March 12, 2004
Senior Thesis in Philosophy
Northwestern University

To my parents,
Mary and Adrian Bejan

It seems to me that in today’s world there is a crucial question that peace, in the most idealistic sense, hinges on. In recent times, all over the globe, mankind has demonstrated his thirst for power. Jonathan Glover has compared the current international community to a Hobbesian state of nature. There appears to be no tangible order or mutually agreed upon set of rules that every international player wants to play by. Rather each respective country makes up his own rules, and rationalizes his own interests in terms of what he thinks is best for everyone else. The fact of the matter is that we are dealing with a world with a plethora of different cultures, traditions, races, religions and regional interests. The crucial question that peace in the modern world rests upon is thus: what is mankind’s fundamental, most supreme, value? I propose that this value is our ability to choose, otherwise known as our autonomy, right of self-determination: i.e. what distinguishes us from the other organisms on this planet. This demonstration of why autonomy is so important can lead us to determine what possibly can be checked in human nature which will best enable people to live peacefully together in this divided world.
In “Perpetual Peace,” Immanuel Kant puts forth a proposal for the foundations of universal and permanent peace in the world and evaluates its likelihood and possibility. Kant states, “Peace means an end to all hostilities.” (93) He holds that such a state of peace between nations rests on account of recognizing and beholding the universal value of autonomy. The autonomy of each state is an extension of the individual’s autonomy within it. People come together in a society and rationally determine how to eliminate the state of nature through the formation of laws in government. If the international community appears to be a state of nature, in that men are still destroying one another on account of ethnic, religious and political difference or on account of any other violent self-serving whim. Kant maintains that man is capable of overcoming these differences and permanently eliminating the violence by recognizing that we are in a “universal community . . . where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.” (107-108) According to him, “There is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other states can emerge from the lawless condition of pure warfare.” (105) We need to create a structure that upholds these universal rights and provides for perpetual peace. In the past century nations have attempted to actualize Kant’s suggestion with the League of Nations and the United Nations, and mankind has witnessed how difficult it has been to maintain peace. Such a coming together of nations depends on the particular nations valuing the autonomy of their citizens. So the possibility of this depends on the smaller scale of setting up a state with institutions that value autonomy. Such a state both depends on and allows for the individuals within it to value their own autonomy.
Kant recognizes the difficulty of this project but asserts that “even a nation of devils” can solve the “problem of setting up a state.” (112) The setting up of a state that preserves man’s individual autonomy does not require or involve the moral improvement of man as a prerequisite. Rather the laws can create the conditions of peace that allow and even promote the moral improvement of man. For progress to be possible, we need to put ourselves on its path and create institutions that allow for it to happen. We are left with two fundamental questions: #1) With regard to society: which institutions do we erect to preserve and promote autonomy? And #2) With regard to the individual: How do we motivate man to embrace his own autonomy?
For this reason I look at newly free societies in our world today. Kant claims, “soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy.” (113) We have witnessed this with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. After the soulless despotism of the totalitarian communist regimes, countries such as Romania were very much in a state of nature. The blood spilt in the 1989 Revolution in Romania is evidence of the immediate dog-eat-dog reality that existed during and after the overthrow of the harsh dictator, Ceauşescu. With respect to newly free societies today, and to Eastern Europe in particular, the subject of man’s autonomy is more important than ever. After half a century of the communist government making every man’s decisions for him, thus denying man’s autonomy and ability to choose for himself, the gift and simultaneous harsh reality of choice confronts the people previously behind the Iron Curtain. No wonder so many dissidents and people who suffered under such inhumane regimes claim that totalitarianism robbed them of their humanity. These governments denied man the fundamental principle, which makes him human. Milan Kundera called life in communist Prague a “penumbra of depersonalization.” (49) People in government who abuse that power can restrict mankind of this fundamental freedom, to choose, the ability for individuals to rule themselves, to deliberate and determine their own destiny.
This is something that severely impedes progress: a man of a certain culture and world-view insisting that he knows best for everyone else. Man insisting that his particular culture (and with that comes a moral code) is universal. I do not buy any of these claims. I am a relativist when it comes to religious-cultural-traditionally inspired and justified moral claims. Kant states, “Religious differences- an odd expression! As if we were to speak of different moralities! . . . there can only be one religion that is valid for all men at all times.” (114) But to call it “religion” confuses man. Kant means there is only one morality universally applicable to human beings. This “religion” Kant speaks of are the universal conclusions with regard to the preservation of man’s autonomy, the supreme value in mankind that has moral superiority with regard to every human being, regardless of background, race or religion. To value autonomy in a given society, means to recognize that every man has to the right to his own pursuit of happiness so long as his pursuit does not infringe upon the rights of others. When the constitution of a state can insure this principle and guarantee its reality in practice, a given society will have provided the necessary structure and assurance for the promotion and preservation of the individual’s autonomy. The question naturally follows: but what of those people who do not value their autonomy? What of the individual who does not want to choose for himself?
This leads me to the significance of a newly free society in general and what Romania can teach us about basic principles of human nature. If we view post-communist Romania as a chance to witness a situation where man does not recognize the value in his own choice, because he never had to use it before, and now is expected to employ it, how do we suppose that autonomy really is valuable? It is easy to arrive at its validity in an established liberal democracy, where we take it for granted. Romania and the newly free societies that cover the globe give us a chance to see if that freedom really is fundamental to a good life. What I am proposing is perhaps presupposes Rawls’ investigation in A Theory of Justice, which, very generally and simply, says: we agree on a set of principles being valuable (equality, fairness) and asks: how do we maximize the justice in our society? My argument precedes this whole discussion. I strike at whether or not human beings find anything inherently valuable. I will argue that the one thing they do find inherently valuable is their own autonomy. But I do not want to deal with already established successful (however flawed and impure) democratic republics in order to prove my moral claims. Rather I feel my argument will be even more acute convincing and compelling if we look at a different society to the one we live in and are familiar with in the U.S., U.K, France, Germany, etc. Rather I need to demonstrate that each and every human being can arrive at the conception of autonomy, on his own, without being brought up in a society that already values it. This is the difficulty.
Thus, I look at a society that has no political restraints or barriers, that institutionally has the same values American democracy has, but whose people were not brought up valuing freedom and individual human dignity. If anything western political philosophy has proceeded on the assumption that liberal ideas are inherently important, because the theoreticians already agree that they are. So how do we arrive at a compelling argument for the Romanian (as well as the Iraqi, Russian, Hungarian, Afghan, etc.) people (who were raised to value something completely different) to embrace their own autonomy and become pro-active members of society in determining their individual fate? We can attribute our modern conception of autonomy to Kant. First, I need to explain how Kant arrived at this unique view and why it is legitimate for all of mankind. We need to understand what freedom meant for Kant before we can apply it to a newly free society.

Establishing Autonomy

I turn to this man from Königsberg to assist me in my attempt to help the newly free societies all over the world. Although Immanuel Kant never left his corner port-city of Prussia his entire life, he had an unparalleled insight into human nature. Kant proposes that mankind can arrive at an universal ethic through reason. In the Preface of his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant asserts that man must search for a pure ethic, one that can be reached through a priori reason and is not based on human nature, tradition and cultural circumstance. He asks, “Do we not think it a matter of utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral philosophy completely cleansed of everything that can be empirical and appropriate to anthropology?” (55) With the Groundwork, he seeks to “establish the supreme principle of morality.” (55)
Kant suggests that we suppose “there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute value, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws.” Kant proposes that the only thing with such absolute value as an end in itself is a human being. He states, “Man, every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will.” (90) Man’s rational nature provides the ground for a universal moral law and the legitimacy of the objectivity of principles. This is why the ‘categorical imperative’ is superior and has moral authority. We can conceive how to exercise the moral law in practice as follows:

“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” (91)

A simpler way to state it reads: Treat every man as an end in himself as opposed to as a means to your own end. Kant uses the examples of killing, restricting the freedom and infringing on the property of others to illustrate violations of this law in practice.
The ‘Formula of Autonomy’ arises as “the supreme condition of the will’s conformity with universal practical reason.” (93) What is most necessary for the will’s adherence to universal reason is that the law originates in the individual person himself. In addition to being his own legislator, man must be the law’s author. Autonomy is the “Idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law.” Man’s will crafts the moral law and his reason ensures that he acts according to it. The individual is in complete control, as someone whose will is subject to the law “of which it can regard itself as the author.” (93) With autonomy, man can conceive himself as his own ruler. He has the ultimate authority when it comes to determining moral behavior.
Kant fully recognizes the existence of this “powerful counterweight of [man’s] needs and inclinations, whose total satisfaction he grasps under the name of ‘happiness.’” (70) He states that a conflict naturally arises betwixt the two (desire and reason), thus causing man to doubt the validity of the moral law. Man should be weary of always giving into his natural desires. Ignorance may be bliss. Being unaware of what constitutes moral behavior may excuse man from behaving morally, but this is dangerous. Kant admits, “Ignorance is a splendid thing, only it has the misfortune not to keep very well and to be easily misled.” (70) This ignorance can mislead man to give up his own autonomy and let someone else prescribe the laws of morality. In this case man would give into the natural inclination of submission and subservience. Or, this ignorance may mislead man to only behave in his own self-interest and influence him to infringe on the dignity of other men, by his insisting on providing a prescriptive morality of his own creation (that benefits himself, as a dictator does). In this case man gives into the natural desire for power. Refusing to recognize the categorical imperative is a violation of universal reason. This refusal out of ignorance of conscious choice can lead man to violate the rights of other men.
Autonomy is being the inner cause and source of your action. This is the practical relevance of autonomy: conceiving yourself as free. But Kant admits that no interests impels a rational being to obey the categorical imperative, so why then should he take an interest in morality? “Why should I subject myself to this principle?” (109) Kant recognizes that it is difficult to give an explanation as to why the worth attached to the categorical imperative should be greater than any other sensible interest. It is difficult to see how man finds his personal worth in being the author and subject of the moral law. What impels us to hold ourselves both free and subject to the principles law our will prescribes? Kant admits that to this question he can provide no “sufficient” explanation. But he suggests that this is not a difficulty for the universality of moral law. The categorical imperative’s validity does not result from man taking an interest in it. Rather man takes an interest in the law because it is already universally valid “in virtue of having sprung from [the freedom of the will] and so from our proper self.” (121)
So the superiority of autonomy as morality stems from its source in the individual himself, with the Idea of Freedom and the capacity to self-legislate. For Kant’s agents, “our autonomy is the source of our obligation.” (104) Kant’s metaphysic of morals comes from designating supreme authority to the power of reason. Autonomy is supremely valuable because it soars above every previous ethic. Kant abhorred the hyper-religious self-righteous Pietists that surrounded him in Königsberg. He found their hypocrisy and vast claims about how man should lead his life appalling. And as we can observe even more clearly today in our multi-cultural pluralist world in which everyone is connected through media, the internet and travel, man can believe very different things to be right and wrong. From Muslim to Christian to cannibalistic tribes in Papua New Guinea, mankind currently demonstrates his inability to come to a consensus on how he should live. Or even just go to a seminar on Moral Philosophy at Oxford. In a room full of experts on the subject, no two people agree.
I propose that it is a mistake to view this as a problem. Moral relativism is not an evil in and of itself. The fact of the matter is that people believe very different things and a vast variety of moralities exist today in practice. Religious and cultural practices differ all over the world. Tradition is very important. Custom matters to people. We can’t tell everyone to stop and live a different way. So I am not suggesting that that is what should be done. Rather this is my proposal: a universal ethic that is compatible with the array of ‘moralities’ we witness all over the world. Autonomy is the necessary premise for harmonious living between human beings. Let man believe what he wants to believe. If autonomy and the main central conclusion that Kant insists we draw from our own autonomy: the categorical imperative, are exercised, conflict could be avoided and the dignity of man would be respected. Treat every man as an end himself, rather than a means to your own end. Do not exploit people. Do not infringe on another individual’s freedom. If we can institutionalize this universal value that respects each individual man as an end in himself, we will have created a society in which ‘inhumanity’ as Glover calls it (25), can be avoided.
But what of the obvious difficulty concerning individuals who do not want to be autonomous? It is quite evident that these people exist all over the world. They are, in fact, the majority of human beings. Conforming to a group, and letting someone else make your decisions for you is easier than doing it for yourself. Whether that authority be the state, the church or your own parents, it is tempting to give up the responsibility of making your own decisions to someone else. Life is difficult. Having someone else tell you how to live it can make it more bearable.
Thus we need an ethic that transcends ideology. Ideology can be a trap for man because then he can act ‘in the name of ideology’ (something in itself better than man). In the name of ideology, he can negate life and behave inhumanely. When ideology is used in such a way, mankind is in danger. This has been demonstrated time and time again. From the Inquisition to September 11^th to the Holocaust to Stalin’s Genocide, man has destroyed man in the name of something better than man. Our ethic begins and ends with man himself. Thus a Kantian ethic is not an alternative to a Christian ethic or a Muslim ethic; rather it is the secular ethic that should presuppose every religious and cultural practice in a society. It is the necessary precondition for the harmonious existence of these diverse multi-cultural belief systems. And this goes for belief systems that are not even based on culture or religion.
Democracy is the form of government that officially recognizes and values the opinions and beliefs of every individual and every group. Freedom of speech, religious practice, etc. are guaranteed rights in the U.S. Constitution. In such a society, as we have in the U.S. and the E.U., we are necessarily exposed to an array of people who disagree with us. In these societies we value man’s freedom to choose. Man has a right to determine his own destiny. Man can choose to convert to Judaism if he marries a Jew, or, even, if he does not. A Jewish man can become an atheist or marry a Catholic or both. I suggest that our intrinsic understanding of this right to choose; of man’s freedom to lead his own life, is something promoted and cultivated in our society. Although some Americans do not understand or value freedom, their right to exercise it is embedded in the institutions that create the U.S. government. These laws protect American citizens from self-destructing. (As would happen in a Hobbesian state of nature.) Even if you choose not to be free, at least you were able to make that choice. What is to be avoided is when someone else takes that choice away, without asking your permission.
Kant bases his “Theory of Right” on the conclusions he draws concerning morality. Although he never wrote a comprehensive treatise on his political views, what he did write supports a democratic republican form of government. According to Hans Reiss in his Introduction to Kant Political Writings, “The term ‘republican’ in Kant’s writings could be interpreted to represent what nowadays is generally called ‘parliamentary democracy.’” (25) Kant felt that what need be preserved most of all is each individual man’s autonomy. He felt that man was at the greatest risk of an unjust ruler infringing on his citizen’s freedom. By creating institutions, which would foster a ‘kingdom of ends,’ man’s freedom will only be limited so that he does not violate another man’s freedom. As Kant states in his “The Metaphysic of Morals: the Introduction to the Theory of Right,”

“Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right.”
(133)

Thus maximum freedom for all is preserved. Man’s autonomy remains intact. No man should be more free than another, and no man should have more “right” than another. (Dicke, 119)
The concept of “right” is universal. Freedom is something that every person possesses and has equal potential to exercise universal reason in order to legislate. Since man knows the moral law according to universal reason, these maxims should extend to become constitutional law. The laws of morality become the laws of right and those are essentially Kant’s political principles. In this way, public law mirrors private law and man is still his own legislator. A constitutional government, with separate legislative and executive branches and a system of representation of the citizenry through voting, is the ideal form of government.
According to Kant, man has the ability to make his life worthwhile. Since each man has a different conception of happiness, what we all share should be a unified conception of what is moral: so that we can each pursue our respective view of happiness in peace. Man cannot exist in a vacuum writhing in his own petty intolerances and ignorance. Men have come to live together to create societies, which need governments to ensure the peaceful co-existence of individuals, families and larger communities. We are now at a point in time when we discuss the peaceful co-existence of nations, a discussion that Kant pre-empted in the late 18^th Century. Governance enforces a universal justice. Law is necessary to ensure the resolution of social and political conflict. Being an ideal of reason, Kant recognizes that the attempts at the realization of such a republican government may be imperfect. But, based on his discussions of history and the goal of progress, humanity moving towards this ideal is necessary.
Kant’s ethic not only has regional political implications, but international political implications as well. He ultimately envisioned a federation of free states, a forbearer to Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations and now the United Nations. This universality of the principles of right would be recognized throughout the world. Reimund Seidelmann in “The New Order of the European System of Security,” (147) views NATO and the formation of the EU to be two organizations that have attempted to achieve this status of federation of free states. Seidelmann proposes adherence to the motto: “Wandel durch Annäherung,“ a change by coming nearer. Becoming nearer in form and substance to the democracies of Western Europe will make “Europaisierung” (Europeanization) and democratization easier and able to achieve success more quickly. By being part of the community of nations who share a Kantian “Friedensbund” (bond of peace), the newly free societies of the former communist states approach a Kantian ideal federation of freedom and peace.
The “Cosmopolitan Argument” of Kant’s philosophy of history is based on his belief that grounded on autonomy, every man is a citizen of the world. Kant viewed history as a process constantly moving to a goal: the full development of the human culture. With respect to the biggest picture: the history of mankind, Kant stretches and talks about mankind as one, as opposed to his focus on the individual with respect to morality or the individual plus society with respect to politics. Kant held that “culture was not the result of individual effort, but was produced by mankind as a whole.” (Reiss, 36) In one way we can view the history of the world as entirely teleological and focus on the descriptive analysis we can do of the phenomena of nature. In another way, we can focus on the ethical goals of nature: as expressed and sought after by freedom, as made possible through man’s autonomy (his will and reason) that has a noumenal source. As Klaus Dicke says,

“From this perspective, the goal of history is called ‘perpetual peace’ through erecting and building a universal republic and cosmopolitan Order of Right.” (129)^[•]

So, culture, according to Kant, is the continuous reach and exercise (and perhaps even celebration of) this eternal freedom by mankind. With respect to a newly free society, perhaps an introduction of Kantian culture as a concept is in order. With respect to Romania, an entire re-definition of the word “culture” is necessary in order to transcend the nationalistic connotations and approach something that is compatible with human rights.
The institutions of a republican state enable “the [Kantian] moral character [to be] realized in legal arrangements.” (Reiss, 37) The establishment of such states (Romania, post-89) should make it possible for the full moral character of man to be realized. But here we encounter the precise problem this thesis aims to tackle: what of the individual who does not value or want to be autonomous? Kant advocates setting up a system of government that makes maximization of individual autonomy possible. Why should one value a system that promotes something one does not perceive to be valuable?

By “newly free society” I mean a society, which is brand-new to freedom. This society has no tradition of freedom, democracy, individual responsibility or respect for personal dignity. The current citizens of this society grew up under an oppressive government and were punished for any attempt to exercise individualism. The institutions that existed previously were tyrannical and promoted totalitarianism. The institutions that exist in the society at present are democratic in structure, but the people are unfamiliar with the exercise of personal freedom. With a citizenry unused to participating in government and naturally suspicious of politicians in general after years of political oppression, the newly free society finds it difficult to transition quickly to a culture of freedom. In this situation, the government is the least trusted institution. Political and societal corruption is still as rampant as it was under the dictatorship.
The citizen of a newly free society has little to no conception of his own value as an individual. Under totalitarianism, the citizen was taught the most important thing was the larger picture: the state, the ideology; the dictator. Man found his value in being part of something greater than himself. He does not value himself as an individual. Now, with a liberal democracy replacing an abusive dictator, this individual is not proud of himself. He does not respect his fellow citizen. He blames anyone and everyone but himself for his problems. He can accept no responsibility for his actions, or his current state of being. He does not recognize that he has the power and potential to improve his place in life. He does not recognize that he can make his life worthwhile. This citizen is not autonomous.
So, why should one be concerned with autonomy in a society where it does not appear to exist either theoretically or in practice? There are two answers to this key question:

The discussion on mentality demonstrated that throughout the past, the attempted democratic reforms in Romania were unsuccessful. Then it lacked the substance of a Kantian mindset. But, as I just described, the mentality that Romanians generally possess is perfectly understandable from a historical perspective. What currently plagues Romania’s attempt at democratization remarkable resembles what crippled her attempt 70 years ago: corruption, suspicion and fatalistic apathy. The mentality has remained the same. Present-day Romanians admit that what they need most is a “change of mentality.” The ideal of a Western liberal democracy functioned on a drawing board in the Parliament in Bucharest, but its actualization throughout the rest of the country could not be realized. If the form did not work then, how can we expect that structure (of a liberal democratic republic modeled after the “West”) to work now? If the mentality is still awaiting a Kantian makeover, can we not just throw our hands up in the air and say, “We give up! What works in theory does not necessarily work in practice!”
Kant anticipates such an objection to his principle of right and his theory of autonomy. Hence he addresses this issue in an essay entitled, “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice.’” Upon re-reading this text, I am left with two key words: possibility and hope. Kant staunchly defends the proposition that what is valid in theory, is also valid in practice. He denies the legitimacy of the argument that experience should discourage someone from pursuing a valid theory. The proposal that one should abandon theory because we have not been able to witness its fruition in practice is dangerous and “does great harm if applied to matters of morality, i.e. to moral and legal duty.” (63) Kant claims that “all is lost if the empirical conditions governing the execution of the law are made into conditions of the law itself.” Kant’s subsequent analysis demonstrates why allowing experience to trump theory is harmful to the individual, states and all of mankind.
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant has already demonstrated how one’s adherence to the moral law is man’s ultimate end. Kant insists, “The true value of morality consists precisely in the purity of its concept.” (69) The consequence of violating duty is appearing “despicable and culpable in our own eyes,” the eyes that have seen the light of enlightenment: those that have recognized the moral law. Natural desire and inclination do not give laws to the free will, whereas duty does.
Kant suggests that it is entirely possible that “no recognized and respected duty has ever been carried out by anyone without some selfishness or interference from other motives.” (69) Kant even supposes that such an instance will never happen in the future! He says, “Perhaps no-one will ever succeed in doing so, however hard he tries.” (69) Perhaps Kant’s conception of morality is so purely ideal that it is practically completely unattainable. Man might be too susceptible to letting his own natural desires concerning happiness leak into a motivation, even if it involves moral duty. Kant admits this can happen.
Kant recognizes that his morality demands a lot of mankind and he sympathizes with the empirical fact that man is not naturally inclined to be rational, autonomous and moral. But, he states, “It is the death of morality if we make it our maxim to foster such motives, on the pretext that human nature does not permit moral purity.” (69) We can still be “aware of the maxim of striving for moral purity” even if it is so strenuous that even the most moral people have difficulty actualizing it. Kant asserts we should still strive to realize the theory, even if we experience discouraging realities of mankind’s behavior in practice. As he admits, “Historical experience has not proved the success of our ethical doctrines.” (72)
So what can man do to further increase the likelihood of behaving morally? In “What is Enlightenment?” Kant discusses the process of becoming enlightened, thus educating oneself about free will and autonomy. As Kant admitted (and has already been discussed in the section on Enlightenment) it is a gradual process. The light-bulb going on is the realization of what the moral law actually is. This insight, of how man ought to behave according to moral reason, i.e. what the moral law actually prescribes, is the first step down the path of becoming a moral (thus autonomous) human being. Possessing a good will requires continuous effort. Kant states,

“If man were frequently enough reminded so that it became a habit for him to [conceive of] virtue (duty) in its complete purity and made a principle of private and public instruction always to use this insight, human morality would be soon be improved.” (71-72)

The ultimate goal, as Kant’s moral doctrine outlines, is achieving universal adherence and respect for the universal moral law. That goal may never be fully reached by anyone, but the striving for it and the attempting to attain it inspires moral behavior. Making it a habit to follow the moral law would make following the moral law more automatic, thus easier, and consequently morality would improve.
Kant does not deny the value of experience all together. He merely says that experience will not “help us escape the precepts of theory, but at most to learn how to apply it in better and more universal ways after we have assimilated it into our principles.” (72) Thus experience does not disprove the validity of theory, rather we should learn from it how better to apply the theory in practice. Thus we are not entitled to reject theory entirely as an unattainable ideal, such as a purely good will, but instead we must strive to achieve it as best we can, in practice.
In the conclusion of Part II, Kant points out that a Rousseau-ian “original contract” has never happened in practice. Although we may operate within a commonwealth as citizens with the assumption that such a contract has taken place, in fact every individual never signed such a thing. It is

“merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality. It can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the general will. This is the test of the rightfulness of every public law. For if the law is such that a whole people could not possibly agree to it, it is unjust; but if it is at least possible that a people could agree to it, it is our duty to consider the law as just.” (79)

The idea of reason (this theory) is necessary to preserve the freedom, equality and independence of man in practice. It is necessary to form the structure of the civil state accordingly to guarantee political right. With this principle in mind, of the universal public will (what will be best for everybody) we can do our best to achieve this ideal of freedom in practical society. If we refuse to consider the possibility of a universality of the principle in practice, it cannot motivate our actions to try to achieve it.
Thus the constraints of individual morality, and man’s ability as his own ruler, extends to the civil state in that political right is the public will, just as the categorical imperative legislates the individual will. As Kant states, “Whatever a people cannot impose upon itself cannot be imposed upon it by the legislator either.” (85)
According to Kant experience cannot provide knowledge as to what is right and wrong. That is a conclusion that we come to rationally, it is something we can a priori know. Natural freedom (freedom without coercion, constraint through political right) leads to antagonism between human beings due to their naturally conflicting desires and inclinations on account of their different conceptions of happiness. Political right has a binding force because it provides “an objective, practical reality” (86) which can legitimately constrain these natural inclinations and preserve man’s universal freedom, equality and independence. It is necessary to appeal to this objective principle in practice because otherwise there would be nothing to check man’s arbitrary will and antagonism would reign. “But if both benevolence and right speak out in loud tones, human nature will not prove too debased to listen to their voice with respect.” (87) The only thing that commands immediate respect through reason are the basic rights of man. To deny those because we do not see them respected in practice is begging for universal self-destruction.
With respect to the human race as a whole, does the evidence of its capacity for distasteful behavior convince us to give up on expecting it the human race to succeed at achieving moral goodness? Kant brings up the issues of progress and improvement when he asks

“Does man possess natural capacities which would indicate that the race will always progress and improve, so that the evils of the past and present will vanish in the future good?” (87)

Kant assumes that the human race is constantly progressing with respect to cultural matters and also is improving “in relation to the moral end of its existence.” The progress can be interrupted. Mankind can relapse into savagery. But the enlightened man knows his moral duty and even though, as Kant admits, “I am not as good as I ought to be or could be according to the moral requirements of my nature” (88), his efforts to be good and moral will positively “influence posterity” and will contribute to the “constant progress” of mankind.
History may give me cause to doubt my moral conviction. I might ask, “Why is it worth it?” But the shadows of the wrongs of the past do not have “the force of certainty.” Although the failure of mankind to behave morally (the failure of theory being successfully adopted in practice) may leave me with uncertainty, that uncertainty does not conquer the moral law. It is necessary to assume “for practical purposes that human progress is possible.” (89) If we do not assume this, then we deny the validity and universality of the moral end of human existence. Kant advocates this “hope for better times to come.” (89) Acknowledging the tragedies that man and nature can perpetrate in the world, “our spirits can be raised by the prospect of future improvements.” (89) Hope for the future can inspire man to behave better in the present. But this still requires “an unselfish will” because we will be long gone to witness the positive effects of our labor. Progress is slow and we must trust that our current efforts will influence long-term improvement.
Kant asserts that it is quite irrelevant if empirical evidence indicates that these hope-based plans would lack success. How could any scientific or humanitarian discovery be made if not for hope it was possible in the first place? In recent history we have Copernicus, Galileo, Isaac Newton and Albert Einstein to demonstrate this. Before the Wright Brothers invented the first successful flying machine, men had asserted that such an apparatus was impossible due to the unfavorably circumstances of physics. Time and time again, a discovery has been made, which greatly advances society, whose possibility had been written off by pessimistic doubters. Those who persevered and proved the doubters wrong had hope in the possibility of their efforts. The same must extend and apply to matters of morality and human behavior. The fact that history demonstrates how difficult it has been in the past should only provide more motivation to try harder.
Kant insists that this observation is also evidence to our moral improvement. He states, “We have reached a higher level of morality. We thus pass more severe judgments on what we are, comparing it with what we ought to be.” (89) The more critical we are of mankind’s past and present behavior demonstrates our self-reproach increasing “in proportion to the number of stages of morality we have advanced through during the whole of known history.” (89) Thus our disdain for past and present immorality should not disprove the value of Kant’s moral theory; rather it should demonstrate that man has developed a moral awareness. It demonstrates that human nature can be animated by respect for right and duty. (92) This awareness coupled with the belief that moral perfection is worthy of striving towards contributes to the constant progress and improvement of humanity. This progress is produced by each age’s love for the age itself, rather than past or present. (91) For lamenting about the wrongs of the past and thus giving up on the future, does not improve the present. Rather, we must recognize the wrongs of the past and hope for the future, which combined, motivate us to live morally in the present. This love for the present will affect perpetual progress towards a morally superior condition.
Thus, Kant “puts his trust in the theory of what the relationships between men and states ought to be according to the principle of right.” (92) Human beings are “earthly gods” who thus prescribe the laws for themselves and determine the right way to live life on earth. We thus must assume the possibility of moral improvement. Men might jump to say that what works in theory does not apply in practice, but we have not tried hard enough yet. We cannot give up hope. To do so is dangerous and destructive for the entire human race. As Kant says,

“I therefore cannot see it as so deeply immersed in evil that practical moral reason will not triumph in the end, after many unsuccessful attempts, thereby showing it is worthy of admiration after all. On the cosmopolitan level too, it thus remains true to say that whatever reason shows to be valid in theory, is also valid in practice.” (92)

In all three realms, individual, state and cosmopolitan, theory serves as the lighthouse, which the agent (as a ship) aims toward in practice. The theory is the goal, the destination, the beacon of light lighting the way, thus directing and influencing action. Just as the enlightened individual keeps attempting to achieve a good will (after he has seen the light, he needs to make an effort to behave accordingly with less and less internal conflict), the state strives to realize universal political right. To give up on the theory that outlines right and wrong, e.g. to willingly ignore the North Star (as the indicator for which direction is “north”), because it has been very difficult to obtain in practice is the last thing mankind should do.
With respect to Romania, I hope that the above discussion demonstrates why the two key words “hope” and “possibility” are particularly relevant to this newly free society. A change of mentality requires adopting a hopeful attitude that abandons its former fatalism and apathy, and views the moral improvement of society as possible. Then a Kantian substance to the democratic form can be cultivated through the gradual enlightenment of the public.
I began this thesis by discussing the global picture and Kant’s idealistic vision of the peaceful coexistence of nations and peoples. My investigation, although focused on a particular region in Eastern Europe, extends to the problems currently faced by newly free societies all over the world. Man’s struggle for self-determination continues, from Africa to the Middle East back to my own neighborhood in Durham, North Carolina. Immanuel Kant believed humanity needs to have faith in theory, in order to successfully affect its realization in practice. In a shrinking world ablaze with hate and confused by religious-cultural difference, we need to recognize the value and legitimacy of a universal ethic. We must take responsibility for the education of our children, the spread of ideas, the promotion of democracy, the advancement of freedom, the advocacy of human rights and, thus, hope to create the conditions in which enlightenment can flourish. It is possible.

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^[•] The quotes from the text, Republik und Weltbürgerrecht: Kantische Anregungen zur Theorie politischer Ordnung nach dem Ende des Ost-West Konflicts, are my own translations from the German into English.