In the winter of 1969, caught
up in the immense significance of May 1968 for France and for capitalism
everywhere, one of the greatest Marxist theorists of the time tried to draw some
lessons. Louis Althusser published “Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses: Notes Towards an
Investigation.”
[1] Like
Marx’s and Lenin’s efforts earlier to do the same for the Paris
Commune, Althusser’s article aimed to build on the successes and overcome
the failures of another historic anti-capitalist uprising.
The central issue confronting Althusser resembled what Gramsci had struggled
with in his
Prison Notebooks earlier in the century: how should Marxism
understand and deal with the inability of the working class and its leading
organizations to transform a crisis of capitalism into a transition to communism.
Like Gramsci, Althusser turned to the realm of ideology.
[2]
How people imagined their relationship to economy and society – the ideology
that infused their actions – became his object of analysis. Ideology –
or, more concretely, the multiple ideologies coexisting in contradiction –
could operate so as to preclude a capitalist crisis from becoming a transition
to communism. Althusser set himself the task of analyzing how ideologies functioned
in society and what institutions (“apparatuses”) served as the sites/mechanisms
for their functioning. Althusser’s Marxist politics governed his project.
By stressing how ideologies and their apparatuses supported the class structure
of capitalist societies, he sought to make future Marxist social interventions
more successful in transforming capitalist crises into transitions to communism.
Althusser began his argument by
citing Marx’s strong insistence that the capitalist mode of production
could never survive unless its social conditions were reproduced. While the
general term “mode of production” was taken from Marx and used in
deference to its great popularity in much Marxist literature, Althusser actually
meant something much more specific than the broader, more inclusive definition
of mode of production in that literature. He spoke repeatedly of capitalist
“exploitation” or “extortion” – which referred to
the appropriation by capitalists of a surplus value produced by others, namely
productive workers.
[3] Thus, this
essay refers mostly to the narrower notion of the exploitative capitalist class
structure rather than the broader, less focused “mode of
production,” since that seems more consistent with Althusser’s
argument.
For him, the non-productive aspects of the society in which
capitalist class structures prevail comprise the conditions of those
structures’ existence. Without the reproduction of those aspects –
and he was especially interested in the political and ideological conditions
– capitalist class structures of production would collapse. Althusser took
the further and crucial step of insisting that nothing guarantees the
reproduction of capitalism’s conditions of existence and hence likewise
the reproduction of capitalism itself. That is, the capitalist class structure
does not automatically or necessarily succeed in reproducing its conditions of
existence. And therein lies a key vulnerability of capitalism’s survival.
The political and ideological conditions of capitalist class structures of
production are always more or less a problem for capitalism and capitalists. The
latter seek to shape, control, and reproduce them so that they provide the
needed supports. However, they do so against contradictory social influences
that can make politics and ideology undermine more than they support
capitalism.
Althusser distinguished between two sets of social sites - or
“apparatuses” as he called them – that conditioned the
capitalist mode of production. The first set was political and comprised the
state and its various activities and branches. This he named the Repressive
State Apparatus (RPA) as a way to summarize his reading of the Marxian
tradition’s understanding of the role of the state in capitalist society.
That understanding stressed how the state (a) maintained and wielded a monopoly
of the means of force in capitalist societies and (b) applied that monopoly to
support capitalist class structures. The state, in effect, repressed the threats
to capitalist class structures that it recognized. Its branches, activities, and
officials constituted a Repressive State Apparatus. What most interested
Althusser, however, was how a different set of social sites or apparatuses
– much less well examined or understood in the Marxist tradition –
played a parallel role in sustaining capitalist class structures. He named that
set the Ideological State Apparatus (ISA).
The various state ideological
apparatuses – and he included among them especially the schools, the
family, religions and religious institutions – worked not by power and
politics (as did the RPA) but rather by ideology. By this he meant that they
functioned to inculcate children and adults in specific ways of thinking about
and thus understanding their relationship to the societies within which they
lived.
[4] As with the RPAs,
ideological state apparatuses were also sites where capitalists’ efforts
to shape their functioning contested with the often differently directed efforts
of others. Capitalists operated in both the RPA and the ISA but in each case
“precisely in its contradictions” (p. 146). Althusser believed that
the RSA was more unified and controlled in seeing and performing the functions
capitalists wanted, whereas the ISA was a more diverse, open, and contested
terrain where capitalists had greater difficulties in securing their agendas as
opposed to others’.
ISAs work by ideology, which in
Althusser’s view means by “interpellation”. That is,
institutions such as families, churches, schools, and so on function by
“calling” individuals by names and in terms that prescribe and
enforce (a) thinking in specific ways about their relationships with other
individuals and with institutions and practices in society and (b) acting
accordingly. In his subtle formulations, Althusser focuses on the
“subjectivity” of such interpellated individuals. He sees the ISAs
as quite literally imposing the particular subjectivity that individuals assume
and internalize as self- definitions. Modern capitalism presses ISAs to subject
individuals to a particular ideology of the “subject” that provides
crucial conditions of existence for (that reproduces) capitalism.
This
ideology of the subject that ISAs impose on individuals affirms, in a kind of
ironic twist, that their subjectivity consists of an independence and autonomy.
That is, individuals are interpellated as free subjects who function as the
ultimate causes and origins of their belief systems, their actions, and their
social institutions. The very ambiguity of the word “subject” - as
both something/someone “subjected” and something/someone that causes
– serves Althusser to highlight the key ideological reversal performed by
ISAs in capitalist societies today. Individuals are thus shaped by ISAs to
believe that their conformity to the needs of capitalist class structures is
something quite different, a life path freely chosen by an independent and
autonomous subject. In Althusser’s words, the individual within modern
capitalist societies is interpellated by ISAs as “free” so that
he/she “freely accepts his subjection” (p. 182).
Now,
Althusser proceeds along the lines of this argument with a deliberate
epistemological self-consciousness. He thus does not imagine or position himself
as reasoning from outside the realm of ideology. He accepts - and indeed
insists – that all thinking subjects, himself included, are “always,
already” interpellated (p. 176). Althusser admits his own subjectivity,
his own peculiar subjection to his society’s ISAs and thus his socially
embedded standpoint. While Althusser’s is a different notion of
subjectivity from that one mostly inculcated by the ISAs of his society, both
are products of that society. For Althusser, the social contradictions working
on the ISAs make them more or less contested terrains. Their contradictions
provoke the formation of different and oppositional conceptions of subjectivity
that the ISAs then disseminate. Althusser’s subjectivity emerges from
their contradictions and moves toward the anti-capitalist traditions of Marxism,
socialism, and communism – contesting forces struggling over the
organization and operation of ISAs. He thus develops a different notion of
individual subjectivity, one that entails his critique of the main kind of
interpellated subjectivity imposed by ISAs. In his view, the latter comprises an
important condition of existence of capitalist class structures of production.
Althusser attacks the dominant interpellation of individuals in modern
capitalism – as “free subjects” – for ignoring/denying
the social constitution and social effects (i.e., supporting capitalist
exploitation) of that particular interpellation.
The analysis of ISAs in
Althusser’s famous article represent a major Marxist contribution to what
later became better known – and more neutrally directed - as
“cultural studies.” His ISAs are, of course, major vehicles for the
formation and transmission of all that is included in the term culture.
Families, schools, and churches are the material realities in and by which
individuals are interpellated into socialized subjects. Their complex
organizations, modalities, and contradictions are precisely what
Althusser’s article invited Marxists especially to explore. Their social
connection to capitalist class structures was as crucial for the latters’
survival as was the state which had gotten the lion’s share of Marxist
analytical and political attention. Althusser was, in effect, urging Marxists to
correct the imbalance, to devote serious and sustained attention to the workings
of ISAs as a central component of Marxist research and politics: a Marxist
cultural studies program.
What distinguishes such a Marxist approach from
other tendencies of cultural studies is the focus on linking cultural values,
institutions, and contradictions to the capitalist class structures of society
with each side of the link serving simultaneously as cause and effect of the
other. No determinist or reductionist linking would be acceptable; no
old-fashioned Marxist reflection theorizations; no essentialism. Althusser had
much earlier pointed the way to his very different approach to linking,
“overdetermination”, in which
every cause was also an
effect.
[5] Culture was both cause and
effect of class. Each was constitutive of the other alongside the constitutivity
of all the political and other aspects of the social totality beside class and
culture. In particular an Althusserian approach to cultural studies would seek
to identify the particular contradictions (and the tensions and conflicts in
which they are expressed) that are overdetermined within (a) the class
structure, (b) culture (the ISAs), and (c) their interactions. Indeed,
Althusser’s final work was just such an attempt focused on the conscious,
unconscious, and intensely contradictory interpellations to which his family ISA
subjected him.
[6] Several
important aspects of Althusser’s conceptualization of the ISAs were either
underdeveloped in his essay or else subject later to intense debates. These
deserve a brief discussion here. First, there is the matter of thinking about a
society’s class structure as singular. Althusser’s original essay on
the ISAs took a clear position on this when he mentioned “modes of
production combined in a social formation” (p. 158). However, he never
developed this point nor integrated it into his discussion. Yet nothing less is
demanded to make the ISAs comprehensible. If societies (or the preferred Marxist
term, “social formations”) comprise multiple interacting class
structures, then a whole host of key issues arise that are directly pertinent to
ISAs. First, Althusser’s logic implies that each class structure within a
society would seek to shape ISAs (family, church, schools, etc.) to secure its
conditions of existence. This would trasmit the contradictions and tensions
among the class structures into the ISAs themselves and into their
interpellations of individuals. In societies where, for example, self-employed
persons (Marx’s “ancient class structure”) coexisted with
capitalist class structured enterprises and feudal class structures inside
households, each of these would exert its specific and likely incongruent
influences upon ISAs.
[7] The latter
would then have complex, contradictory effects upon those class structures. This
opens the door to highly nuanced Marxist theorizations of ISAs in societies with
diverse class structures, but Althusser did not go through that door, neither
explicitly nor systematically.
Second, there is the flavor of economic
determinism that is discernible at points in his original essay. Like Marx,
Althusser was concerned to stress what others had minimized or ignored: the
roles of class structures in shaping ideology. In so doing, he sometimes veered
close to determinist arguments of the sort he had denounced repeatedly ever
since the original essay on “Contradiction and Overdetermination”
(see footnote 5). The same problem arose as well in Althusser’s
overstressing of the profound and subtle ways in which ISAs provided the
conditions for capitalist class structures’ reproduction. He gave far less
attention to the ways in which ISAs also did the opposite, undermining that
reproduction because of contradictory influences upon them emanating from, for
example, exploited workers and the non-capitalist class structures coexisting
with the capitalist in modern societies.
Thirdly, Althusser’s
discussion of the ISAs resembled his other works in paying too little attention
to the different modern forms of capitalist class exploitation. These would
presumably shape ISAs in different ways that Althusser might have at least
briefly surveyed to good theoretical and political effect. Capitalist
exploitation can, for example, exist in both private and state forms. That is,
the capitalist exploiters – the appropriators of a surplus produced by
others – can be either private individuals or they can be state officials.
In modern capitalist corporations, the capitalists are either private
individuals comprising a board of directors elected by share-holders or they are
state officials assigned to a comparable position (although perhaps named a
commission or ministry). Althusser’s trenchant criticisms of the USSR
might have, but never did, lead him to inquire about how a state capitalism
would interact differently with ISAs than a private capitalism. This is
unfortunate especially as it might have provoked extremely useful examinations
of the sorts of interactions between ISAs and state capitalist class structures
that had much to do with the collapse of the USSR in 1989.
In conclusion,
Althusser’s theory of the ISAs enabled and provoked a distinctively
Marxist examination of culture and its importance to class analysis and class
politics. It added layers of depth and richness to Gramsci’s efforts in
similar directions. Althusser’s beginnings aimed to stimulate a Marxist
tradition of studying ideology and culture. He would have ridiculed the notion
that the term “post-Marxist” need or should apply to cultural
studies, since he clearly believed that Marxist work was precisely what had not
yet been undertaken beyond mere beginnings. We may perhaps best illustrate the
rich possibilities of Althusser’s beginning by applying his ISA analysis
to the particular history of the world’s most successful capitalism, the
United States.
The basic statistics on capitalist exploitation in the United States since its
civil war are stark in Marxist terms. Real wages rose but less quickly than
did labor productivity. In Marxist terms, this means nearly a century and a
half of a rising rate of exploitation. More and more surplus value was generated
relative to what was paid to productive workers. That surplus is what enabled
the US to achieve its ostentatious wealth and the massive state projecting a
global military preponderance. In Marxist economic terms, that surplus results
from the fact that US workers are among the most exploited in the world today.
At the same time, the success of US capitalist enterprises in continually raising
their productivity (and thus producing commodities with ever less labor per
unit of output) enabled the workers’ real wages to rise to historically
unprecedented levels. Indeed, the “success” of US capitalism lay
in its unique combination of rising exploitation and rising real wages (a possibility
Marx foresaw precisely in
Capital, vol. 1’s
famous discussion
of “relative surplus value”).
US capitalism has been able to raise the
exploitation of its workers to dizzying levels with much less resistance than
capitalisms elsewhere have faced. Coopted trade unions, little socialist and
communist opposition, and weak criticisms from its intelligentsia have been
hallmarks of US capitalism. Hence the US became the securest capitalism on the
planet, a magnet for the wealth of the rich across the globe. Yet the extreme
rate of capitalist exploitation in the US has come at an equally impressive
social cost. The levels of physical and psychological stress, drug abuse,
interpersonal violence, broken families, psychological depression, loneliness
and isolation are also extremely high.
The reasons for US
capitalism’s success – its security, its growth, and its wealth
– lie only partly in its economic performance. Here the central
achievement has been this: capitalists compensated their productive workers for
an historically high and rising rate of exploitation by delivering a rising
level of consumption. In this, the US fulfilled the hope articulated much
earlier by Adam Smith. He argued that a capitalism exhibiting growing
inequalities between a few and the many could nonetheless avoid the envy and
resentment that risked a Hobbesian war of all against all if it could compensate
the many with rising consumption. This is what US capitalism accomplished. Yet
that would hardly have sufficed if workers in the US had defined themselves and
the quality of life they sought predominantly in ways that stressed
interpersonal relationships, mental health, community, and free time. Had those
– rather than personal consumption levels - been their measures of the
good life, workers in the US would not have tolerated and accepted the costs of
high and rising rates of exploitation that generated the surpluses enabling US
wealth and global power.
Here Althusser’s ISAs enter the picture and
assume their importance. Workers in the US had somehow to be interpellated
systematically – in their families, schools, churches, the mass media, and
so on – as consumption oriented and driven. They had to be called to think
of themselves as free market participants choosing between work and leisure
according to the consumption they could achieve via the income from that work.
They had to define themselves as above all “consumers” who suffered
the “disutlity” of labor to acquire the “utilities”
embodied in consumption. The neoclassical economics that so totally dominates
academia, the media, and politics in the US is the theoretical formalization of
this interpellation. The advertising that pervades every aspect of life is the
relentless popularization of the interpellation. Workers in the US were
subjected to an ideology that defined and celebrated them as consumers first and
positively (and workers as secondary and negatively). Their individual worth
– for themselves and for others - was to be measured in the level of
consumption they could achieve. And that level of consumption was to be
understood as the reward for their individual contribution to production.
Only in so far as the ISAs in the US effectively defined most
individuals’ subjectivity in such terms were rising wages sufficient to
compensate workers for their extreme exploitation. Only if the workers
subjectively understood themselves as beings demanding chiefly consumption from
the laboring activity that so depleted them (rather than community, solidarity,
emotional/relational sustenance, and so on) would they be content with rising
wages. The ISAs performed well in the US, perhaps better for capitalism there
than anywhere else.
Althusser’s caution to be mindful of the
contradictions always plaguing ISAs is applicable to the US as well. The rampant
“consumerism” in the US has always provoked criticisms, such as
Thorstein Veblen’s attacks on “conspicuous consumption” from
the left and religious fundamentalists’ laments about lost
“spirituality” from the right. More than a few workers reasoned
their way to a recognition, partly inspired by such critics, that the
accumulation of consumer goods and services failed to overcome the intolerable
strains of exploitation at work and its horrific social effects on personal
lives. Such persons revolted, more or less and in diverse ways: some fled to
rural villages, some “dropped out” for lives on the social margins
(artistic pursuits, alcohol, lives in religious sects, petty crime, and so on),
some turned inward to concentrate upon a fetishized family unit, and some found
their way to a personal immersion in their work that came to be called, in a
revealing usage, “workaholism”. Such revolts presented the ISAs
with special problems, namely to constrain the revolts to forms and directions
that would not put at risk the capitalist class structures. The solution was to
shape subjects such that if they revolted against consumerist society, that
revolt should be individual, not collective, and should not aim at displacing
capitalist in favor of communist class structures.
Here finally, the issue
arises as to how Marxists such as Althusser might use the notion of ISAs to
inform a Marxist politics. That politics aims to intervene socially with an
agenda that includes transforming capitalist (exploitative) into communist
(non-exploitative) class structures of production. In the US that would mean
entering into the contradictions of its ISAs precisely to undermine the
interpellation of individuals as chiefly consuming subjects and thereby to
expose the profound inadequacy of consumption as the workers’ compensation
for capitalist exploitation. Anti-capitalist forces would stress the costs of
that exploitation while exposing the consumerist subjection of workers as a key
ideological support of that exploitation. Such forces would counterpose the
benefits of a communist class structure that, by eliminating exploitation, would
also reduce the social costs to which exploitation contributes.
A tragedy
of anti-capitalist politics in the US for a long time is that they were not
informed by anything like Althusser’s ISA argument. The left in the US did
not attack the interpellation of individuals as consuming subjects. Indeed, the
left endorsed and repeated such interpellations. It presented itself and
socialism generally as the better vehicle for individuals to achieve higher
levels of consumption: endless slogans and programs for “higher
wages”, “family wages”, “living wages”,
“minimum wages”, “guaranteed incomes” and so on. The US
left thus chose to compete with capitalism in the one area, consumption, where
capitalism could deliver enough to render that competition unpersuasive and
ineffective with workers interpellated as consumers.
In this way, the left
inadvertently reinforced the capitalist-sustaining aspects of ISAs rather than
building upon the contradictions within ISAs to undermine the consumerist
interpellation of US workers. Applying Althusser’s theory of the ISAs thus
enables a profound critique of the socialist movement in the US and of similar
socialist movements
elsewhere.
[1] The article appeared first
in the French journal
La Pensee in 1970; it was then reprinted in the
collection of Althusser’s articles translated into English by Ben Brewster
and titled
Lenin and Philosophy (London: New Left Books, 1971, pp.
127-186; New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978; and several reprintings
subsequently). The page numbers here refer to the Monthly Review
edition.
[2] Althusser
explicitly (p. 142) credited Gramsci’s work as one basis for his
own.
[3] Althusser uses these
terms repeatedly, on pages 137, 150, 154 and 156, to pinpoint what was, for him,
the definitional core of the capitalist mode of production: the economic
relation whereby some take and use the surplus produced by
others.
[4] Althusser’s
argument here is quite subtle. He insisted that the distinction between RSA and
ISA was a matter of emphasis and degree. The RSA, he said, worked mostly by
force and secondarily by ideology, whereas the reverse applied to the ISA (p.
145). Althusser thus recognized the social diffusion of mechanisms of power and
repression stressed by Foucault, but, unlike the latter, systematically
maintained the distinction between power and ideology as central to his argument
about capitalism’s
reproduction.
[5] See his
important essay “Contradiction and Overdetermination” in
For
Marx (Trans. By Ben Brewster). New York: Vintage Books, 1970, pp. 87-128.
The importance of overdetermination and its relation to constitutivity as a new
and different Marxian concept of cause and effect are discussed at length in
Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff,
Knowledge and Class: A Marxian Critique of
Political Economy. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987,
pp. 81-106.
[6] Louis Althusser,
The Future Lasts Forever: A Memoir (Edited by Olivier Corpet and Yann
Moulier Boutang and Translated by Richard Veasey). New York: The New Press,
1993.
[7] See the analysis of
such feudal class structured households in Harriet Fraad, Stephen Resnick, and
Richard Wolff,
Bringing It All Back Home: Class, Gender and Power in the
Modern Household. London: Pluto Press, 1994.