Science of Nature has always been concerned with the role of reflective knowledge. Nietzsche uses various formulations to question new realms in science as in art. Scientific and artistic activity is compared not only to children who “throw away their toys; but soon (...) start again in an innocent frame of mind”, also to constructions that “connect, join and form lawfully and according to strict internal organizations^[1].” We are going to explore how two types of reflective knowledge, those of the awareness of self and the knowledge of self, hold an ambiguous place in regards to the knowledge man constructs in all innocence. We will sketch the way in which, out of a knowledge of self that is attached to the reality mode of the ambient world, a knowledge that is attached to the reality mode of the physical has emerged, calling to mind the significant change of attitude caused by a displacement from one realm to another, such as the passage of the attitude adopted in the world at large to that adopted by the scientist in his laboratory. Understanding Nietzsche through the inspiration of phenomenology is not an anachronism. Rather it is a test for contemporary philosophy to be faced with a philosopher who does not think in a measured way, but considers the interior and the exterior world in parallel and often even goes so far as to allow them to intermingle in a most ambiguous manner. The advantage of this process is that it allows one to familiarize oneself with the artistic process, which naturally tends towards this irrefutable fact through mimesis. The question that links science and art is “how is reflection anchored in the formation of knowledge?” Ordinarily, it is through reflection that we set limits and render all sorts of experience possible. When we touch upon the following paradox, we can also conclude that our experience of the world is limited for another reason: “We, men of knowledge” live in two worlds, but we cannot engage our knowledge of these two worlds at one and the same time. These two levels of reality are: 1) the common sense attitude that says that if I become engaged in this level of reality, I cannot avoid seeing myself as a person; that is to say as a centre of imputation of responsibility or of free action, that remains subject to a surrounding world that includes other people and whose relationship to the surrounding world is regulated by the laws of motivation. 2) The natural attitude that, to the contrary, consists of considering myself as a part of nature (as an individual of the biological species ‘man’, a bio psychological object of study), inserted within a context whose reality, in the last analysis, is physical and regulated by the laws of causality.
Nietzsche’s answer to the problem of the knowledge of nature and human reality consists in placing science in the realm of art^[2].
Our argument will take two directions: the first 1/ will answer the question of the existence of two levels of natural and personal reality in Nietzsche. The pre-figuration of the antinomy man-nature/person can be found in a projection of science into the realm of art. This position shows that phenomenology was not discovered but developed. Although its initial source can be found in Edmund Husserl, it was as well inspired by Nietzsche. A second direction 2/ consists of a more critical method of respectively distinguishing between the phenomenological undertaking, that sees itself as a philosophy of the conscience, and Nietzsche’s philosophical critique of knowledge. Nietzsche’s projection of science into the realm of art initiates an inversion: scientific research must replace the search for self-knowledge, for this not to be chased indefinitely. For Nietzsche, an acceptable measure of wisdom in the search for knowledge consists in remaining attentive to “the Spirit of Music” which is the rhythm of existence. By taking an affirmative yet, as ever, selective direction, the scholar, for Nietzsche, is situated within a world he himself has contributed to build, interlaced by fictions and metaphors that appear to him urgent necessities; this world is also the one he has learnt to love, despite its complexity and its incessant modulations, in order to be able to live in it.

1. Epistemology and perennial philosophy

For Kant, we can all observe how human existence is turned towards that which confers a form of permanence, a duration of fleeting character in human time, from which all the importance of the basic conditions of life on Earth is gleaned by man. Following Kant, Dilthey, a contemporary of Nietzsche, shows that focusing on human existence ( – that provides an artificial world of objects that are clearly different from the natural environment) questions our conception of the world through the undertakings of historical anthropology that relies upon the foundation and development of “the Human Sciences” Geisteswissenschaften, as opposed to “Science of Nature” Naturwissenschaften. The study of these human sciences incites us to adopt a particular mode of thought or method: that of “understanding”. But understanding is not only useful to the disciplines of the exact sciences because of the enlightenment it brings through joining reflection to a determined thought. It also exceeds all other forms of knowledge, because it is the thought by which Man can become himself, in the sense of Pindare’s words, that Nietzsche repeated: “Become the one you are!^[3]”
Knowledge of the self is the central theme of Ecce Homo, but it is first and foremost a quotation from the Gospel (of John, 19:5). Translated from their original Latin, the words mean: “Here is the man ! ” Via this deliberately provocative title, Nietzsche presents an autobiography. His intention is not to convince about his vision of Man by moral or religious argument but by means of the practical goal of showing that it is possible to change values by changing living conditions and thereby “become the one we are”. In the chapter beginning “Warum ich so klug bin”, Nietzsche’s affirmation that it is not desirable for “instinct to be understood too early” let us guess his reservations. It is notable that Nietzsche’s prudent response to the task of constituting human anthropology raises a question: that of distinguishing between knowledge of human nature (including both instinct and faculties) and human reality in the expression: “understanding an instinct”. The mission of perennial philosophy is constructed upon the presupposition that there are two modalities of knowledge peculiar to two types of science: 1) the world of nature and 2) the historical-social world, formulating the demand for an epistemological foundation for the autonomous sciences of culture separate from science of the natural sort. Even if, in the first chapter of Ideen, Husserl makes a distinction between “ Geisteswissenschaften ” and the phenomenological undertaking (because for Husserl the Diltheyan doctrine of world views is incapable of attaining the rigor required of authentic science) we will not revisit the idea that “understanding” is precisely the mode of knowledge that is suitable neither to the body, nor to the instinct^[4]. “Understanding” is a notion that becomes attached to self-knowledge and becomes the basis of a personalist attitude that dictates the majority of the situations of ordinary life. Should we then identify Nietzsche's attitude natural rather than personalist and admit reductionism as the implicit preliminary knowledge to any theory? We will see that science in the realm of art holds a more subtle position.
In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche explicitly states that knowledge and self-knowledge are not, in our age, susceptible to being reached reciprocally, even though in ancient times these two forms of knowledge were mutually implied in their acquisition and possession. Today: “ We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves – how could it happen that we should ever find ourselves? ^[5]”
The reason invoked resonates with provocation. But let us not mistake Nietzsche’s intention: nothing tells us that the enterprise of self-knowledge is in itself without value. In fact, men of knowledge have disciplined themselves in order not to follow it. They know that their quest for knowledge requires them to abjure the pursuit of self-knowledge. But being unknown to oneself is really a necessary condition for the possession of knowledge, around which we, men of knowledge, according to Nietzsche, must henceforth consolidate our circumspection?

1.1. A historical reminder of the notion of self-knowledge

It is of course, hardly likely that, incapable of knowing, determining or defining the nature of all the objects that surround us which are not us, we should be capable of doing so much for ourselves. This would be jumping over our shadow. And, actually, if knowledge is thought of upon the model of the knowledge of objects, then for the Socrates of Charmides there is no such thing as self-knowledge. The object of knowledge is always distinct from knowledge itself. But as this cannot be the case with self-knowledge, it is obviously impossible. A less radical version of this argument in St. Augustin would say: by reason of the differentia mirabilis, the difference between me the only being that is given to me from the interior and all the things I can simply observe : there is a part of a person’s knowledge that eludes all empirical approaches. In consequence, we must admit to a peculiar difficulty in accessing self-knowledge. Hence the Delphian word changes meaning to become the augustinian overture to itinerarium mentis in Deum^[6].

1.2. Aporia of self-knowledge in Nietzsche

It is clear that constituting the ideal of self-knowledge implicates a preliminary assessment of the limits to our own self-knowledge. For Nietzsche it distances us from ourselves at the very same time it teaches us about ourselves. But he adds “nosce te ipsum would be the recipe for ruin^[7]”. Nietzsche thereby pushes the paradox inherent to this form of knowledge to its paroxysm. There are several ways of fixing limits to self-knowledge and not all of them signify a denial of this last.

1.2.1. Self-knowledge and self-referral

Let us compare the first lines of The Genealogy of Morals to an extract from Ecce Homo: “ We (...) count the twelve trembling bell-strokes of our experience, our life, our being – and alas! Miscount them. – So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law “ Each is furthest from himself” applies to all eternity – we are not “ men of knowledge” with respect to ourselves.^[8]”
“Why do I know a few things more? Why am I altogether so clever? I have never reflected on questions that are none – I have not wasted myself.” (EH, Why I Am So Clever)^[9]
If we leave the context of phenomenology, which consists of positively extracting the world of self-knowledge, we cannot exclude the fact that though we are never looked for necessarily implies we are never found. But then perhaps the best way to find oneself is never to seek oneself? Perhaps the search for knowledge indirectly confers an unanticipated insight into our identity, as representative exemplars of late modernity. Nietzsche’s disavowal of self-knowledge must not contradict the opinion that Nietzsche himself holds of his own unrivaled degree of self-understanding. It cannot go unnoticed that the insistent “I” of Ecce Homo (1886) bears a strong resemblance to the “we” of Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887), as in “We, men of knowledge”. In the period following Zarathustra, a profusion of similar expressions can be found: “we scholars” (JGB 204); “we Hyperboreans”(AC 1); “we free spirits” (JGB 61); “we other philosophers”, “we fearless ones”, “we born guessers of riddles”, “we, firstlings and premature births of the coming century” (FW 343); “we modern men” (FW 375); “we who are homeless” (FW 377), etc. In these cases the subject’s references to self do not designate a subject but a plurality^[10]. The practical maxim is not “do what I say, or am, or do”, but “do like me, unburden yourselves of yourselves and be born again of the ashes like the phoenix”. For Nietzsche, die Fröhliche Wissenschaft “is a reward: the reward of a long, brave, industrious and subterranean seriousness”. Of course, the privilege of participating in “gaya scienza” demands a period of initiation and apprenticeship. But studious and solitary study may not necessarily lead to a self-knowledge that already seems outmoded. The abundance of “we”-avowals show Nietzsche to be a member of a privileged group of “scholarly, bold, and industrious comrades^[11] ” and it is ironic that all we know about these men of knowledge is, at any rate at first glance, their heroic ignorance of the sphere of self-knowledge.

1.2.2. Consciousness and the collective

And yet Nietzsche also shows through his reference to the collective that consciousness itself is possible only thanks to the existence of society. Thus, man’s presence unto himself, his self-consciousness, is a form of gift from the collective to isolated man : “My idea is (...) that consciousness does not really belong to man’s individual existence (...) it has developed subtlety only insofar as this is required by social (...) utility. Consequently, given the best will in the world to understand ourselves as individually as possible, “to know ourselves”, each of us will always succeed in becoming conscious only of what is not individual but “average”. Our thoughts themselves are continually governed by the character of consciousness – by the “genius of the species” that commands it – and translated back into the perspective of the herd.^[12]”
We hereby see that one of the possible answers to the multiplication of subjects is the formation of a collective, product of the public realm, that would act as guarantor that I correctly follow the rules of the use of language that lead to the formation of knowledge. Wittgenstein would say it is not possible to obey a rule in a private way, otherwise believing we obey a rule and obeying the rule would be the same thing. Here, the interior world would seem useless and emptied of all substance^[13]. This could have been Nietzsche’s stance, but then it would have been simpler not to have spoken of self-knowledge at all. Nietzsche’s outlook is different, consisting of developing upon the very plane of self-knowledge itself the denial of this type of reflective knowledge.

1.2.3. Aporia of the phenomenological endeavour emptied of world

Let us see what the nietzschean task would be if the denial of self-consciousness implied a denial of world. In phenomenology, there is no such thing as a “world-free” person. Such a pure abstraction of everything that escapes a Cartesian cogito would not convey any knowledge, neither of the being-person, nor of the particular person in question. One need only examine what self-consciousness would be without the ambient world to ascertain this.
- The model of “the failure of introspection” identifies between self-consciousness and self-knowledge in a concrete approximation of a tentative to know oneself. It is the threat of emptiness well known to the literary genre of the personal diary, in contrary to memorial and autobiographical literature. An example can be found in Maine de Biran. The problem is to get a hold of the person who, freed of all temporal engagements, is nevertheless determined and limited by them^[14]. A new form of knowledge thus comes into being to the exclusion of any contribution from the exterior: that of the knowledge of self by the self. This opposition between my own existence and the world in which it develops marks the origin of the idea of an “inner life”.
- Let us examine the problem of analytical deformation. To all intents and purposes, the private diary attempts to achieve the coincidence of the subject and the object through its analysis, in the form of doubling a self that assumes both functions at one and the same time. However, for the examination of awareness to have a decisive value, all personal value must be concentrated upon the very order of awareness, with thought absorbing within itself the totality of the being without deforming it. My observed self must then be, at one and the same time, entirely passive and entirely truthful before my observing self, which in turn would limit itself to reflecting this last as it truly is. Because, in this movable and fragile domain of the intimacy of self to self, we can only suppose, without a referee, that similar conditions of experience have been accomplished. The failure of the intimate journal shows that the limitless dimensions of existence, where personal life would take on self-awareness by reflecting itself as if in a mirror, would therefore result in failure.
- A radical solution can, however, be found for this acknowledgement of failure. If the reality of the self slips away at every attempt to grasp it, we could well ask of what that reality consists. Perhaps the ultimate and paradoxical realization in striving towards self-knowledge is that its object simply does not exist.

For Nietzsche, the correct approach to gaining self-knowledge is not via consciousness, for only the hidden self is authentic: “Fundamentally, all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and indefinitely individual ; there is no doubt of that. But as soon as we translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be (...). Owing to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can become conscious is only a surface-and sign-world, a world that is made common and meaner; whatever becomes conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal; all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalization.”^[15]
Hence, another method must be found if we are to achieve self-knowledge. Nietzsche’s reversal of intellectualist values must be noted. To the contrary of their deprecation of the hidden self, he recognizes this last as authentic.

2.1. Understanding the rhythm of existence in the spirit of music

Many indications in Nietzsche’s published works and Nachlaß show that Nietzsche sets the rhythm of existence against the architecture of knowledge by endowing even the most erudite of discourses with characteristic harmony and rhythm: “Music as a supplement to language: numerous excitations and entire states of excitation that language can never represent are rendered by music.^[16]”
Music is the medium of comprehension as it collaborates in rendering speech communicable in much the same way as the spatial representations of the ancient mnemonics that imagined the artifice of the loci of memory and the symbolic images that lodge within it. Music permits the absorption and digestion of those very things the speaking subject’s words wish to take possession, as, once executed, they at last adhere to the very substance of the subject’s personality^[17]. Nietzsche’s proposition of a manducatio of the subject’s speech appears within a perspective that questions the art of speech.
In various notes Nietzsche differentiates between “language” in its strictest sense and its widest sense^[18]. Language in the wide sense, in which “music” also represents a “language”, is close to its own nature for it is “sonorous”, being “spoken language”^[19]. The medium of sound is what makes music and spoken language similar, just as it is via the medium of sound that the great difference between written language and spoken language is based. An experience of the sentimental content is made possible thanks to the relationship of tones, intervals, rhythms and tempi, as well as the intensity and the accentuation of audible phonetic expressions. The artist and the scientist act as much by words as by gestures. Musical language appears to open room for play between the fugitive language of gesture and the fixed gestures of conceptual language. An example of the closure of this space would be a pure ‘musical score’ (which has become a combinatory art for visual artists), where the relation to sentimental content is entirely lost.
Nietzsche’s phenomenism enhanced with the personalist attitude which consists in being present in the world and in opening towards the other, appears via the idea of a rhythmical existence.

2.1.1. Type and empathy

Husserl highlights the structure of intentional acts along with their intentional objects, which are understood in advance as products of consciousness, and attempt to discover within these acts what is essential to consciousness as such. Understanding assumes the formation of strictly intuitive connections: e.g. perception, coenesthesis, emotions, empathy, remembering and the imagination. On the other hand my determination of something can be limited to a word, or a sentence: “Göteborg”, or “Göteborg is a town in Sweden”. Here my own experience of Göteborg does not correspond to anything intuitively obvious but a “type” because I have never travelled to Scandinavia, even if I can form valid occurrences in relation to certain events that happened in this town. I read a report in a newspaper on Nietzsche’s influence on swedish literature, for example^[20]. “Type” is also one of the immediately evident expressions in Nietzsche’s thought and a commonly used notion in his time. Via this notion, Nietzsche is not interested in the individual as such, but rather in the individual realization of self. He says: “ (...) I want to submit myself to the judgement of certain people: that will be my education and it should stimulate and frighten me (...). One only reveres an individual to the extent that he represents a type: for example “the priest”, “the hero”, etc. and later, only because he is “nothing but himself”.^[21]
Nietzsche’s distancing in relation to presentation is close to empathy, that has been suggested above in the attention one can lend to the tone of one’s interlocutor’s voice and the character of their gestures. But we touch upon Nietzsche’s concept of esthetical and physiological imitation, which is also distinct from Husserl’s intuitive empathy. To the question if Nietzsche recognize a effective extension to the real domain of emotions, we have to answer carefully and distinguish between: 1) a capacity to take up the perspective of another person, that is, to see things as that person sees them and to feel what that person feels, that is the capacity to project my consciousness into other people, so that I can experience what they experience, the way they experience it, and 2) sympathy strictly speaking. On the whole and unlike Husserl, Nietzsche adopts the founding proprieties of a logic of sentiments through the use of the notion of “type”. It seems that the love of one’s neighbour has been eclipsed in favour to “the love of a self confirmation” in one’s neighbour that do neither rule out respect nor implies friendship. But the sceptical adiaphoria: a complete indifference gained after achieving philosophical knowledge would be closer to Nietzsche’s position^[22].

2.2. The intuition of the world’s complexity

As to our personal attitude in the world we substitute metaphorical distance we adopt a natural attitude. But it is to be observed that it does not matter if reflective knowledge be focusing on Nature or philosophical: a similarity between Nietzsche and phenomenology can be found here, both allow the question “how have I become the person that I find already made” to surface. A static of emotions is attached to feelings that are founded in the temporal modifications of my incorporation. Like phenomenology, Nietzsche measures the effectiveness of a pre-reflectional experience that is intimate mental process pertaining to the organism. We remain concerned by our livingly present organism for it is the source of a non deliberate or pre-reflectional mental process that does not cease its activity because we stop thinking of it. There are certain analogies between the structure of the world we live in and the universe that we attempt to explain via our natural attitude: “(...) Man knows the world to the extent that he knows himself: his depths can only reveal themselves to him to the extent that he is surprised by himself and his own complexity^[23]” but “at first he imagines it to be simple, as superficial as himself. ”
The Nietzschean response to the growing complexity of the world in which we live is that it is intentionally complex because we wish to gain complete knowledge. In Ecce Homo’s “How one become what one is”, we find the framework of a double affirmation, « the holy affirmation », that shows how a voluntary act presupposes the originary mental process pertaining to my power, distinct from my position taking in a decision. Nietzsche’s “blessed affirmation” is at once the affirmation of the world in which we live an existence that sometimes abuses us for it is a complex world in constant evolution and a will to dynamic and renewed realizations : “We who think and feel at the same time are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colors, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations.^[24]”

Conclusion

Self-knowledge goes beyond self-awareness in every way for it is at one and the same time memory of my proper self, sense of my past and future conducts, and presence of me to myself that allows me to come to terms with myself. Nietzsche was particularly attentive when he transcribed Pindare’s “be true to thyself, now that thou hast learnt what manner of man thou art” to “become the one you are”. In this way he flatters our illusions that we can one day know ourselves and brings the ideas of evolution and presence together within self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is far from the self-complacency found in the abyss of analysis. It only becomes actual in the polyphony of the rhythmical listening of inter-subjective experience. But self-knowledge runs the risk of distending and adulterating self-awareness by the very fact of bypassing this last. This is the reason why “we, men of knowledge” must distance ourselves from it, according to Nietzsche.
This study has brought together those questions that relate to the foundation of self-knowledge, the individual side of reflection that in Nietzsche is rooted in the ground of art, and we have developed it as a fundamental and constituting metaphorical activity.

Geneva, Switzerland

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express his thanks to Deborah Knight for the original work of translation.

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Notes

^[1] Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studien Ausgabe: KSA, 1, 7, Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter des Griechen, p. 830-1, DTV de Gruyter, Berlin / New York, 1999. Trans. Marianne Cowan, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, South Bend: Gateway, 1962. The child playing pais paizon is one of the central image in Nietzsche derived from Heraclitus and enriched by Friedrich Schiller’s play theory of art.
^[2] On art and science see: Angèle Kremer-Marietti, Le ‘terrain de l’art’ une clé de lecture du texte nietzschéen in Nouvelles lectures de Nietzsche, les Cahiers de l'Age d’Homme, Lausanne, 1985. Babette Babich, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science, State University of New York Press, 1994.
^[3] Pindare, 2. Pythischen Ode, Epode 3. KSA, 4, p. 297,: « Werde, der du bist ! ». The Odes of Pindar, Loeb Classical Library, 1915, 1978. Various expressions of this maxim in : KSA 8, 340 ; MA I, N° 263, FW, N°270 and 335 ; N , KSA 9, 555 ; N, KSA 13, 290 ; EH, KSA 6, 293.
^[4] Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Werke, 1. Bd., Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte, Hrsg, v. Groethuysen, Bernard, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 9. Aufl., 1990. Introduction to the Human Sciences, ed. by Rudolf A. Makkreel, Princeton University Press, 1989. Edmund Husserl, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 3, Buch 1, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, ed. by W. Biemel, Ideen zu einer reiner Phenomenologie und Phaenomenologischen Philosophie, I, § 1, Haag : M. Nijhoff, 1950.
^[5] KSA 5, GM, Vorrede 1, p. 247. Trans. Walter Kaufmann, Basic writings of Nietzsche, p. 451, Modern Library Edition, 2000. Freud used to say of Nietzsche that “he had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever lived or was ever likely to live”; Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. II, (New York, Basic Books, 1953), p. 344.
^[6] Roberta de Monticelli, La conversion philosophique, 2 and 3, Ch. I, pp. 5 and 6, University of Geneva, 1992. Plato, Charmides, Complete Works, Ed. by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997.
^[7] KSA 6, EH, 293. Trans. p. 710.
^[8] GM, “Vorrede”, 1, p. 247. Trans. p. 451.
^[9] EH, p. 278. Trans. p. 692.
^[10] Eric Blondel’s Introduction to Ecce Homo, p. 37, GF, Paris, 1992. Daniel Conway, Wir Erkennenden : Self-referentiality in the Preface to Zur Genealogie der Moral, in Nietzsche’s Use of Language, p. 1, « Nietzsche Dictionary Group », Nijmegen University, 2000.
^[11] GM, “Vorrede” 7, p. 254-5. Trans. p. 457.
^[12] KSA, 3, FW, 354, p. 592. Trans. Walter Kaufmann: The Gay Science, p. 299, Vintage Books Ed., 1974.
^[13] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 202, 1953. Georges Gusdorf, La découverte de soi, ch. 1 « La conscience miroir », p. 27, PUF, Paris, 1948.
^[14] Maine de Biran, Journal intime, éd. de la Valette-Monbrun-Plon, t. II, 1931, sept. 1823, p. 318
^[15] KSA, 3, FW, p. 592. Trans. p. 300.
^[16] KGW, IV, 2, 1, § 111.
^[17] On this topic see Angèle Kremer-Marietti, « Rhétorique et rythmique chez Nietzsche » in Rythmes et Philosophie, p. 182-3. Edited by Pierre Sauvanet and Jean-Jacques Wunenburger. Paris : Kimé, 1996.
^[18] KSA 7, 47.
^[19] Other relevant discussions include: Angèle Kremer-Marietti, Nietzsche et la Rhétorique, pp. 150-164, PUF, 1992 ; Thüring, Herbert: Poetik des Gedächtnisses unter Ausschluß der Leiblichkeit? : Merkpunkte zur Universalie der 'Memoria' und zu Nietzsches leibhafter Mnemotechnik. - In: Fragmente. Schriftenreihe zur Psychoanalyse. H. 42/43. Kassel 1993. pp. 177-190. Helga Hajdu, Das mnemotechnische Schrifttum des Mittelalters, p. 15-17, E. J. Bonset - Amsterdam, 1967. 
^[20] H.H. Borland, Nietzsche’s influence on swedish literature with special reference to Strindberg, Hansson, Heidenstam and Fröling, Göteborg, 1956.
^[21] KSA 10, Nachlaß 1882-84, 9 (12), p. 348-9. Cf. Nietzsche-Handbuch, p. 341, Henning Ottmann (ed.), Metzler, 2000.
^[22] KSA, 13, 14 (79), p. 258.
^[23] KGW, IV, 2, 1, § 80.
^[24] KSA, 3, FW, 301. Trans. p. 241-2.