills 1986.
^[83] Avis no.3. October 23 1984, source cited above. “L'autre conduit à constater, à propos de cette affaire, que l'ensemble de l'information contenue dans le génome humain appartient au patrimoine commun de l'humanité : c'est un domaine de la connaissance qui ne peut faire l'objet de monopole. ”
^[84] I.Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, in : AA VIII, p.144.
^[85] Still the prevailing in all the European constitutions, as one may learn from Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe, fourth edition London 1999 (SAGE Publications), ch.6/II : “The institutions of democracy”.
^[86] As recent publication recalls (Graham H.Bird, “The Paralogisms and Kant’s Account of Psychology”, in: Kant-Studien 91 (2001), pp.129-145) one would have to determine and distinguish between forms of experience that relate to the empirical, otherwise to the transcendental, ideal, or abstract side – these not identical – in order to unfold segments within the ‘fan’ of reference.
^[87] Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre (1804), op.cit., II/8, p.236, 244, 262 (with an allusion to the rhethorical we), 326, especially 350.
^[88] Novaes 1996, op.cit., p.1190.
^[89] Peter R.Russell, Art. “Political Pluralism”, in: The Social Encyclopedia, eds. A.Kuper & J.Kuper, 2nd Edition, London 1996; Lane and Ersson 1999, op.cit., pp.37, 43, where the common concept is set off against the new concept of consociational democracy (II/6) and espcially the cleavage, pp.155-159.
^[90] Emile Durkheim, Pragmatism and the Question of Truth, in : Pragmatism & Sociology, Cambridge University Press 1983, Nineteenth Lecture.
^[91] Émile Durkheim, Émile Durkheim, Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, lère éd. : 1894, English version ed. by Steven Lukes, New York : Free Press 1982. Émile Durkheim, Textes. 1. Éléments d'une théorie sociale, pp. 109 à 118. Collection Le sens commun. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1975. Robert Alan Jones, Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four Major Works, Beverly Hills 1986, pp.60-81.
^[92] Jürgen Habermas, „Wahrheitstheorien“, in: Helmut Fahrenbach (Hg.), Wirklichkeit und Reflexion. Walter Schulz zum 60. Geburtstag, Pfullingen 1973, S.211-265. Jürgen Habermas, „Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. Zu Richard Rortys pragmatischer Wende“, in: Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung, Frankfurt 1999, S.230-270. - Martina Deckert, „Recht und Wahrheit“, in: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie vol. 82 (1996), S.43-54.
^[93] This is also the scope the Comité consultatif national d’éthique is aiming at (p.e. avis 54).
^[94] In comparison with Locke: Josiane Boulad-Ayoub et François Blanchard, Les grandes figures du monde moderne (2003). Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval; Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001, pp.124-126.
^[95] Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, in : A VIII, p.352.
^[96] Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe, fourth edition London 1999 (SAGE Publications).,II/6, esp. pp.175-182 up to corporatism later.
^[97] Émile Durkheim, « Le « CONTRAT SOCIAL » de Rousseau » (1918), Étude originalement publiée après la mort de Durkheim par Xavier Léon dans la Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, tome XXV (1918), pp. 1 à 23 ; et 129 à 161. (Une édition électronique réalisée à partir du livre d’Émile Durkheim, Montesquieu et Rousseau. Précurseurs de la sociologie, pages 115 à 198. Note introductive de Georges Davy. Parie : Librairie Marcel Rivière et Cie, 1966. Série B : Les Classiques de la sociologie. Collection : Petite bibliothèque de sociologie international), p.46.
^[98] Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, in. A VIII, p.353.
^[99] “Il est certain que le genre humain n'offre à l'esprit qu'une idée purement collective qui ne suppose aucune union réelle entre les individus qui le constituent” (Durkheim, Contrat social, op.cit., p.15).
^[100] “Mais si la force nouvelle, née de la combinaison des individus en sociétés, au lieu d'être accaparée par des particuliers et individualisée, était impersonnelle et si, par suite, elle planait au-dessus de tous les particuliers, ceux-ci seraient tous égaux par rapport à elle, puisque aucun d'eux n'en disposerait à titre privé et, du même coup, ils ne dépendraient plus les uns des autres, mais d'une force qui par son impersonnalité, serait identique, mutatis mutandis, aux forces naturelles” (Durkheim, Contrat social, op.cit., p.23). 
^[101] Roland Posner, „Pragmatics“, in: R.Posner, Klaus Robering, Thomas A.Sebeok (Hg), Semiotics. Ein Handbuch zu den zeichentheoretischen Grundlagen von Natur und Kultur, Berlin-New York : de Gruyter 1997, p.219-246
^[102] Sartre 1981, op.cit., p.130-131.