Reflections on Durkheim in Hong Kong

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Abstract
Written specifically for a broadly international – cross-civilizational – sociological readership, the article analyzes Durkheim’s concept of anomie, relating it to the Western civilizational framework. It argues that, given this derivation, the applicability of this, possibly the most powerful explanatory sociological concept may be nevertheless limited to Western civilization alone and suggests that, with China becoming more relevant to the Western world, sociological theory as such may have to be reconsidered. The concept of civilization is clearly delineated and the fundamental differences between the Western monotheistic and Chinese civilizations are briefly outlined.

Keywords
anomie, China, civilization, Durkheim, monotheism

As a teacher of sociological theory, I must once and again return to Durkheim. Every time I reread him, I find passages which I did not notice before and which increase my appreciation for this great mind. And so it happens as I review The Division of Labor in Hong Kong, preparing for a discussion of anomie in a seminar at Lingnan University. A digression on science in “The Anomic Division of Labor” catches my attention. Durkheim writes, ‘[science] is not wholly contained in the few propositions that it has definitely demonstrated. Beside this present-day science, consisting of what has already been acquired, there is another, which is concrete and living, which is in part still unaware of itself and still seeking its way: beside the results that had been obtained, there are the hopes, habits, instincts, needs, and presentiments that are so vague that they cannot be expressed in words, yet so powerful that occasionally they dominate the whole life of the scientist. All this is still science: it is even the best and major part of it, because

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the truths discovered are very few in number beside those that remain to be discovered, and, moreover, to master the whole meaning of the discovered truths and to understand all that is summarized in them, one must have looked closely at scientific life whilst it is still in a free state, that is, before it has been crystallized in the form of definite propositions. Otherwise one will grasp the letter of it and not the spirit. Each science has, so to speak, a soul that lives in the consciousness of scientists. Only a part of that soul takes on substance and palpable forms. The formulas that express it, being general, are easily transmissible. But the same is not true for that other part of science that no symbol translates externally. Here everything is personal, having to be acquired by personal experience…’ (Durkheim, 1964:362-63).  

I quote this at length because here Durkheim lets us into his personal experience and any attempt to sum up or even paraphrase what he says would detract from the weight of these lines. In this passage, Durkheim is engaged in a conversation with himself, he exposes his scientific soul, attempting to understand what is happening in the mind as science (definite propositions) take external, palpable and transmissible, forms. Clearly, at this moment he sees science – and by extension, one may infer, all of culture – as two interconnected processes, one occurring in the consciousness of a scientist, where it is still unembodied, ‘in a free state,’ the other, explicitly symbolic, ‘crystallized’ in definite propositions, expressed in words and formulas, for everyone to see, in a public cultural space. He sees science – by extension, culture -- therefore as one process on two levels: individual and collective. It is the inner process, occurring in the mind (remember, French does not have an equivalent term and must use âme, ‘soul,’ to refer to it) that he considers to be the best and major part of science. It is in the soul, in the consciousness of the scientist, that science lives, where it is created. One who does not understand this will grasp only the letter of science, not the spirit of it, or, in other words, will encounter only its dead remains.

This remarkable passage contradicts the tenor of *The Division of Labor in Society* and of Durkheim’s sociological vision in general, which attributes all human creativity to the collective consciousness. Later, in *The Rules of Sociological Method*, he would concede to the individual – in a footnote! – the role of the active element in society, but this activity is not to be equated with creativity (Durkheim, 1964:xlvii).  

Suicide would make evident at least some of the considerations for the prioritization of the collective consciousness above the individual. For polemical purposes – to claim the sui generis reality of ‘society’ for the empirical science of sociology -- Durkheim is abandoning the understanding of the autonomous individual to biologically-inspired psychologists of his day and decides to focus exclusively on society and the individual only as created by it (Durkheim,1951). In *Elementary Forms*, he would postulate that man, i. e., the mind, is double, part of it defined by collective consciousness and part by biology; only the former is of interest to a sociologist (Durkheim, 1965:29). The social individual thus is denied cultural autonomy. Society, Durkheim insists throughout, is a reality, but a mental reality, not a material one. But, in his advocacy of the empirical science of mental reality, he forgets his early insight that, at least insofar as science (for instance, his science, seeking to understand the nature of man) was concerned, it is precisely this autonomous, creative, part, consisting of ‘instincts, needs, and presentiments that are so vague that they cannot be expressed in words’ was the ‘concrete and living’ one and that crystallized collective representations – formulas – that could be shared because they were easily transmissible, unless constantly mediated by it, were only dead letter.

The rest of us often forget this too. To be reminded of it constantly one must cultivate introspection and be conscious of the unconscious work of interpretation and understanding that goes on in our minds as we participate in the cultural process and keep it alive. Such self-
observation makes one more sensitive to signs of it in others and encourages reading as conversation with, and participation – of course, only to a certain extent – in the personal experience of the author, which is what I am doing in this instance with Durkheim. Some contexts, on the individual and the collective levels of the process, are more conducive to this than others. For instance, there is no doubt that working on the problems of Mind, Modernity, Madness⁵ made this passage from The Division of Labor much more salient to me: I understand why I did not pay attention to it earlier.

The context on the collective level of the cultural process is the time we inhabit. This is precisely what the younger colleague and interlocutor of Durkheim, Marc Bloch (another great mind), meant by ‘time’, when he defined history as ‘the science of men in time’ (Bloch, 1953:27).⁶ In this sense, time necessarily involves cultural space: in Hong Kong, I live in a time qualitatively different from the time inhabited at the same point on the clock by my husband in Boston. (Granted one lets Hong Kong into one’s mind, of course: otherwise, it is possible to live in Hong Kong for years without for a moment leaving Boston.) And Hong Kong, it so happens, is a spot particularly conducive for pondering the relationship between ‘the truths discovered’ and ‘those that remain to be discovered,’ while mastering ‘the whole meaning of the discovered truths’ and understanding ‘all that is summarized in them.’ It is also a particularly good spot for reflecting on Durkheim.

A Western social scientist in Hong Kong is encouraged to think about China. What do we know about China? A colleague of mine says, ‘huge amounts are known. We have studies of ancient Chinese philosophy and law; we have histories of the Chinese dynasties, we have ethnographies of Chinese religious experience, we have political analyses of the major transformations of China since 1949, we have biographies of Chinese personalities. Foreigners are living in China and writing about it, just as the missionaries and colonists did before them. The Chinese themselves are writing about China.’⁷ This is true. These discovered truths are many. But how much do they help us to understand China? The appearance of China on the intellectual horizon of Western social science is both very recent and very sudden. With the notable exception of Max Weber,⁸ and of political scientists focused on communist regimes outside the Soviet Union, China was not included in our “world” until the 1990s. Only when it has turned its unexpended nationalist energies to competition with the leading Western powers for prestige (so far mainly expressed as economic competition, but the rest is sure to follow soon), we, so to speak, woke up to its existence. Suddenly Mandarin is a regular offering in Western universities; linguistic proficiency is an essential first step in gaining access to an unfamiliar culture. One can predict, therefore, that in a few years a generation of scholars linguistically equipped to study China will come of age and there will be numerous Sinologists among sociologists, political scientists, economists, historians, and so on, as earlier in all these disciplines there were Sovietologists.

But, though numerous truths were discovered about the Soviet Union when it was a popular focus of study, Sovietology came and went without teaching us much: that’s why the collapse of communism and everything that has happened in the former Soviet sphere of influence since has been to Western scholars and policy-makers they advise a surprise. Information is not much use, if one cannot make sense of it. Even big data, on its own, does not create understanding. The reason for this is clear: already Hume explained why, in distinction to the accumulation of information, science, which is the ever-greater mastering of its meaning, can only be achieved through deduction. Induction is never conclusive, no matter how big is the reservoir of data, but
even one counterfactual is enough to reorient and increase the ‘content of truth’ of a deductive explanation (Hume, 1748).9

The emergence of China as part of the social science world changes the outlines of this world and, very likely, its nature too. For not only the reservoir from which we can glean our data is becoming significantly bigger, allowing additional specializations (an urban sociologist, for instance, in the US now can find a niche in Beijing, in addition to other exotic locations, such as Rio de Janeiro or Moscow). But, possibly and even probably, it is becoming different, and thus, adding a new reservoir for counterfactuals, allows for the re-examination of our fundamental assumptions. This is probable because our understanding of humanity itself has been formed without any connection to this huge chunk of it: for the entire course of its existence, from the moment (the birth of Jesus Christ) we identify as its beginning, the so-called West has developed independently from China, not connected to, not influenced by its traditions, and never involved with it in an existential conflict. Neither friend nor enemy, China has been less relevant to us than the Moon (also our constant neighbor), like the Moon, seen but unobserved.

Because of the ultimate dependence of scientific, or objective knowledge of empirical reality on the logic of no contradiction, which makes contradiction by evidence, or counterfactuals, the ultimate check on proposed explanations, all explanations that go beyond descriptions and, rather, attempt to make sense of reality (that is, to answer not only the question how something happens but also why it happens) must rely on comparisons. In social science, nobody knew this better than Durkheim, the most systematic of all social scientists. However, naturally, even when intentionally casting about for counterfactuals, social scientists limited themselves to the world they were familiar with: only comparisons within this – our ‘Western’ world – presented themselves to us. China’s totally unexpected decision to become relevant: to influence us, to be noticed by us and taken into consideration, revealed to us that our world, which we equated with social reality as such, is only a part of the world, representing only a particular form of social reality.

The implications of this go beyond the possible limitations of even the most powerful and generally applicable of our explanatory concepts, which we must now suspect to apply only to our particular form of empirical social world, instead of pointing to the mechanisms operative throughout it. In addition, the rise of China, which brings a comparable self-contained world to our social science consciousness, forces us to regard our world as one among several possible worlds, and not as a necessary, natural development. This means that we could not have understood it (i.e., ourselves) fully and thus correctly before this, even though our most powerful and generally applicable explanatory concepts have captured some of it, that is, despite all the truths we have indubitably discovered about it in the course of the two millennia of desultory observation, and a century-and-a-half of systematic observation in the framework of social science. For the first time, we are in a position to raise ultimate empirical questions about ourselves: why our world exists at all? what makes it what it is? Thus, among many arguably more important things, the rise of China creates an opportunity for social science, specifically sociological, theory to renew itself, and there is no better point to start than with the greatest and most systematic sociological theorist – Durkheim.

It is quite likely that behind Durkheim’s dismissal of the individual as a creative element in the reality sui generis of collective consciousness was the conviction that the cultural space with which he was familiar was the world and that this world was the only possible one. It is hard to
imagine, indeed, what else could have justified such consistent structuralism (in the sense of the stress on such material parameters of collective reality as size of the group, volume and density of social interactions, and even geometrical shape of settlements) and such reliance on biological evolution as an explanatory principle for a scholar who insisted that his subject was both a reality of its own kind and a mental, rather than material, reality. Like life, Durkheim must have thought, society is a process of development from simple to ever more complex forms, naturally started in different locations by the combination of elements: living cells coming into being with the combination of their chemical elements, and social cells appearing with the coming together of several individuals. The process is fundamentally linear and its orientation from simple to complex forms cannot be changed, stages reached depend basically on the number of interacting individuals per quantity of material resources; forms on the same level of complexity differ but slightly (by analogy to the same biological family), but forms on different levels of development exhibit profound differences. Thus, comparison between forms on different levels of development (i.e., mechanical vs. organic solidarity, segmented vs. organized society) is the optimal analytical tool. Collective representations are the ways interactions between elements at every given stage of development are regulated. Societies of different levels of complexity call for different regulations. One would not be surprised to find the statement, ‘Each people has its own morality which is determined by the conditions in which it lives,’ in German Ideology by Marx. Regulations/collective representations in different species of society on a given level don’t have to be identical, but must be functionally equivalent. The goal of this research program is to establish what sort of regulations is called for at a given stage. Thus, although the subject is consciousness and it is different collective representations that we seek to understand, we are not interested in them for their own sake, but only because of the rather limited functions they are supposed to fulfill: contribute to solidarity, to social health. Clearly, it is not the infinite variability of culture that attracts here our attention. If it were, we would have to turn it to the mind (the individual) as well, because there is no way to explain it without taking into consideration the autonomy and multiplicity of minds. As it is not, we can disregard the individual.

It is interesting to ponder to which extent all of us, social scientists, are misled by Auguste Comte’s ill-conceived term ‘sociology,’ which, from the outset encouraged science of humanity as a reality sui generis to concentrate on society, and not on culture. Society is a corollary of numerous forms of life; our variety of great apes is not more social than the species of wolves or geese. Culture, i.e., transmission of our ways of life by means of symbols, rather than genes, by contrast, sharply distinguishes humanity from all the other animals. Durkheim’s attention also might have been diverted from culture by the ongoing Culture vs. Civilization dispute in which Culture was appropriated by German Romantic nationalists as a particular (Ur)virtue of the German nation and France associated with the Enlightenment-worthy universalist notion of Civilization. However that may be, social scientists have been since Durkheim’s days preoccupied with material structures and quantitative relations which called one or another aspect of culture into being and generally accepted the belief that it reflected stages of economic development and served material social interests. As to civilization, it has not been much discussed and certainly has not been used as an important explanatory concept in cultural analysis. The rise of China invites such use.

For Durkheim, evidently, civilization is the progress of society from lesser to greater complexity, expressed in functional differentiation. Causally significant differences between societies are quantitative, societies differ in degree, rather than in the nature of their civilization.
They necessarily begin from a savage or lower state, in which social life (thus health) is assured by the ‘likeness of consciences’\(^\text{12}\): their members resemble each other in their thinking and acting (‘ways of thinking and acting’ is Durkheim’s definition of social institutions\(^\text{13}\)), and are represented in collective consciousness, fundamentally, as cogs in a machine, an undifferentiated mass. That’s why Durkheim characterizes their solidarity, the bonds that hold the members of such societies together, as mechanical solidarity. The individual is simply unknown in them. ‘In fact,’ he says, arguing against those who claim that such societies do not sufficiently value the individual and restrain his freedom, ‘if in lower societies so small a place is given to individual personality, that is not because it has been restrained or artificially suppressed. It is simply because, at that moment in history, it did not exist.’\(^\text{14}\)

With the progress of civilization, the nature of the bonds that hold societies together changes and social life is based on the division of social labor. Civilized societies are complex societies, in which functions are minutely divided, ensuring social diversity and interdependence of society’s members. (This functional diversity and interdependence is stressed by the name Durkheim chooses for the social bonds in societies so advanced: organic solidarity.) Everyone has a special function, thus nobody is supposed to be like others but must cultivate one’s individual personality. In this manner, society creates the autonomous individual. Summarizing the argument in the first part of *The Division of Labor*, Durkheim writes:

‘Social life comes from a double source, the likeness of consciences and the division of social labor. The individual is socialized in the first case, because, not having any real individuality, he becomes, with those whom he resembles, part of the same collective type; in the second case, because, while having a physiognomy and a personal activity which distinguishes him from others, he depends upon them in the same measure that he is distinguished from them, and consequently upon the society which results from their union... The cooperative society... develops in the measure that the individual personality becomes stronger. As regulated as a function may be, there is a large place always left for personal initiative. A great many of the obligations thus sanctioned have their origin in a choice of the will. It is we who choose our professions, and even certain of our domestic functions. Of course, once our resolution has ceased to be internal and has been externally translated by social consequences, we are tied down. Duties are imposed on us that we have not expressly desired.’\(^\text{15}\)

How innocent this sounds in 2017 – ‘even certain of our domestic functions’! And what a difference in mood between ‘duties that we have not expressly desired’ and Weber’s ‘iron cage’ (Weber, 1976:181),\(^\text{16}\) though the phenomenon to which both refer is exactly the same. Durkheim’s mood soon changes: it becomes somber and one won’t see much enthusiasm for advancing civilization in *Suicide*. But this affects the tone of the argument, not its logic.

Before the World War the Enlightenment spirit in France is strong. And so, as he writes *The Division of Labor in Society*, there is no doubt in Durkheim’s mind that civilization means progress, that it certainly makes human life richer, if not necessarily happier. *The Division of Labor* is a defense of modernity, a response to the Romantic complaints about its dehumanizing effects, coming from Germany. Paradoxically – given Durkheim’s ontological collectivism – it is a spirited defense of (the ideology of) individualism. ‘It would doubtless be extravagant,’ writes Durkheim,
To state that psychological life begins only with societies, but it certainly only becomes more widespread when societies develop... So long as societies do not attain a certain size or a certain level of concentration, the sole psychological life that is really developed is one common to all the members of the group, one that is identical in each individual. But as societies grow larger and above all more densely populated, a psychological life of a new kind makes its appearance... Individual personalities are formed and become conscious of themselves. ... the ever-increasing distance arising between the savage and the civilized man has no other origin. It is doubtless a self-evident truth that there is nothing in social life that is not in the consciousness of individuals. Yet everything to be found in the latter comes from society. Most [the choice of the word is curious] of our states of consciousness would not have occurred among men isolated from one another and would have occurred completely differently among people grouped together in a different way. Thus they derive not from the psychological nature of man generally, but from the way in which men, once they associate together, exert a reciprocal effect upon one another, according to their number and proximity.17

This vision of social reality is fundamentally materialist, which surprises one anew every time in the work of the person so singularly dedicated to proving that consciousness is an empirical reality calling for a positive science of its own. This materialism is fundamentally structural, i.e., stressing the organization of the elements, rather than their biological nature, which is dismissed as irrelevant, also surprising in the work of a person clearly very influenced by recent developments in biology and guided by the principles of evolutionary theory. To these contradictions, quite stunning at the core of Durkheim’s remarkably methodical and lucid thought, one must add the implication of moral relativism (not to be confused with cultural relativism, which one might expect, but of which in The Division of Labor there is not a whiff, since this book analyzing collective consciousness, is not at all interested in culture), striking against the background of Durkheim’s evident ideological commitment to the French Enlightenment values. Piled one upon another, these logical problems derive from one and the same problematic premise, in itself so unwarranted yet so common as to make one reject common sense (Durkheim indeed strongly cautions against it in The Rules of Sociological Method)18 the belief in the historical priority of isolated, unsocialized human animal and in the possibility of abstracting the individual and society one from another and studying either of them in isolation!

The Conclusion of The Division of Labor leaves no doubt as to Durkheim’s opinion of advanced, modern, civilized society: ‘Today,’ he writes, ‘there is in all healthy consciences a very lively sense of respect for human dignity,’ and then even more explicit and more confused: ‘If, moreover, we remember that the collective conscience is becoming more and more a cult of the individual, we shall see that what characterizes the morality of organized societies, compared to that of segmented societies, is that there is something more human, therefore more rational, about them... The rules which constitute it do not have a constraining force which snuffs out free thought; but because they are rather made for us and, in a certain sense, by us, we are free...’19 And yet, it is at this point that he returns to anomie.

Anomie is introduced in the book’s chapter on the abnormal forms of the division of labor simply as a descriptive term for a lack of regulation. ‘If the division of labor does not produce solidarity,’ says Durkheim introducing it, ‘it is because the relationships between the organs are
not regulated; it is because they are in a state of anomie.\textsuperscript{20} This lack of regulation is temporary, it is not implicit in the division of labor as such, and therefore requires an \textit{ad hoc} explanation. Normal division of labor produces solidarity. Anomic division of labor is abnormal. It is not characteristic of civilized, or modern, societies. Durkheim explains:

Since a body of rules is the definite form taken over time by the relationships established spontaneously between the social functions, we may say \textit{a priori} that the state of anomie is impossible wherever organs solidly linked to one another are in sufficient contact, and in sufficiently lengthy contact… Yet if, on the other hand, some blocking environment is interposed between them, only stimuli of a certain intensity can communicate from one organ to another. [The argument relies on the analogy with the biological organism and the logic here is that of synaptic conditioning in the nervous system.]… new conditions of industrial life naturally require a new organization. Yet because these transformations have been accomplished with extreme rapidity, the conflicting interests have not had time to strike an equilibrium…\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{Anomie}, therefore, is akin to growing pains, something like a baby’s teething, and it will be naturally resolved, as will other problems, simply because it must be so. An advanced, civilized society, in addition to regulation, requires justice and equality. Durkheim writes in ‘Abnormal Forms’: ‘Because the segmental type is effaced and the organized type develops, because organic solidarity is slowly substituted for that which comes from resemblances, it is indispensable that external conditions [of the division of labor] become level… Just as ancient peoples needed, above all, a common faith to live by, so we need justice, and we can be sure that this need will become ever more exacting if, as every fact presages, the conditions dominating social evolution remain the same.’\textsuperscript{22}

He reiterates in the Conclusion: ‘it is not enough that there be rules; they must be just, and for that it is necessary for the external conditions of competition to be equal.’\textsuperscript{23} What is necessary is, Durkheim argues, correspondence of social inequalities to natural inequalities of individual propensities, or, in effect, equality of opportunity. Social inequalities independent of natural inequalities are unjust, and it is they that cause anomie. Equality, justice, and anomie are, therefore, tightly connected. He argues:

It has been said with justice that morality – and by that must be understood not only moral doctrines, but customs – is going through a real crisis. What precedes can help us to understand the nature and causes of this sick condition… Our faith has been troubled, tradition has lost its sway; individual judgment has been freed from collective judgment… What we must do to relieve this anomy is to discover the means for making the organs which are still wasting themselves in discordant movements harmoniously concur by introducing into their relations more justice by more and more extenuating the external inequalities which are the source of the evil. Our illness is not, then, as has often been believed, of an intellectual sort…\textsuperscript{24}

The problem, in other words, is of a structural nature: ‘As we advance in the evolutionary scale, the ties which bind the individual to his family, to his native soil, to traditions which the past has given to him, to collective group usages, become loose… Of course, the whole common conscience does not, on this account, pass out of existence. At least there will always remain this
cult of personality, of individual dignity… which, today, is the rallying point of so many people. 25

The applicability and the explanatory scope of the concept of anomie expands tremendously after The Division of Labor. In Suicide, anomie emerges both as a much more serious problem and as a problem of an intellectual sort, or at least a problem of thinking. It is still the issue of regulation, however not of the regulation of relations between functions or organs but of ideas in the mind of an individual; it is characteristic in the first place not of the economic sphere, but of certain (recent) forms of religion and collective consciousness; expresses itself most strikingly not in the conflicts between employers and employed, but in suicide and, as such, while it may be still seen as the sickness of a society, actually destroys individual lives. It also no longer appears to be temporary but seems to be inherent in modern societies insisting on individual dignity and freedom of choice. In this respect, it seems to increase alongside the progress of civilization. It is difficult to read Suicide as a consistently structuralist text. Egoistic suicide may indeed be interpreted as reflecting the character of social structures in the sense of measurable features of social relations. But the causation of anomic and altruistic suicides is clearly cultural: it is the inconsistency between collective representations (ideas, beliefs, etc.) that motivate people to take their own lives in the former case and the specific nature of collective representations in the latter. If anomie in Suicide can be seen as a structural problem, it is only in the sense that it is systemic: it can be found throughout (in all the structures/kinds of relationships of) the modern society.

Does this mean that Durkheim realized that his claim that society is an autonomous reality in some respects analogous to life implied a totally different causation from that of biology and thus was extremely unlikely to be structural and functional, as he presumed in The Division of Labor, but necessarily (because of the empirical characteristics that distinguished humanity from other forms of life) led to the focus on the symbolic historical process of culture and the mind, intimated in his early work by the remarkable passage with which this discussion began? This is not certain. The preface to the second edition of The Division of Labor, written after Suicide, rather suggests that Durkheim was confused, yet held fast to his structuralist assumptions. He wrote there in the very beginning, greatly exaggerating the place of anomie in the earlier book:

We repeatedly insist in the course of this book upon the state of juridical and moral anomy in which economic life is actually found. Indeed, in the economic order, occupational ethics exist only in the most rudimentary state… if one attempted to fix in a little more precise language the current ideas on what ought to be the relations of employer and employee, of worker and manager, of tradesmen in competition to themselves or to the public, what indecisive formulas would be obtained!... It is this anomic state that is the cause… of the incessantly recurring conflicts, and the multifarious disorders of which the economic world exhibits so sad a spectacle. 26

Anomie was moral anarchy, and it was wrong to equate it with individual liberty, Durkheim said, and oppose liberty to regulation: ‘That such anarchy is an unhealthy phenomenon is quite evident, since it runs counter to the aim of society, which is to suppress, or at least to moderate, war among men, subordinating the law of the strongest to a higher law. To justify this chaotic state, we vainly praise its encouragement of individual liberty. Nothing is falser than [this] antagonism too often presented between legal authority and individual liberty. Quite the contrary, liberty (we mean genuine liberty, which it is society’s duty to have respected) is itself
the product of regulation. I can be free only to the extent that others are forbidden to profit from their physical, economic, or other superiority to the detriment of my liberty. But only social rules can prevent abuses of power. It is now known what complicated regulation is needed to assure individuals the economic independence without which their liberty is only nominal.

We may note, parenthetically, how well this definition of liberty, as liberty from, the demand for which may well be satisfied by equality (not unlike Marx, Durkheim does advocate ‘perfect economic equality’ at birth), rather than as individual autonomy, fits into the still ongoing over a century later debates in the West. From the theoretical point of view, even more noteworthy are the purely metaphysical assumptions of society’s aim (to prevent war) and duty (to respect genuine liberty), so obviously contrary to the spirit of positive science and always arresting in Durkheim’s work.

Because of the vastly increased importance of the economic sphere (which was earlier consigned to the lower classes) in modern society, Durkheim continues, lack of regulation in it becomes ‘a notable source of general demoralization.’ This demoralization is a very severe problem that cannot be waved aside by comparing it to a childhood disease; Durkheim explicitly recognizes that his argument in The Division of Labor that ‘functions, when they are sufficiently in contact with one another, tend to stabilize and regulate themselves… is incomplete. For,’ he argues against himself, ‘if it is true that social functions spontaneously seek to adapt themselves to one another, provided they are regularly in relationship, nevertheless this mode of adaptation becomes a rule of conduct only if the group consecrates it with authority. A rule, indeed, is not only an habitual means[?] of acting; it is above all, an obligatory means of acting; which is to say, withdrawn from individual discretion.’

The way to correct the argument, therefore, is to make it even more structural (and metaphysical, unscientific). One may ask, why does not the group consecrate its rules with authority in the first place, if this is what must happen, given the assumptions? Durkheim does not provide an answer, but, frustratingly for his admirers piling a contradiction upon contradiction, he insists:

[Society] has the chief interest in order and peace; if anomy is an evil [this is after Suicide!], it is above all because society suffers from it, being unable to live without cohesion and regularity. A moral or judicial regulation essentially expresses, then, social needs that society alone can feel; it rests in a state of opinion, and all opinion is a collective thing, produced by collective elaboration.

At some length he argues that the corporation should be the group consecrating moral regulations with the requisite authority, adding that it is ‘destined’ to play this role, which eliminates all need for an argument, and insists again:

A group is not only a moral authority which dominates the life of its members; it is also a source of life sui generis. From it comes a warmth which animates its members, making them intensely human, destroying their egotisms. [We shall see this thought developed in The Elementary Forms.]… A nation can be maintained only if, between the State and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into a general torrent of social life.
As Durkheim himself notes, this is the same argument he proposed in the conclusion of *Suicide*.  

This means that the concept of *anomie*, which I owe to Durkheim, and particularly to the way it is employed in *Suicide*, is not really Durkheim’s concept. I considered it the most powerful explanatory concept in all of sociology, a functional equivalent of gravity in physics, one might say, applicable throughout the social universe, and I relied on it often to gain understanding of the most disparate phenomena. I understood *anomie*, however, as capturing an aspect of an essentially and emphatically cultural process, an understanding which Durkheim never subscribed to, even though so much in his writing suggested it. To my mind, *anomie* is the condition of systemic cultural inconsistency, due to which a culture cannot provide individuals within it with sufficient guidance in life, leaving them, disoriented, to their own devices. To the extent that all human social structures are cultural, this is a structural condition, a characteristic of a social order, society. Its effects, though, are psychological, and it is precisely the necessary connection of the surrounding culture and the individual mind in *anomie*, the fact that it is at once a social and a psychological condition, that makes the concept so powerful. The mind and culture represent the same process on two levels: the individual and collective. The mind is culture on the individual level, individualized culture or ‘culture in the brain.’ A culture, in turn, can be called a ‘collective mind’; it could be called a ‘collective consciousness,’” if Durkheim did not believe – as he clearly did – in the existence of a collective brain, which makes it an epiphenomenon of a material reality!  

Ironically, the question “What is in this Durkheim’s concept Durkheim’s?” is a question of the relationship between culture (cultural process on the collective level) and the mind (cultural process on the individual level). For, clearly, I have not invented *anomie*: I took it from Durkheim’s books, that is, from the reservoir of shared culture existing outside of my mind. The way I interpreted *anomie*, that is, what this Durkheim’s concept suggested to, the meaning it took on, for me, happened in my mind, and it is this, modified by me concept that I then employed in my work. Collective consciousness (culture) does not of itself imprint itself upon the individual, even on the unreflective individual: it needs the cooperation of the individual to do so. Creative minds actively contribute to the formation of collective consciousness, modify the meaning of representations taken from outside, and, in turn externalizing these modifications, carry on the cultural process on the collective level. What is remarkable about Durkheim is how very suggestive his thought is, despite logical contradictions and empirically unwarranted conclusions. His ideas are fruitful: they bear fruit in other minds, acquire in them existence independent from their source and may even lead to conclusions he could never have reached himself. What is Durkheim’s in *anomie* in my mind is, first of all, the word, and, second, the application of the concept specifically in *Suicide*. This is what inspired my concept, which is not his and which, I imagine, he would not accept.  

The concept of *anomie*, as already mentioned, appeared to me to be the most powerful concept in sociology, applicable throughout human social reality. The discovery of the importance of *civilization* made me question its universal applicability. In my mind, civilization has been growing steadily in importance since I first began to study Japan in the late 1990s. It became clear to me rather soon that the differences between Japan and all the cases I compared it to in the course of my studies of nationalism (England/Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, and the United States) went far deeper than all the profound differences among these cases. This meant that there was an additional level of culture beyond the level of specific (national in this case) cultures, which united certain specific cultures, despite the
differences between them, and distinguished them from other (sets of) specific cultures – the level of civilizations. In order to understand any culture fully, therefore, it is necessary to take this level into consideration as well. The study of Japan drew my attention to the set of cultures to which it belongs: above all, China. The simultaneous rise of China naturally increased this emerging interest and reinforced my conviction in the importance of cross-civilizational studies.

It is unnecessary here to delve into the arcana of the ways in which the word ‘civilization’ was used by those who used it before. Suffice it to say that I don’t use it to refer to the unilinear process of human development from the savage roots to modernity, be it determined economically, as for Marx, or demographically, as for Durkheim. Obviously, unlike Huntington, neither do I use the term as a synonym of specific, however broad, traditions. I define civilization as a distinct, self-enclosed, self-sufficient, and self-generating variant of cultural reality, that – for all intents and purposes independently of other such variants with which it may coexist – has developed over multiple generations, multiplying in the process its interlacing traditions. It is an enduring, self-sufficient culture, with codified first principles, resistant to outside influences; mega- or meta-culture; mega- or meta-tradition, allowing for the existence of numerous specific cultures and traditions within the same set of first principles. In this context ‘enduring’ means spanning many generations: at least five centuries; ‘first principles’ refers to binding, unquestioned values and ideas that determine existential experience, and ‘codified first principles’ means principles embodied in the written language and transmitted through language itself.

A remarkable quality of civilizations is their cultural magnetism, which explains their easy incorporation of surrounding non-civilizational cultures (i.e., cultures lacking the above features), even if these are militarily superior, and their own absolute resistance to cultural incorporation, even when they are militarily weak, which, even in cases of outright conquest, makes colonialism in the common sense of the word impossible in their regard. This means that, when civilizations meet, they react to each other as similarly charged magnets, mutually uninterested in all involvement.

This definition is in some respects similar to the one proposed by Marcel Mauss, Durkheim’s nephew and student, in 1930. In ‘Les Civilizations. Elements et forms,’ Mauss wrote:

Civilizations, like the elements that compose them, have their own individuality, their fixed forms, and their mutual oppositions. This is what characterizes civilizations: these borrowings, these commonalities, and also the limits to these contacts and these commonalities, including the refusal to maintain contact with other civilizations. We can therefore propose the following definition of civilization: namely a combination of phenomena that is sufficiently large, sufficiently numerous, and sufficiently important as much through their quantity as through their quality. A civilization is a combination of societies sufficiently vast in number that present these phenomena; in other words, a combination that is sufficiently large and distinctive that it can signify and bring to mind a family of societies. Moreover, this family derives one reason for its existence from certain facts: both current facts and those that are historical, linguistic, archaeological, and anthropological. These facts create the belief that these societies have been in prolonged contact and are related to each other… in a word, a sort of hypersocial system of social systems: now this is what we can call a civilization.
Therefore, we can speak of civilizations that are more or less extensive and civilizations that are more or less restricted. We can further distinguish levels of civilizations, their concentric circles, and so on. [These] allow us to classify civilizations and even to make hypotheses regarding their genealogy, to the extent that the dialectical logic of their divergences and convergences represents one of the best means for establishing the existence of families of people. The result of all this is that every civilization is at the same time a physical area and a social form. Indeed, every civilization has its boundaries, its center and its periphery… we only perceive the extent of a civilization’s space because we have the impression that the phenomena that form this or that civilization are of a type that is unique to themselves and to the particular civilization. Thus the definition of this form is essential and the two terms of the definition are mutually allied…

So let us define these two terms. The form of a civilization is the total (the summa) of the special aspects revealed through the ideas, practices, and products which are held in common or more-or-less in common by a certain number of given societies, the inventors and carriers of this civilization. We can also say that the form of a civilization is all that gives a special aspect to the societies that form this civilization, making them unlike any other.

A physical area of a civilization is the geographical extent of the distribution of the total phenomena held in common (more or less complete in each society within the area) and which are considered as characteristic or as typical of this civilization. It is also the totality of the ground surface of the societies having the representations, practices, and products that form the shared patrimony of this civilization…. One can call layers of civilization the given form taken by a civilization of a given area within a given period of time.

The tone of this text is that of an oral presentation at a workshop, with Mauss reaching his conclusion – the definition of civilization – as he speaks. He is thinking aloud. The context in which he is thinking is anthropological and his examples are mainly taken from Polynesia. Thus, it is understandable that the emphasis is on the immediate impression the cultures in question create (including space, common practices, and material culture), rather than on the recorded history and first principles (modes of thought and existential experience) codified in written language; and on the sum total of the commonalities that can be described, rather than on the principles behind what can be described. This anthropological definition focuses attention on cultural commonalities and differences beyond those that characterize specific relatively simple cultures. It is essentially static and the main mechanism of cultural transmission it presupposes is that of geographical diffusion. It leaves unanswered why different civilizations would limit contact with others and refuse to borrow from them.

In distinction, the historical definition that I propose is dynamic, applies to commonalities and differences of systems of very complex societies, and allows to explain the cultural magnetism and the self-sufficiency of these systems. The size of a civilization is measured in time at least as much as in space, which implies the possibility of creative development of the same principles, including complete transformation in practices and material culture that expresses them. And the mechanism that ensures (or arrests) the spread of a civilization is itself cultural, i.e., pertaining to the give-and-take between the mental process on the individual level (the process of the mind) and the symbolic process on the collective level. Specifically, it has to
do with the formation of the mind under the influence of language that carries specific principles, which necessarily shapes the existential experience in their terms and makes it quite impossible to think outside of their framework, thereby easily absorbing minds not so formed (that is, minds formed outside of a framework of codified first principles) and at the same time erecting walls of fundamental incomprehension between civilizations.

Seen in this light, there are three civilizations that coexist in today’s world: Chinese civilization, Indian civilization, and ‘Western’ civilization which, if we analyze its enduring codified first principles, should properly be called the monotheistic civilization. The Chinese and Indian civilizations, between them, probably contain about half the world's population (with the countries of China and India alone containing 2.5 billion people), leaving the other half to us. This makes the monotheistic civilization the most populous of the three. It is also the most widespread (extensive, Mauss would say) with societies on all five continents, while the other two civilizations exist only in Asia.

Peers in age -- all three civilizations are between five and six thousand years old -- they followed different historical trajectories, among which ours seems to be the most eventful. For at least first three thousand years of its existence it was so small that only the steady development through the millennia of its foundational traditions and the codification of their first principles justified calling it a civilization. Its spread, which began only two thousand years ago -- when both the Chinese and Indian civilizations already reached their territorial limits -- first, under the aegis of Christianity, then both Christianity and Islam, however, was extremely rapid. Yet, it was only during the last 500 years that the monotheistic civilization expanded to the Western Hemisphere and most of Africa. It was the addition of South American and African populations that made our civilization the most populous of the three.

The spread of the monotheistic civilization in the last two thousand years of its existence has been aggressive: none of the cultures it came into contact with outside the other two civilizations (which during these two thousand years remained almost entirely self-contained) were able to resist its thrust. At the borders of the other civilizations, however, this thrust stopped. Like two similarly charged magnets that repel each other, existing side by side for two millennia, the Chinese and the monotheistic civilizations could as well be populating different planets. Until very recently we simply did not include China in our concept of ‘the world.’ The space of the Indian civilization, by contrast, has been repeatedly invaded by Islam, and parts of it were for centuries under Muslim rule. In distinction to the Chinese civilization, which, were it not in fact, would still seem to be walled off from monotheistic influences, the Indian one was able to recede before them like oil before metal: it was pliable, but it remained immutable. It is significant that as a major factor in shaping individual and group identities in India, dividing Indians' political commitments, and pitting Muslim Indians against the huge majority of others, Islam emerged only when absorbed in national consciousness.

While the drive behind the monotheistic civilization during the first millennium and a half of its aggressive spread was the spirit of religious proselytism, much of its expansion in the last 500 years was motivated by, and at the same time spread, national consciousness. Until the middle of the twentieth century nationalism developed almost exclusively within the monotheistic civilization: the only nation outside it was Japan. Humiliated by the forcible opening of their country, self-sufficient and completely uninterested in the rest of the world, to the West, Japan's unusually large upper class of the samurai, to reassert their dignity, decided to reconstruct their society on the national model of the invading Westerners. This reconstruction was astonishingly rapid and successful. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the little
Asian country without natural resources, which less than half a century earlier did not have firearms to defend itself and was satisfied with a subsistence economy, entered both military and economic competition with the major Western powers. Propelled by nothing but its national motivation, committed to the dignity of the nation above all else, it has been counted among these major powers ever since.

Yet even as a nation, Japan did not join the Western civilization. Fully aware of Western military and economic superiority, architects of Japanese nationalism considered Western peoples barbarian and looked down on their religion and moral values. Their motto was ‘Western knowledge, Eastern values’; they wished to learn Western methods of doing things, not to pursue the same goals. The Japanese never measured themselves by Western standards, in other words, never wanted to be ‘like’ the West. And conscious of being unlike, they did not envy the West and did not develop resentment, the major psychological factor both in the formation of nationalisms and behind international relations in our civilization.

The distance Japan kept between itself and the world which would force itself on it channeled its people's energies and they acquired Western knowledge very quickly. War, they learned from the West among other things, was the surest way of making a nation respected. Thus, just forty years after American ‘black ships’ sailed into Uraga Harbor, Japan invaded and defeated China. China's defeat at the hands of its erstwhile ‘dwarf’ vassal, far more humiliating for the Middle Kingdom than the irritations caused by contemptible ‘yangguizi’ – ‘foreign devils’ (the Japanese were called devils too, ‘ribenguizi’, but the Chinese did not consider them foreign), sowed the first seeds of Chinese nationalism (Zu and Wei, 2016:225-41). With the even more spectacular victory over Russia, ‘the Great White Power,’ in 1905, hailed all over South-East Asia, Japan opened the way to the spread of national consciousness throughout the two Eastern civilizations -- or its true globalization – and it was the spectacular entry of China into competition with the West that woke us up, at last, to its existence.

One can distinguish several layers – to borrow the term in the sense of ‘the given form taken by a civilization of a given area within a given period of time’ from Mauss – within the monotheistic civilization. To begin with, there are the levels of monotheistic religion itself: the fundamental layer of Judaism and the layers of Christianity and Islam. Then there is the secular layer of nationalism (or modernity). Remarkably, this secular layer is also emphatically monotheistic, because the core principle of One God comes accompanied by other first principles, encoded in all our written languages since the first redaction of the Hebrew Bible, and these principles continue to define our existential experience and mode of thought. Posing ONE GOD ruling over everything, Jewish monotheism posed that objective reality represented a universe, i.e. one, consistently ordered, entity. (It is clear, for instance, that a polytheistic culture allowed for no such conception and, therefore, channeled thought and feeling in very different directions, as would any non-monotheistic symbolic system.) The conception of objective reality as an ordered universe, in turn, dramatically increased the mind’s sensitivity to cognitive disorder and so made possible the ascendancy of logic based on the principle of no contradiction – the Aristotelian logic, so called after the one who later formalized it. For people who expect consistent order from reality, contradictions represent a major irritant, and indeed logic has been one of the determinants of the existential experience – i.e., of life as lived – for the many successive generations in this civilization.

In our civilization, we experience life in binary terms: everything, for us, has its contradiction, its opposite. We think and feel in terms of good vs. evil; of right vs. wrong; of life vs. death; of material vs. spiritual; of mind vs. body, and in each such case what is other than
something is by definition the contradiction of this something. Thus the Leninist principle ‘Those who are not with us are against us,’ for instance. This goes far beyond affecting the characteristic forms of our formal thought in philosophy and science (e.g., our tendency to think in discrete categories and absolutes, preference for analysis over synthesis). Logic of no contradiction imprints itself on our very history, shaping the dynamics of every aspect of private and public life among us, from personal relations in a couple to domestic and international politics. And it is this that makes anomie a central element of these dynamics and therefore such a powerful explanatory concept. Anomie is structural contradiction, a condition of cultural inconsistency, and contradictions are indeed found behind every dramatic change in ideas, thus every instance of dramatic social change, every pivotal event in our history.

But what about cultures that do not privilege logic and are not bothered by contradiction?

Our concept of individual also derives from monotheism (specifically, from the Bible). A discrete category, the human individual is an autonomous actor. The Bible is a story of named individuals who compose a people; it is their individual actions that create history. God creates individuals, a man and a woman, in his own image, with a free will – the will to make choices. They can obey or disobey Him, for example. This explains the centrality of the concept of freedom for us, and it also implies the concept of individual responsibility, which is the foundation of the concept of justice in our civilization. The value of social equality emerges as the supreme social and political ideal only with nationalism, but it is also presupposed in the idea of discrete autonomous individual. Durkheim takes all these notions for granted; it is this that explains the presupposition of the pre-social, unsocialized human behind his discussion of solidarity and the fact that the connection of justice to equality in modern society with which he is personally familiar appears to him self-evident.

We have been defined by monotheism and never considered the possibility that the centrality of logic of no contradiction in our lives might be an historical, cultural phenomenon, peculiar to our civilization or that there can be complex, highly sophisticated cultures which lack the discrete category of individual, or the concept of freedom: in accordance with monotheism’s universalism, we believe all these products of monotheism to be characteristic of human nature, hard-wired, so to speak, into human brain. Forced at last to face other civilizations, we come to understand our civilization better, to understand what makes us think the way we think, imagine and experience reality the way we imagine and experience it.

Among the governing principles in Japan, China, and India is the principle, which in Japanese is pronounced ‘ji ji mu ge’ and in Chinese pinyin ‘shi shi wu ai’; it may be translated as ‘thing, thing – no boundaries’ (事々無礙). From our point of view, this is the very contradiction of the principle of no contradiction. In the framework of ‘shi shi wu ai’ there are no absolutes, everything is relative: there is no absolute good and no absolute evil; life seamlessly transforms into death, right into wrong, mind into body and the other way round. Nothing is purely positive or negative and everything is positive only in moderation. This makes one’s existential experience dramatically different from the one predicated on the assumption of the logically ordered unified world. In the world of ‘shi shi wu ai’, the concept of anomie loses its explanatory power -- in most cases it does not apply at all. This does not mean that anomic, i.e., contradictory, situations do not exist there; they do. But it means that they do not reach the dimensions of systemic cultural inconsistency, necessarily affecting broad strata of population, which is what makes anomie a powerful social force. Neither does this imply that the Chinese, Japanese, or Indians are not good at logical thinking, which obviously they are; it implies only that, while employing logic in formal scientific and philosophical discussions, which would be
impossible without it, they do not let it permeate the rest of their existence. Their political conduct, for instance, is likely to be based on principles entirely different from ours. Not privileging thinking in discrete categories and absolutes, they do not conceive of individual as an autonomous actor. This may explain why the very concept of freedom appeared in Japanese only in 1862 and in Chinese even later, though the word (the characters) used to render it has existed for centuries – meaning ‘selfishness’; why justice is not tied to equality in China; and why epidemiologists at the World Health Organization consistently find such surprising-for-them low rates of schizophrenia and depressive disorders (the central symptom of which is problematic sense of self) in South-East-Asian countries.\textsuperscript{41}

Hong Kong, which was ‘handed over’ to China only some twenty years ago, remains a fascinating kaleidoscope of Chinese and Western elements. It never became a mixture, for these elements do not mix and are clearly distinguishable, but their friendly coexistence eases a ‘monotheist’ gently into the otherness of the Chinese civilization, provoking no defensive reaction against and encouraging the appreciation of differences between us. Still, it is hard to think about the limitations of our perspective, the dependence of our best creative efforts on our cultural context, without deep regret. Which brings us back to Durkheim: was he, after all, right about the relationship between collective and individual consciousnesses?
Notes


3 Emile Durkheim, Suicide, Book I, ch. 1, “Suicide and Psychopathic States.”


7 Peter Baehr, in a conversation at Lingnan.


9 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Section 4, part I.

10 DoL, op. cit., p. 239.

11 For a review and summary of the concept’s use in social science, see Rethinking Civilizational Analysis (Said Arjomand and E.A. Tiryakian, eds.), SAGE Studies in International Sociology, 2004.

12 DoL, op. cit., p. 226 and throughout the discussion of mechanical solidarity.

13 Rules, op. cit., ch. 1 “What is a social fact.”

14 DoL, op. cit., p. 194.


18 Rules, op. cit., first two paragraphs of the preface to the first edition.

19 DoL, op. cit., pp. 400; 407-408.

20 Ibid., p. 368.

21 Ibid., pp. 368, 370.

22 Ibid., p. 388.

23 Ibid., p. 407.

24 Ibid., pp. 408-409.

25 Ibid., p. 400.

26 Ibid., pp. 1-2.

27 Ibid., p. 3.

28 Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid., p. 5.

Ibid., pp. 26, 28; Elementary Forms, op. cit., in particular Book 2, ch. 7.

DoL, op. cit., p. 29.


See discussion in Mind, Modernity, Madness, pp. 64-65.


This can be found in Arjomand and Tiryakian, op. cit..


Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 15-17.


I am grateful for this reference to Professor Takeishi Chikako of Tokyo’s Chuo University.

In Japanese, “freedom” is translated today as jiyu /jiyuu (自由). This word first appeared in an English-Japanese dictionary in 1862; in the second edition of this dictionary in 1867, some other options for translating "freedom" were suggested, but jiyu became the standard translation because Fukuzawa Yukichi used it in his book, Seiyo Jijo (Seiyo=The West, Jijo=Conditions, Seiyo Jijo=Things Western), in 1866. There Fukuzawa commented: "'freedom’ doesn't mean being selfish and unrestrained by law. Rather, it means autonomously accomplishing things you can while relating to other men freely within the nation. No word as yet exists in Japanese for this concept." The word jiyu, however, existed in Ancient Chinese and old Japanese, but both meant "selfishness." (This reference is also courtesy Professor Takeishi.); regarding relative unimportance of equality, see Zu Guo-xia, op.cit.; re epidemiological rates, WHO World Mental Health Survey Consortium, R. C. Kessler et al., JAMA 291 (2004):2581-2590.

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