The ontological status of objects of knowledge is crucial for epistemic theories.
It seems that if these are mind-independent then the cognitive relativists
do not have a strong ground. On the other hand if objects of knowledge are
constructions or at least mind-dependent, then it is a win for them. Since
scientific theory/knowledge enjoys a sacrosanct position, any effective assault
on their objectivity, truth etc. can be regarded as a virtual victory for
cognitive relativisrn.
I shall try to argue in this paper, by examining two different aspects. of
cognitive relativism whether the arguments based on these aspects are adequate.
These are methodological and anto1ogical aspects of cognitive issues. The
first one involves the most powerful argument namely, the incommensurability
of theories which can be contested. The second aspect concerns the ontological
status of epistemic objects. It is claimed in this section that a1though we
can concede a lot to the constructionist view, most of the arguments against
objectivist theory of knowledge can be met by making a distinction between
commonsense realism and scientific realism. Although scientific theories and
objects involve lot of constructionist element, commonsense objects, surprisingly
do not involve those problems and endure changes in cognitive systems in a
more or less stable way.
The most powerful argument in favour of cognitive relativisrn is that the
ground on which one theory is accepted rather than another is not rational
or objective because rival theories are not comparable. Theory-choice is mostly
based on historical-sociological grounds. Even 'propaganda, conceit
and lie' are suggested (as done by Paul Feyerabend in the case of Galileo)
as reasons for accepting a theory such as Copernicus' heliocentric theory
in preference to Ptolemaic geocentric theory.
The argument in favour of cognitive relativism thus heavily relies on the
assumption of incommensurability of theories as it is well known in literature
on methodology. Let us start with the possible senses in which 'incommensurability'
can be understood and then we shall see if theories are incommensurable. In
this connection we can refer to various senses[1]
without assuming that any of these is primary and the others secondary.
1) In one sense 'incommensurable' means 'not commensurable in
respect of magnitude'.
2) In another it means 'incapable of being measured (in comparison with)'.
3) In mathematics it means 'having no common factors integral or fractional'.
4) Another use in mathematics refers to 'irrational - not commensurate
with the natural numbers' . Examples may be non-terminating decimal etc.
Incommensurability of theories generally means (1) and (2) although the protagonists
are not very precise about the meaning. (3) and (4) sometimes constitute the
content of some version of the incommensurability thesis.
Let us start with an examination to see whether theories are comparable (or
not) in any acceptable sense and also if cognitive relativism gains any ground
by such analysis. A scientific theory is one which is always vulnerable to
be falsified or at least superseded by a 'better' theory. What makes
a theory 'better' and how theories are logically related to each other
are methodological issues, issues undermined by a stance that regards rival
theories as incommensurable or incomparable as to their cognitive/scientific
value. Two theories are rivals in a strong sense if their intended
subject-matter is identical and in particular if what either of them says
about this common subject-matter is incompatible with what the other says.
Such is the case with Einstein's theory of the gravitational field as compared
with Newton's. Quantum mechanics and the classical mechanics of masspoints
make up another pair of rival theories. In a weaker sense one theory is rival
of another if the objects of the second one are not identical with, but ontologically
dependent on the objects of the first. Thus we may see quantum mechanics as
a rival of classical continuum mechanics and any atomic theory of matter (classical
or quantum) as a rival of (phenomenological) thermodynamics. Because matter
as the object of the latter is composed of atoms as the primary objects of
the former. In these cases although the theories may be strictly speaking
incompatible, their total relation may nevertheless be seen as that of one
theory reducing the other or explaining it, and that is exactly what physical
theories aim at : to understand and explain the properties of matter by those
of its ultimate constituents.
The question is : Can rival theories be evaluated ? And if so on what basis
? This divides philosophers of science. One camp views theories to be evaluated
by analysis of rival theories by objective and universal standards. In this
opinion only logical parameters can decide which one is a better theory and
succession of theories is progressive. On the other hand all these are denied
by the opponent view that, so-called changes in meaning and conceptual incommensurabilities
involved in the development of a discipline would defy all attempts to present
the new theories as adding to our previous knowledge rather than being, as
it was claimed, total replacements of the earlier views. In a wider sense
the development of the natural sciences and of physics in particular was assimilated
to the various other changes which depended essentially an extra-logical factors
and were determined if not perverted by the idiosyncracies af their originators.
Unlike most philosophers of science, physicists have developed a more moderate
view [2] on the matter. Instead
of the philosophical view that our knowledge of nature undergoes a continuous
development one can emphasise[3] that
the development of theoretical physics had always been by leaps and bounds.
This however must not mislead us to believe that the new ideas were absolutely
true and the old had been totally worthless. We must rather acknowledge that
the earlier theory too was useful and there is a possibility that the new
theory in turn will be followed by an even better one.
Under the impact of relativity and quantum theory, Boltzmann's view has been
developed into the standard version that an empirically successful though
finally refuted theory S becomes a limiting case of its successor
T. As viewed from T the theory S remains approximately
valid under conditions a specifying the limit of validity and becoming
known together with T. [4]
The standard parameters of comparing theories are (a) logic, (b) conceptual
assimilation, (c) (deductive) consequence class and (d) empirical support.
(a) In comparing two physical theories we can assume a common logic although
some assumptions of classical logic such as 'every sentence of a language
is either true or false' are highly questionable for modern physics. Although
same people believe that the quantum theory of a single object (as opposed
to a statistical cluster) needs a deviant logic, advocates of such quantum
logic could not yet reformulate the theory in such a way as to be founded
only on quantum logic in exactly the same way in which classical physics can
be founded on classical logic. Moreover the fundamental laws of logic are
equally applicable to both classical and quantum mechanics.
(b) Rival theories often are different not only in their contention but even
in their basic concepts. The concept of orbit for example is basic to classical
particle mechanics but is absent in quantum mechanics. Similarly, as is well-known,
the concept of absolute time and space is rejected by the principles of relativistic
space-time in relativistic mechanics. Thus these pairs of theories seem to
suffer from a certain conceptual incommensurability.
However conceptual incommensurability does not occur throughout and the mere
existence of incommensurabilîty does not exclude the existence of a
common conceptual basis for two theories, provided we allow for a sufficiently
wide nation of conceptual equivalence or at least comparability. For example,
Euclidean 'straight line' is comparable/equivalent to arc in non-Euclidean
geometry which are rivals.
(c) Approximative reduction is again a ground for comparing two rival theories
T and T1. Often a theory T does not only follow from
Ti (that is a member of its consequence class) but often is the strongest
consequence of Ti. oNewton's theory of gravitating masspoints as compared
with Kepler's law is a case in question. Physics is full of such cases of
approximate reduction, Dirac' s equation with Pauli's equation and the latter
with that of Schroedinger's equation are similar cases of deductively related
theories with some additional assumptions.[5]
(d) The value of a theory in physics or in any other sciences is however ultimately
judged by its empirical import. Thus the superiority of a theory T1
over T can not be judged independent of facts. Indeed, deduction is
important because it is a truthpreserving procedure but in empirical science
its importance is in a different level since both T and Tl may
be false but still valuable. So we can formulate the concept of empirical
superiority of T1 over T in a way such that,
(i) every empirical success of T can be empirical success of T1
but every empirical success of T1 is not empirical success of T.
Empirical success is generic to include explanation of some phenomenon, solving
same theoretical or practical problems etc.
(ii) there are no empirical success of T such that they can not be
success for T1.
Popper formulated such adequacy conditions for theory choice; he called it
corroborative value of a theory. More corroborated (empirically established)
a theory, more acceptable it is. But unfortunately this emphasis on empirical
import is regarded by his critics as shifting ground from his original falsificability
test/criterion to allow induction to sneak into theory-evaluation.
There are other problems also in connection with empirical success and failure.
For instance, what would be the criterion for such success? Secondly[6]
an earlier theory may sometimes explain something which a later theory
can not. For example, pre-Daltonian phlogiston theory could explain many phenomena
and salve many problems which nineteenth century Daltonian chemistry could
not salve. The other problem in this respect is to identify the conditions
relating to any corpus of empirical knowledge E in such a way that
at least (i) would follow for empirical statements belonging to E.
The issues discussed above are some of the difficulties confronted in comparison
of theories which however are not insuperable. Cognitive relativists consider
pluralities of theories as enrichment of knowledge; the story of physics however
says something different. Most physicists again view physics as characterised
by 'a greater conceptual unity today than at any time in its history'.
Completing the conceptual unity of physics is regarded as finite task to be
solved same day. More and more efforts are seen in search of a unified theory
that can explain all the basic problems of physical nature.
Stephen Hawking of Cambridge (and Micheal Green of London, John Schwartz of
Caltech, David Gross and Edward Witten of Princeton and many others) attempts
to tie up all the laws of the universe by a single principle. To a scientist
(physicist) every phenomenon is due to some force. No change (action/reaction)
is possible without some force. Till date, four kinds of force/energy ore
found : gravitation which brings the apple from a tree to the ground
or keep the moan in place round the earth; electro-magnetism which
makes the electric fan move; strong force that keeps the nuclear particles
of atoms with tremendous force and weak interaction which is responsible
for radiation/radio-action.
Our ordinary activities – eating, playing1 sleeping, etc.
or motion of cars and planes and machines or chemical reactions – are
all due to electromagnetic force. Even the birth and death of stars in the
remote galaxies are due to gravitation, electromagnetism and strong force.
Without gravitation, nothing would have been in this world; everything would
have been gone. Similarly without strong force, neither any object nor any
creature would have existed. If protons and neutrons were not kept at the
nucleus of atoms, the latter would have been fragjle and disorderly. Weak
force however is not so pervasive except in radio-activity of matter. Anyway,
these four kinds are behind all physical events.
The further question is why four types of forces? Why not more or less? That
means 'four' an arbitrary number. It would be more rational if we can
think of one kind of farce that can explain everything. That would also be
consistent with the harmony of the universe and uniformity of nature. This
belief is almost like the religious belief in one and only one God. To scientists
law or theory is like that - ultimately there should be one principle that
can explain every variety of events.
That it is not a mere fantasy can be borne by history. Magnet attracting iron
particles and the conduction of electricity through copper wire were regarded
as two different kinds of action But in 1854 M. Faraday has shown that electricity
and magnetism are not two different actions. After that we consider them as
the same electro-magnetic farce. Similarly Abdus Salam and Waynberg (in 1967)
have established that electro-magnetic and weak force are actually two varieties
of the same farce. That means nature suggests unity among diversity. If we
progress more we may find a principle that explain different phenomena and
also incorporate the different forces within it.
Indeed nature's own puzzle creates much of our confusion about it. Laws are
different in micro and macro world of objects. Celestial bodies (stars, planets)
move by principle of gravitation whereas electrons, protons follow electro-magnetic,
strong and weak force. The latter is explained by quantum mechanics. The relativity
theory of gravity does not have anything in common with quantum mechanics.
Bath theories are found to be true and working successfully but only in their
respective fields. Relativity cannot explain the activity of electrons and
protons while celestial bodies do not follow quantum mechanics. Many. Scientists/philosophers
hope that unification of gravity and quantum can dispel this puzzle by discovery
of a theory that can explain every event from galaxy to neutron. That would
be a 'theory of everything', reducing all the four types to the same
force and establishing quantum and gravity as the same phenomenon. That theory
would be the 'masterkey' to understand the entire universe of macro
and micro world of objects. It is also called the final theory. Stephen Hawking
thinks that discovery of such a theory would be the end of discovery for physics.
Einstein was the first one to unify gravity with the second force (strong
and weak force were not known then) till the end of his life because law was
God to him and 'God does not play with dice'. Therefore there can not
be two Gods or two ultimate theories. In the seventies Hawking talked about
'super gravity' (an interaction of force among particles following formula
similar to Einstein's) . After that 'super string theory' takes over
according which particles are not like points but vibrations rather like strings.
Abhay Asteker and others however challenge the assumption of such theory that
empty space would not be not continuous but more like a sponge or a perforated
thing, somewhere it is present, somewhere it is not. But even this is only
a metaphor to understand the concept. We should remember that in case of sponge
or a cloth the empty place is still space. But in case of space it is not,
these are completely empty, no space is there. This new geometry of empty
space is moving towards unification of gravity and quantum. Asteker's formula
is one of many similar attempts. But whether such unification formula can
ever be found is still an open question.
To come back to our original issue of comparison of theories, although 'measuring'
of rival theories often involve s ome difficulties, it is possible to compare
them an the above mentioned accounts (a - d) . Moreover the incommensurability
claim overlooks an important aspect of rival theories namely that the latter
have same 'common factors' . If theories are conjectures, what do they aim
at ? One thing at least is 'common' between two rival theories, that
they both are attempts to salve some common problem, theoretical or practical.
Even if theories are not accepted on logical grounds (truth, rationality,
objectivity, etc.) - they can at least be compared as to their problem-solving
capacity. Indeed the pragmatist/instrumentalist account is also based on such
a ground, but my contention here is not exactly the same. A problem can surely
be also salved successfully by a rule of thumb. That success can not necessarily
raise the epistemic status of a theory. But theory comparison can at least
be done on the basis of the common problem they aim to salve. By solution
of a problem I mean the way in which it is resolved by theoretical assimilation
with other extant theories, background knowledge with minimum ad hoc assumptions
and finally with empirical success.
One final comment : without accepting any monolithic concept of rationality
one can hold that accepting a theory is not arbitrary or on extra-logical
grounds. If this position holds then cognitive relativism (that there are
no rational grounds to vindicate one set of beliefs/theories rather than another)
requires some more arguments to establish its claim.
In a broad sense realism stands for a position which asserts the existence
of some disputed kind of entity (universal materiel objects, causal laws,
numbers, probabilities, propensities, etc.). Commonsense realism, cal s~,
often called naive realism, represents the pedestrian view that the objects
of our knowledge (mostly perceptual experience) like apples and oranges have
independent existence. This assumption is taken for granted in our practical
life. But how do we know that this is an apple which does not need the knowing
mind for its perceptual properties? If the direct relation between the subject
and the object holds then why are there so many discripancies, illusion, hallucination,
etc. possible? So a reflective approach would be one that would take into
account the complete process of various sorts that intervene between the world
and the knower.
Scientific realism asserts the existence and activity of scientific objects
absolutely independently of the enquiry of which they are the objects or more
generally of all human activity. Scientific realism then is the theory that
the objects of scientific enquiry exist and act for the most part, quite independently
of scientists and their activity. It becomes mandatory thus to make a distinction
between the (relatively) unchanging real objects which exist outside and perdure
independently of the scientific process and the changing and theoretically
imbued cognitive objects which are produced within science as a function and
result of the practice. I want to examine this distinction usually associated
with commonsense and scientific realism respectively with a view to argue
first, that the distinction is overblown and the two approaches are at two
cognitive level; so scientific realism does not negate commonsense realism.
Second, commonsense realism is unduly made a caricature of it but some amendments
can make it more plausible if we consider the complex process through which
we know the world. There are good reasons to uphold it as many of us do.
The schism between scientific realism and commonsense realism is held to be
so wide that accepting one of these positions seems to negate the other. But
if it is realized that scientific realism and commonsense realism posit objects
and their behaviours In two different levels - it can be recognised that accepting
one world-view does not necessarily exclude the other.
As stated earlier, commonsense realism insists that if there are inter-subjectively
shared perceptual experiences of macro-objects like, say, apples and oranges
or the sun, then there are apples and oranges and the sun which exist independent
of our perceptions. It is clear that this kind of naive realism has the burden
to justify the ontological status of mirage and rainbow magic or jugglery.
Illusory macro-objects or rather seeming objects pose a serious problem for
commonsense realism.
Scientific realism is mainly concerned with the internal infrastructure of
things and it attempts to give a causal explanation of our perceptual experiences.
It claims to decompose
or analyse macro-objects like apples and oranges into their structural elements,
molecules, protons, electrons, etc. Moreover scientific realism appears to
draw its high status from the purported 'omnipotence (to borrow John
Watkin's terms) of physics' . It assumes that all meaningful questions or
problems can be settled at least in principle by physical theories. If there
are some seemingly unsettled problems (like, say, apparent miracles), then
those questions can be settled by presuming the incompleteness of the present
state of physics. It clearly shows either a pre-emptive measure to retain
the omniscience of physics or else issuing an unlimited reincheck to it by
making the doctrine irrefutable.
The omnipotence claim of physics however is not unquestionable. John Watkins[7]
presents some questions for which physics does not have any answer.
For example, the question of the 'Now' as distinguished from 'earlier-later',
the question of how consciousness arises or why only humans are privileged
with the sense of humour in the animal kingdom - are questions physics is
unable to answer. In cases of creative or intellectual activities again, the
inadequacy of science is more apparent. Science indeed is a good copier but
not an inventor of a creative/intellectual value. Garry Kasparov set a good
example of it by beating the Super Computer, Deep Blue, in a chess competition
in 1996. If the omnipotence of physics can not be refuted, it can not be upheld
either. Thus the high status of scientific realism against commonsense also
can not remain intact.
Be that as it may, the assertion of scientific rea1ism that only the inner
structure is real and the surface features of phenomena are only caused by
the infrastructure, assumes the truth of scientific theories. The apparent
conflict between commonsense realism and scientific realism is due to the
long held dichotomy of structural level as real (as held by Locke) and the
surface level as real (as held by Berkeley).
The belief that the entities at the structural level are only real gained
credibility if one believes in a 'stopping place' beyond which objects
can not be decomposed into microcomponents.. A standard objection to the unreality
of macro-objects as given by Graver Maxwell[8]
is based on the fact that on analysis of an apple we find subatomic particles
that constitute an apple and the relations that subsist among those particles,
but not an apple! Therefore the latter does not exist. This argument is not
correct. As Watkins shows that by the example of one of Newton's experiment
of sun light as an object which can be decomposed by a method (say a prism
1) to components a,b,c (the lights of spectrum) which can be reconstituted
by another method (say a prism 2 - suitably placed) as the original object
namely, the sun light. The relation of a macro-object and its microparticles
can be conceived in different ways:
(a) As a stable and determinate object amidst the flux of the changing and
indeterminate.
(b) As a logical construct out of the components.
(c) If the micro-objects and some organising rules or relations among them
can reconstruct the object, then the latter can not be just a concept of the
object but something real.
(a)is the Kantian way of explaining the 'stability' of 'object'
among the fleeting intuitions by the faculty of imagination. (b) is the Russellian
move of reducing the reality of an object into its logical components, (c)
can avoid the difficulties of both and can also explain aur perception of
simulated reality.
Moreover even if the micro-level analysis is corroborated by actual scientific
practice, it does not make the ontological status of a macro-object any less
stable. Our biological set up is such as to receive some signals from the
microparticles of, say, an apple or a piece of art. But we can decode the
message in ways which can decipher between a good or a bad apple and appreciate
a genuine piece of art. An analysis of an abject into its root cause or prime
components can not make the object unreal. After all apples and oranges are
more stable and enduring than the subatomic particles these are composed of.
Commonsense realism speaks of objects in a level which is different from the
level in which micro-objects are posited. As it is said before, one can also
question whether natural science is 'realist' or not, which again can
be settled empirically, viz. by determining whether or not scientists believe
or behave as if the theoretical terms they employ possess real referents independently
of their theorising. Realism is not a theory of knowledge or truth, but of
being, although as such it is bound to possess epistemological implications
of the objects investigated by the sciences to the effect that they endure
and operate independently of human activity and hence of both sense-experience
and thought. Every theory of scientific knowledge presupposes a theory of
what the world must be like for knowledge under the descriptions given it
by the theory to be possible.[9]
In short, it becomes mandatory to make the distinction between the (relatively)
unchanging real object which exists outside and endure independently of the
scientific processes and the changing cognitive objects as said in the beginning,
that are products of the scientific tradition. The so-called difference between
'transitive' and 'intransitive' objects of scientific knowledge
is crucial to understand the microlevel dichotomy of reality.
Commonsense realism speaks of macro-objects independent a the scientific process,
scientific realism posits micro-object which are cognitive objects within
the scientific tradition and thus changes with the changes in scientific theories.
Accepting objects at one level does not necessarily negate the reality of
the objects at the other level.
One more possible area need our attention in this context: namely, a possible
new world in which reality itself might become a manufactured and metered
commodity. Virtual reality is not 'just possible' any more. It is not
only opening methods of mind amplifications but also widening the vista of
spatial experience. Computer-generated simulated reality resembles traditional
macro-objects, but we know these are micro-body generated reality. Here the
dichotomy of commonsense and scientific realism faces a problem.
Let us now turn to the second component of the issue namely, the cognitive
status of commonsense objects. A probe into the scientific theories would
lead us there. The principle of complimentarity (of quantum physics) turns
the so-called 'elementary building blacks' of classical physics into
Janus-faced entities that behave under certain circumstances like hard lumps
of matter (particles) in other circumstances as waves or vibrations propagated
in a vacuum. With Einstein's magic formula, E=mc², the process of dematerialization
of matter started which was completed in the '20s by de Broglie and Schroedinger.
The famous formula E=mc² implies that the mass of a particle must not
be conceived as some stable elementary material but as a concentrated pattern
of energy, locked up in what appears to us as matter. The 'stuff' of
which protons are made is nebulous. A. Koestler[10]
compared it with stuff of which dreams are made. In the physicist's
bubble chambers, highenergy 'elementary' particles collide and annihilate
each other or create new particles which give rise to a new chain of events.
The particles in question are of course infinitesimally small and shortlived
(even shorter than a millionth of a second), yet they leave tracks in the
bubble chamber which enable the physicists to decide which of the 'elementary
particles' has caused it.
The fundamental lesson which the bubble chamber and other sophisticated instruments
teach the physicist is that on the subatomic level, our concepts o space,
time, matter and conventional logic can no longer apply. Thus two particles
may collide and break into pieces but these pieces may turn out to be not
smaller than the original particles - because the kinetic energy liberated
in the course of the collision has been transformed into 'mass'. Or
a photon, the elementary unit of light, which has no mass can give birth to
an eletron-positron pair which does have mass; and that pair might subsequently
collide, and by the reverse process transform itself into a photon. The fantastic
events in the bubble chamber have been compared to the dance of Shiva[11]
with its rhythmic alternations of creation and destruction.
All this is a long way from the simplistic Rutherford-Bohr model of the beginning
of the century that represented atoms as miniature solar systems. But we know
the model ran into problems, the eletrons were found to behave quite unlike
planets, they kept jumping from one orbit to another. The orbits themselves
were not well defined trajectories but wide blurred tracks. There are other
discrepancies as well.[12] As
Russell puts it, the idea of a hard little lump which is the electron or proton
is an illegitimate intrusion of commonsense notions derived from touch.[13]
"Nuclear matter is thus a form of matter entirely different
from anything we experience 'up here' in our macroscopic environment."[14]
Atoms are not things, in the sense of concepts like location, velocity, energy,
size, etc. Heisenberg comments that when we get down to the atomic level,
the objective world in space and time no longer exists.[15]
Lifting our eyes from the bubble chamber to the starry skies, our commonsense
notions of space, time and causality turn out to be as inadequate as when
we try to apply them to the subatomic domain. If parts of the universe are
furnished with galaxies of anti-matter (which consists of atoms in which the
electric charges of their constituents are reversed) , there is a fair chance
that in these galaxies the flow of time is reversed. Feynmann's diagram shows
that particles in microcosms also are supposed to move for a short while backwards
in time. Thus our medium-sized world with its homely nations of space, time,
causality, appears to be between the mega and micro realms of reality to which
these parochial nations do not apply.
Conclusion
The upshot of this account, first of comparability of theories and then of
multilevel reality, different concepts and theories that describe it (even
quantum reality is description) is to show that
(1) There is no clommon ground to judge which one is really real or
more real than the other. Non-Euclidean geometry does not negate Euclidean
geometry (which is still a science of terrestrial space) but only shows a
way to understand celestial space of spheres. Similarly sub-atomic level reality
can not make our commonsense objects like apples and oranges (which still
obeys the laws of classical physics) unreal or at least not the proper cognitive
object.
(2) It is also difficult to decide why protons and electrons would be of a
higher ontological status than apples and oranges. After all, cognitive systems
change with new hypotheses and new sets of theoretical entities. But commonsense
objects seem to be the same through different sets of theoretical entities.
(3) The greatest problem of commonsense realism can be overcome to some extent
if we recognise that the posited objects are not known so directly
as usually presented. Even perceptual processes are quite complex and involve
lot of theoretical elements. [16] If
that makes knowledge of objects indirect we can face the problem of
illusion with some success. We can at mast say "we know objects indirectly"
- then a possibility of error could be explained along with a fallibilistic
but rational account of knowledge. One may recall that Galileo's findings
through telescope was not instant success. People regarded it as 'magic'
in the beginning because it is so different from naked eye perception.
(4) Finally, anti-realists of various sorts may still say that all our so
called 'facts' are constructions, therefore the presupposition of the
commonsense view that there is an objective external world is simplistic.
But the persistent realist can argue[17]
nevertheless that we can still make a distinction between 'brute'
fact and 'institutional' fact. Some facts are indeed institutional depending
upon culture, language, scientific tradition, paradigm - if you like. But
that this is so constructed is contingent upon some brute fact. "Apple
is sweet" , "Orange is sour", "Jane is a married lady",
"Tiger is a ferocious animal" or "The atomic number of gold
is 79" are examples of constructions dependent upon the institution
of language, natural classification, scientific knowledge of biology, etc.
But that they are so described depend on something brute or irreducible in
these things. Commonsense realism claims only this and no more.
